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SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The Specia1ists' Meeting on "Fue1 Fai1ure Detection and Location in
LMFBRs" was held at the Kernforschungszentrum Kar1sruhe, Federa1 Repub1ic
of Germany, on 11-14 May 1981. The meeting was sponsored by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the recommendation of the
International Working Group on Fast Reactors (IWGFR). It was presided
over by S. Jacobi (General Chairman) of the Federa1 Repub1ic of
Germany and was attended by 28 participants from Be1gium, the Federa1
Repub1ic of Germany, France, India, Japan, the Union of Soviet Socia1ist
Repub1ics, the Uni ted Kingdom, the United States of America and two
international organizations, CEC and IAEA.
The purpose of the meeting was to review and discussmethods and
experience in the detection and location of fai1ed fue1 elements and to
recommend future deve1opment. The technica1 sessions were divided into
five topica1 sessions as fo11ows:
1. Reactor Instrumentation
2. Experience Gained from LMFBRs
3. In-pile Experiments
4. Models and Codes
5. Future Programs
During the meeting papers were presented by the participants on
behalf of their countries or organizations. Each presentation was
fo11owed by an open discussion in the subject covered by the
presentation. After the formal sessions were comp1eted, a final
discussion session was held and general conc1usions and recommendations
were reached. Session summaries, general conc1usions and recommendations,
the agenda of the meeting and the list of participants are given be1ow.
SUMMARY
Session 1. Reactor Instrumentation
Fo11owing common subjects were covered in presentations of specia1ists
from DeBeNe-countries, France, India, Japan, the Union of Soviet Socia1ist
Repub1ics, the Uni ted Kingdom and the United States of America:
1. Ro1e of fai1ed fue1 detection systems as safety systems and
monitoring systems
2. Design considerations for DND and cover gas monitoring systems,
state-of-the-art of cover gas monitoring systems
3. Location techniques and systems (sodium samp1ing and gas tagging)
4. Inspection methods
5. Ca1ibration methods
2At the present time every LMFBR has a fuel failure detection and
location equipment to achieve a high availability and it is recognized that
DND monitoring is necessary for the safe operation of an LMFBR plant.
The Ge-Lip-spectrometer is considered to be the most adequate system
for cover gas activity measurements, and, from the point of view of French
specialists, the further development of instrumentation for cover gas
activity measurements does not need large efforts.
Different views were stated by specialists of different countries on
the purpose of cover gas activity measurements. French specialists believe
that the purpose is contamination measurements rather than characterization
of fuel failures. Japanese specialists consider these measurements as a
means for failure characterisation and for preventing serious consequences.
German specialists emphasize the importance of the work on detection,
location and characterisation of fuel failures during early stage of LMFBR
programme development when there is insufficient experience of operation
LMFBRs with defected fuel pins.
It was acknowledged by the participants of the meeting that DND
monitoring is an efficient tool to detect and to follow the evolution of a
cladding failure. Investigations of this method are carried forward in many
countries.
Three methods are available now for location of failed fuel
subassemblies: (1) sampling systems; (2) gas ta~ging and (3) sipping
systems. The first two methods are weIl adapted to the removal of a failed fuel
subassembly as soon ä~ ene DND signal reaches the determined level. The
last method should be used if the reactor operation with several DND
failures in the core is accepted. ~n this case a sipping system
enables the contaminatioll of the primary circuit to be limited.
The following items were agreed to be important for future
international information exchanges:
1. Requirements for parameters of DND and cover gas monitoring
systems (response time, sensitivity, scram/alarm levels)
2. Criteria for selection of various methods of cover gas monitoring
3. Upgrading sensitivity for DND systems
4. Performance of location systems used during a reactor operation
(gas tagging, sodium sampling)
5. Performance of wet/dry sipping methods used during reactor
shutdown
6. Consideration of cost reduct~on for location systems
7. Calibration methods
3Session 11. Experience Gained from LMFBRs
The discussion indicated that in the reactor under operation the DND
and fission gas detection systems provide sufficient information about
the moment the failure occurs, the number of failures, the failure type
(gas leak failure or failure with fuel-coolant contact)*, the failure
evolution and, approximately, the surface area of fuel-coolant interaction.
This information enables the primary circuit contamination by fission,vto -
~ucts to be estimated provided ~ha~ weIl developed calculations methods and
experimentally determined fission products release fractions are used. On
the other hand, up to now there is no satisfactory information about the
fuel release.
Practically all count ries have an experience of operation with failed
fuel pins, however, the questions of localising, characterisation and
possible further irradiation of failed pins are also subjects of interest.
The fuel failures accompanied by the fission gas release were
detected by the gas activity measurement systems and by DND systems. In
most of the cases fission gas montiors indicated fuel failures earlier than
DND monitors. The t~me of delay of the DND-signal in comparison with the
fission gas detection depends on the composition of the fuel, the fuel
element construction, irradiation manner (especially burn-up) and it is
within the range from several hours to several weeks.
In the field of location of failures the tagging methods and the
DND-location systems during reactor operation and dry sipping methods
after reactor shutdown are considered as very successful.
The characterization of fuel pin failures is possible to some
extent, but additional information from in-pile experiments and from
reactor operation experience is needed. Two criter~a for taking adecision
about the reactor shutdown were presented - fission products contamination
level and fuel escape out of the defected pin.
Different kinds of control systems are under development in many'
countries and the main objectives of such development are further
improvements of the efficiency and time response of fuel failure detection
systems, used in LMFBRs.
* h d" k d 'IS ort es~gnat10n: Lea er an DND Fa1 ure
4Session 111. In-Pile Experiments
Loops and reactors are used for experiments with failed fuel pins.
1. On loops:
Japanese specialists use FPL, SIL and GGTF loops
for instrumentation qualification required to commission JOYO and MONJU
reactors, as well as for the investigation of behaviour of fission
products in sodium. Some results obtained can be used for any reactor
(for example, temperature dependence of the diffusion of fission gas from
sod ium to' the cover gas).
British, French and German specialists have obtained important results by
irradiating defected fresh fuel pins in the SCARABEE loop instrumented with DND
monitoring system. Concerning the recoil model, a much larger surface
than that of the defect should be considered and the time of delay within
the pin should be taken into account.
DeBeNe-specialists used the SILOE loop (in cooperation with CEA) to
study the evolution of defective fuel pins in normal operating conditions
and MOL loops to study the evolution of pin bundles in accidental
conditions. In both cases very high DND signals were reached.
2. On reactors:
From EBR-2 US Specialists obtained results that can be compared with
the SCARABEE results: k-factors for recoil model were more than 30 and
delay time (" ag ing") was about 10 sec.
USSR philosophy of defected pins irradiation is related to the
contamination consequences of failures. A computerized Ge-Li r -spectro-
meter has been developed on BOR-60 for investigation of this problem.
Special functioning conditions allow to measure on-line the contamination
of sodium coolant by Cs and I isotopes at a level 104 to
10 5 less' than the background level due to Na24.
In France a new DN counter able to work at a high temperature and
~ -level is under development. Its sensitivity is expecte~ to be less
than that of the modular systems. Research work is devoted to the study
of failure evolution up to very high DND signals and fuel release.
It was agreed that future in-pile experiments will concern the
development of instrumentation (towards its simplification and decreasing
cost) and the investigations of the evolution of the fuel failures up to
massive fuel release.
5Session IV. Models and Codes
Five papers were presented in this session: - 'Studies on Modeling to
Failed Fuel Detection System Response in LMFBRs' by the Japanese
delegates; , Models and Codes' by the UK delegates; 'Delayed-Neutron
Signal Analysis Techniques' by the US delegates; 'Plans MARGO, VOLGA and
PARKA' by the French delegates; and 'Fuel Failure Detection and Location
in Fast Breeder Reactors' by the German and Interatom delegates. Subjects
discussed in the session were diverse in nature and ranged from empirical
correlations of DN signal data on the one hand to discussion of a
whole-system code for fission-product transport in LMFBR on the other.
Four papers dealt with various ways to interpret DN signals from
breached pins, and only one with trying to model the behaviour of fission
gas and DN precursors in a whole reactor system, whereby the expected
response of detection instruments might eventually be determined. Only
one paper attempted to treat real signals from an operating LMFBR, the
others being limited to interpretation of signals in small test loops
(where, of course, systems effects on signals are probably small and may
therefore be ignored). This diversity of approach indicated there is much
work yet to be done before signals from breached pins may be interpreted
in real time for LMFBRs. Nevertheless, considerable progress has been
made world-wide towards such an interpretation.
There was unanimous agreement at this session (and throughout the
meeting) that DN precursors release from breached pins with exposed oxide
fuel is not by recoil alone, but by a likely combination of recoil,
knockout, and radiation-enhanced and thermal diffusion. These mechanisms
combine to produce an enhancement of DN signal, or k factor, which is
dependent on many local fuel parameters, including roughness, porosity,
burnup, temperature and temperature gradient, and the presence of
microcracks and sodium reaction products. Derived parameters,
the release to birth ratio (Ri/Bi) and the alpha ratio [-ln(~i/Bi)/~ln~i)]
have proved useful to interpretation of DN release. Increase in DN signal
and defect size on test pins in loops appear correlatable toa distinct
change in the alpha ratio. There is hope that such a formalism may
eventually be ,used to indicate the severity or character of a cladding
breach.
Once DN precursors and fission-gas isotopes leave a breached pin,
their activity which is eventually measured by the detection systems
appears critically dependent on their transit path through the primary
sodium and, for fission gas, on disengagement from sodium and movement
through the cover-gas space. Mixingin both media is important. Modeling
of this transport - which is important to determine the required
sensitivity of failure detectors, and to set prudent shutdown limits for
activity in operating plants - is at an early stage world-wide; it lacks
much required data, and is very dependent on the particular reactor plant
configuration. This is an area, perhaps, where most future work is needed.
6As a major agreement of the session, and as an aid to fruitful
exchanges in this area in the future, it was decided that a commonly
agreed upon data set for DN-precursor and daughter isotopes should be
adopted by all countries represented at this IAEA specialists' meeting -
a possible set is attached.
A further proposal to aid a meaningful exchange of future information
lS to have a similar method used in all countries for the calibration of
DN monitors. That is the use of a common type of recoil source of an
agreed-upon composition or nature.
Session V. Future Programmes
Future activity should be aimed at the improved safety and
performance of fast reactors.
Failed pin can potentially release fuel and it is necessary to know
the effect of this on the reactor system, e.g. this could lead to flow
reduction in the fuel bundle or to contamination of the circuit - the
importance of this in the circuit needs further study. Also failed fuel
can release fission products which could eventually cause significant
contaminationof the reactor circuits and thus complicate maintenance
procedures. As fuel failures are to be expected from time to time, most of whicp
will be innocuous, it is impQrtant that simple failures should pe readily
distinguished from these likely to cause problems. Further work iso
required to enable the in-reactor signals from failures to be known and
characterised. This must be done statistically from a large data base
using results both from in-pile loops experiments and from the reactors
operation experience. T6 support and interpret those studies the
development of models should be continued involving both theoretical and
supplementary experimental work on fission product release taking into
account chemical interactions of fuel, coolant, fission products and
cladding. Also transport of fission products in accident condition
requires further study.
This work is particularly important to assist in determining reactor
operating policies, i.e., whether or not failed fuel should be removed
immediately or at some future date.
Development of instrumentation to enable failed fuel detection and
location to be made cheaper, simpler and more reliable is to be encouraged.
Systems for particular reactor designs must be developed to meet
engineering considerations and sampling must be such that representative
samples are obtained quickly and allow all reactor sub-assemblies to be
adequately monitored.
The discharge of failed fuel has important econom1C aspects thus the
operating policies must take this into account.
7General Conclusions and Recommendations
1. It was recognized that the problems of the failed fuel
characterization and the failed fuel management are connected with other
fields and specialists in these fields should be involved to solve the
problems. The evolution of the cladding failure, and methods for direct
measurements of fuel release into the coolant could be investigated in
cooperation with specialists on sodium chemistry and metallurgy. The
policy of operating reactors with failed fuel should be disGussed not only
by specialists on fuel failure detection and location, but also by
specialists on reactor safety, economics, operation and management, fuel
performance.
2. It was recommended that a commonly agreed upon data set for DN
precursor and daughter isotopes should be adopted by all countries
represented at this specialists' meeting. A possible set was proposed by
US specialists.
3. A fruitful exchange of the future information obtained in different
countries could be organized if a standard method were used in all
countries for the calibration of DN monitors, including using of a common
type of a recoil source of an agreed upon composition or nature.
4. It was recommended by the participants of the meeting that a
specialists' meeting on "Contamination Problems in LMFBRs including
Contamination by Fuel " should be sponsored by the IWGFR in the near future.
5. It was also recommended that the specialists' meeting on "Fuel Failure
Detectiol1 and Loca.tion alld a Strategy of FailedFuel Management in U1FBRs" be
sponsored by the IWGFR in three or four years' time.
POSTSCRIPT
In accordance with the subjects of the meeting the participants elaborated
during the Sessions I to 111 the following tables. Although they are
tight connected to the items of the three sessions they are subtracted
from the presentations and presented on the next pages as a further
summarized result of the meeting.
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Survey of Failed Fuel Detection Instrumentation
Experience with Failed Fuel Elements
Test Facilities
Abbreviations
)0
TABLE I. SURVEY OF FAILED FUEL DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION
Related to Session I: Reactor Instrumentation
DND Loeation Scramtransit time aod sensitivity
..--. -
-
-----
Reactor Hain pipe By-pass spec .pipe Na-probe Gas Dry Wet other Autom. DND
work strip, sipping sipping scram
Rapsodie - 6-16 s 7 subass . no Exp. no yes
Phenix - 00 -30 s yes yes no no 00 yes
SPX - no 15 s 15 s no no no no yes
KNK I! 22 s 2 no 00 no no yes Exp. 00 yes
22 eps/em R
SNR 300 - 00 29 s 2 no no 00 yes no yes
2 cps/ern R
FBTR
- 20-30 s no no no no no no yes
JOYO -44 s no no no no no Exp. 00 no
MONJU <60 s no no no 00 no(?) yes(?) no yes
DFR - -20 s no 00 no no no no no
PFR - no 25 s 26 s yes no no no yes
CDFR - no -60 s 20 s yes no yes (?) no yes
EBR-I! - 18-20 s no no no yes (2h) no no 00 (adminis tr.
16 cpsl cm2R limit)
FFTF 27-28 s no 00 no no 00 no no no
CRBR 30-40 s 00 no no no 00 no 00 no
BR 10 - no no no no yes yes 00 no (adm. limo )
BOR-60 -30 s (U-23g~ 00 no 00 yes yes no no (adm. limo )
BN-350 3400 eps/g yes 00 no (adm. limo )30 s no 00 no no yes
BN-600 -60 s 00 no no yes yes 00 no
Cont. Tab. 1
Cover gas BlanketReactor
Ge or Variable Gaschro- Ion. Hass- Preci- Sein t. Tagging Xe- elements
Ge (Li) sensit. roategr. chamb. spectr. pit. counter adsorp.
Rapsodie no Volume yes yes yes 00 no yes no DND?
Phenix yes Volume yes yes yes no no part. no DND?
SPX yes no yes 00 no no 00 no DND?
KNK I! Exp. Geom./Coll. Exp. no no Exp. yes no Exp. DND?
SNR 300 yes yes no 00 00 00 no 00 00 DND?
FBTR no Volume yes yes no no 00 no no DND?
JOYO Exp. no yes 00 yes no Exp. Exp. DND?
MONJU yes(?) Volume no yes yes yes yes(?) yes no(?) DND?
DFR no Volume no no no 00 yes part.
PFR yes Dis tance 00 no no yes 00 part. no DND
CDFR yes yes? no 00 00 yes no part. 00 DND
EBR-I! yes Val. /Geom. no no yes no 00 yes yes DND?
FFTF yes Abs ./Col!. yes 00 yes no no yes yes no
CRBR yes Abs ./Col!. yes no yes 00 yes yes yes (Tag)
BR 10 yes Col!. no yes no yes yes no no no
BOR-60 yes Coll. no yes no yes yes 00 no no
BN-350 yes Coll. no yes no yes yes no no no
BN-600 yes Col!. 00 yes no yes yes no no no
11
TABLE 2. EXPERlENCE WITH FAlLED FUEL ELEMENTS
Related to Session 11: Experience from LMFBRs
Reae tor From Leaker to DND Failure
Number Detected Leaker Phase DND Phase Geom. Area (cm2)
by roin rnax roin max Recoil Area (cm2R)
Rapsodie 50 fai Ied Gas and DND hours < month same haurs same daYB
subass .
Phenix > 4 Gas and DND haurs < month same he urs same days
KNK II' Gas and DND 1.5 h 30 d roin. 18 d ~ 3.2 crn2R
JOYO na na na na na na na
DFR )0 months
PFR Exp. Gas and DND 1 rnonth month month 1 cm 2
EBR-lI - 20 Gas, Tagging haurs days
BR--IO several Gas and DND haurs days days
BOR-60 10 % Gas and DND 10 d 40 d 40 d
BN-350 nan
BN-600 nan
Cont. Tab. 2
From Leaker not to DND Failure DND Failure without Leaker Phase Repair
Reactor
Number De tee ted Time Number De tee ted Time GeoID.Area
by roin rnax by min rnax Recoil Ares
Rapsodie 20 Gas DND 0 some haurs yes, some-
at lew times no
power
Phenix > 2 Gas severa! 0 na
rr:onths
KNK II none none na
JOYO none none
DFR
PFR none none
EBR-II 90 - 100 Gas + days months
- 2 Gas + hours days yes (2)
Tagging Tagging
BR-IO ?
BOR-60 > 100 Gas up to 2 several DND
toonths
BN-350 10 Gas months none
BN-600 none none
12
TABLE 3. TEST FACILITIES
Related to Session 111: In-pile Experiments
Country Name Abbr. Location, open No. of pins
of the facility Reactor closed (minimax)
France exp. defect. fue! Rapsodie closed
Phenix
Scarabee 37
Eros
Volga
DEBENE ---~ Thermopump SILOE closed I
Mol 7C BR 2 closed 37
exp. open fuel KNK Ir open now J
rodia none
Japan Fission Product Loop FPL Toshiba Training closed U0 2 ballsReactor TTR
Cover Gas Monitor CGMTF JRR-3Test Facility open
UK Prototype Fast Reactor PFR open 19
USA Breached Fuel Test Fae. SLSF EBR-II 9/37
Fuel Performance Test Fae. EBR-II 9/37
Closed Loop Irradiation Ass. FFTF 37
USSR BR-IO, BOR-GO an,d BN-350 also used for in-pilE experiments
Cont. Tab!. 3
country
France
DEBENE
India
Japan
UK
USA
Surveillance
Na~ver gas
yes/yes
yes/yes
yes/no
yes/yes
yes/yes(Ar)
no/yes(He)
yes/yes
yes/yes
Main Objectives
eva! uation of exp. and oa t.
clad failures
evaluation of accidental bundles
allround
DND
allround
to study fission product deposition
to test cover gas monitors of various kinds
to test monitors to understand signals, DND and
fuel lass
ANL
CEA
HEDL
IA
LAU
JAERI
KBG
KfK
PNC
RRCK
SBK
SCK/CEN
SRIAR
UKAEA
BPTF
CGCS
CGMS
CRBRP
DAS
EBR-I!
FERD
FFTF
FFR
FPTF
GLASS
OLDU
OLMS
RAPS
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TABLE 4. ABBREVIATIONS
., Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne. l11inois
.. Commissariat a l'"Energie Atomique
00: Hanford Engineering Deve lopment Labors tory, Richland, Washington
• INTERATOM, Bergisch Gladbach, Gennany
.. International Atomie Energy Agency l Vienna
.. Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Tokai-mura
.. Kernkraftwerk-Betriebsgesel1schaft mbH, Karlsruhe
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
= Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation, Tokyo
.. Reactor Research Centre Kalpakkam, India
Schnel1brüter Kernkraftwerksgesellschaft mhR, Kalkar, Germany
:::l Studiecentrum voor Kernenergie!Centre BeIge d'"Etudes
Nucleaires, Mol, Belgium
.. Scientific Research Institute of Atome Reactors, nimitrovgrad
Uni ted Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
AMERICAN ACRONYMS
- Breached-Fuel Test Facility
- Cover-Gas Cleanup System
- Cover-Gas Moni toring Sys tem
- Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project
- Data Acquisition System
- Experimental Breeder Reactor 11
- Fuel-Element Rupture Detector
- Fast Flux Test Facility
- FERD-Flow Reduction (Test)
- Fuel Performance Test Facility
- Germanium-Lithium Argon Scanning System
- On-Line Distillation Unit
- On-Line Mass Spectrometer
- Radioactive Argon Processing System
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A GEN D A
Monday, 11. May 81
Bus from the hotels to KfK (every following day also)
Registration
8.30
9.00
9.30
9.45
10.00
10.30
Welcome
Opening remarks
"A REVIEW" and
Approval of the agenda
Technical remarks
Coffee Break
W. Marth, KfK, Head
Fast Breeder Project
V.F. Efimenko, IAEA
S. Jacobi, KfK
W. Glauner, KfK
10.45
12.30
14.00
15.30
16.30
17.30
20.00
Session I: Reactor Instrumentation Sess. Chairman:
T. Miyazawa, Toshiba
Vice-Chairman:
F.E. Holt, HEDL
Techniques and equipment for measuring
fission products in reactors
- Methods for detection, localisation and
characterisation of failed fuel elements
- Sensitivity of the monitors, alarm and scram levels
- In-pile calibration methods
Contributions from France, Germany and India with discussions
Lunch
Continuation of Session I
Contributions from Japan, UK, USA, USSR with discussions
Coffee break
Session discussion
Reception at the KfK Casino
Bus to the hotels
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Tuesday, 12. May 81
9.00 Session 11: Experience from LMFBR's Sess. Chairman:
E.K. Yakshin, SRIAR
Vice-Chairman:
M. Relic, IA
10.30
12.00
12.30
- Results from measurements of existing and
applied instrumentations to detect, localize
and characterize pin leakers and open fuel
failures .
- Behaviour of fuel elements during these measurements
- Failure statistics, strategy for continued operation
in respect to minimize shut-off-time
with contributions from all participating countries
(about 15') and short discussions, starting with Germany
Coffee Break
Session discussion
Lunch
14.00 Session 111: In-pile experiments Sess. Chairman:
P. Michaille, CEA
Vice-Chairman:
E. Sakai, JAERI
15.30
16.30
17.00
- Research and development work on
instrumentation and detection methods
- In-pile experiments and related fission
product and fuel release results
- Signal interpretation
with contributions of all participating countries
(about 15') and short discussions, starting with India
Coffee Break
Session discussion
Bus to the hotels
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Wednesday, 13. May 81
9.00 Session IV: Models and Codes Sess. Chairman: J.D.B. Lambert, ANL
Vice-Chairman: D.B. Sangodkar, RRCK
10.30
12.00
12.30
- Modelling and code development
of fission product release and transport
in loops and reactor plants
- Explanation of DND-enhancement factor k
- Application of these codes to LMFBR's
with contributions from all participating countries
(about 15') and short discussions, starting with Japan
Coffee Break
Session discussion
Lunch
14.00 Session V: Future Programs Sess. Chairman: D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA
Vice-Chairman: C. Berlin, CEA
15.30
16.30
17.00
- Research and development
pro grams related to the session I to IV
- Objective and description oi national
and international programs
- Remaining questions
with contributions from all participating countries
(about 15') and short discussions, starting with United Kingdom
Coffee Break
Session discussion
Bus to the hotels
Thursday, 14. May 81 Session VI: Conclusions
9.00 Summary and recommendation from Session I T. Miyazawa
9.20 Summary and recommendation from Session II E.K. Yakshin
9.40 Summary and recommendation from Session III P. Michaille
10.00 Summary and recommendation from Session IV J.D.B. Lambert
10.20 Summary and recommendation from Session V D.K. Cartwright
10.40 Closing of the meeting S. Jacobi
11.00 Bus-tour through the Kernforschungszentrum
12.00 Lunch
13.30 Visit of KNK II

19
PARTICIPANTS
+
DeBeNe
S. Jacobi (Meeting-Chairman)
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
Institut für Reaktorentwicklung
D-7500 Karlsruhe
W. Glauner (Co-Chairman)
Rernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
Projekt Schneller Brüter
D-7500 Karlsruhe
G. Schmitz (Recording Officer)
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
Institut für Reaktorentwicklung
D-7500 Karlsruhe
K.Ch. Stade (Recording Officer)
Kernkraftwerk-Betriebsgesellschaft
D-7514 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen
G. Finke
Kernkraftwerk-Betriebsgesellschaft
D-7514 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen
F. Gestermann
Interatom GmbH
Friedrich-Ebertstraße
D-5060 Bergisch-Gladbach 1
W. Koop
Kernkraftwerk Kalkar
SBK Schnellbrüter-Kernkraftwerks-
gesellschaft mbH
Postfach 1220
D-4192 Kalkar
H. Lippens
Belgonucleaire S.A.
Rue du Champs de Mars 25
B-1050 Brüssel
M. Relic
Interatom GmbH
Friedrich-Ebertstraße
D-5060 Bergisch-Gladbach 1
H. Richard
Kernkraftwerk-Betriebsgesell-
schaft mbH
D-7514 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen
France
C. Berlin
Centre de Cadarache
DRNR
BP No.1
F-13115 St. Paul lez Durance
J.C. Cauvin
Centre de Cadarache
DER
BP No. 1
F-13115 St. Paul lez Durance
P. Michail1e
Cent re de Cadarache
DRNR
BP No. 1
F-13115 St. Paul lez Durance
India
D.B. Sangodkar
Reactor Research Centre
Kalpakkam-603102
(Tamil Nadu)
Japan
T. Miyazawa
Nucl. Eng. Lab. - Toshiba Corp.
4-1 Ukishimach, Kawasaki City
Kanagawa, Japan 210
Eiji Sakai
Reactor Instrum. Lab.
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute
Tokai Village, Naka-Gon
Ibaragi, Japan
N. Sekiguchi
O-arai Eng. Center, PNC,
O-arai Narita machi, O-arai
Ibaragi Prif., Japan
T. Takag.i
Nucl. Eng. Group
Mitsubishi El. Corp.
+ representing Federal Republic of Germany/Belgium/Netherlands
United Kingdom
D.K. Cartwright
UKAEA - Northern Division
Risley, Warrington, WA3 6AT
T.A. Lennox
UKAEA Dounreay Nuclear Power
Development Establ.
Thurso, Carithness KW 14 7T2
USA
F.E. Holt
Hanford Eng. Development Lab. W/C-53
POB 1970
Richland, Wash. 99352
John DB Lambert
EBR 11 Project, ANL
9700 South Cass Av.
Argonne, 111. 60439
20
USSR
V.1. Schipilov
S.-R. Institute of Atomic Reactors
USSR 433510 g. Dimitrovgrad - 10
E.K. Yakshin
S.-R. Institute of Atomic Reactors
USSR 433510 g. Dimitrovgrad - 10
Commission of the European
Communities
M.C. Savatteri
Comm. of the Europ. Comm.
Joint Research Cent re
Ispra Establ.
1-21020 Ispra
lAEA
Donald E Mahagin
Hanford Eng. Development
Techn. Management Center,
POB 1970
Richland, Wash. 99352
R. Pflasterer
Advanced Reactor System
General Electric Co.
Sunnyvale, Ca.
Lab.
FM
V.F. Efimenko
International Atomic Energy Agency
Wagramerstr. 5
POB 100
A-1400 Vienna
21
. F.E.Holt---.
K.E.Yakshin
T.A.Lennox - .......
M.Relic---......
D.E.Mahagin 1.
Ci.Finke-nl.OD.B.sangOdkar~0
E.Sakai 0
K.ch.Stade~
J.CCauvin -l-J
.R.Pflasterer
CBerlin __---I
J.D.B.Lambert
D.K.Cartwright
......---v.1. Schipilov
N.Sekiguchi
Ci.Schmitz
l.Leenders
T.Miyazawa
L--__ F.Ciestermann
L..--_ P.Michaille
1---_H.Richard
S.Jacobi

23
DETECTION AND LOCATION OF FAILED FUEL ELEMENTS IN LMFBRS
A REVIEW
Siegfried Jacobi
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
Institut für Reaktorentwicklung
AN EXPANDING FIELD OF WORK
Many years ago in the early days of reactor engineering the topic of
"Failed Fuel Detection and Location" had been dealt with in most countries
by just a few research workers who hardly maintained international contacts.
Although, at the time, activities in this field had been considered as
necessary already, they were not very much appreciated everywhere: They
pointed at failures, more particularly fuel element failures, and these
very failures should actually be avoided. Today, the situation is completely
reversed. In every country engaged in the development of breeder reactors
more or less large working groups have been established, extensive out-of-
pile and in-pile experimental programs and intensive international contacts
exist, in most cases provided for by agreements. Which have been the reasons
for this course of development?
Cladding Tube Failures are Unavoidable
The finding has been generally accepted that cladding tube failures
are unavoidable despite careful fabrication and testing methods and strictly
specified conditions of operation. This means that cladding tube failures
must be taken into account when designing a reactor, i.e.,
- devices must be available for detection of a cladding tube failure
- devices must be available for locating the failed fuel element and
- these devides or additional ones must allow to characterize the failure.
In Ghis work literature references have been omitted intentionally because
their number would necessarily be extremely high. The reader is referred to
the following technical papers.
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Number of Fuel Elements
The first small prototype reactors accommodated about 2 to 3 dozens
of fuel subassemblies. The present goal of breeder reactor development is
1000 to 1300 MWe with up to 360 fuel subassemblies. Given this great number
alone, certain precautions as regards failed fuel elements must be taken.
Rod Power and Burnup
Above all for reasons of better economy, the specific rod power and
the burnup were increased continuously. This necessarily implied several
higher loadings on the cladding tubes. On the other hand, main1y on account
of neutron economy, the wall thickness of the c1adding tubes had to be kept
within limits and cou1d not be increased to comp1y with the fai1ure proba-
bility. Consequently, despite the improvement of the c1adding tube qua1ity,
no major reduction of the number of cladding tube fai1ures could be expected
because of the increased rod power and burnup.
Loss of Fuel
In case of fai1ed pins the fuel might get lost into the coo1ant, with
the following potential consequences:
- Increase in the fission product background signals.
- Background signals approaching the limits of alarm generation.
- Contamination of the primary circuit and fuel, especially with plutonium.
This results in more difficult conditions for maintenance and repair.
- Cooling disturbances in the bundle due to deposited fuel partic1es.
Also these aspects led to an intensification of activities performed
in the field of "failed fuel detection".
Contamination with Fission Products
Although unavoidable in general, the em1SS1on of fission products from
failed pins should be restricted because, eventually, it makes repair and
maintenance conditions more difficult, in the same way as a loss of fuel.
Also in this case successful detection and characterization of the failure
may result in improvements for reactor operation.
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Reaetor Operation
A suffieiently preeise information about the eondition of failed fuel
elements may lead to substantial advantages for the reaetor plant: Eaeh
seram implies as serious thermal load on the system and is avoided, if
possible, by the operator through slow reduetion of the power.
This means the highest possible seram level and reliable alarm
signaling aeeompanied by the most accurate possible eharaeterization of the
damage.
Eeonomy
For reasons of eeonomy and power reserve in the supply network it is
the outspoken goal pursued by the utility eompany that a large plant ean
be operated until the next or the weekend after next despite damage to the
f~el rods. Obviously, this ~s possible only if the most exaet information
possible is available eoneerning the eondition of the eore.
Safety
Last but not least, the requirements on reaetor safety likewise exert
a great influenee on failed fuel deteetion and loeation: A major fuel pin
failure may eonstitute a disturbanee giving rise to a dangerous disturbanee
in eooling. Thus, from those responsible for reaetor safety, the requirement
was imposed of the quiekest possible failure deteetion. This also implies
a eonsiderable extension of the seope of work.
STATE OF THE ART
The reasons indieated above gave r~se to a multitude of interesting
aetivities, ineluding a very broad speetrum of different diseiplines: reaetor
design, eomponent teehnology, reactor operation, fuel fabrieation and behavior,
measuring teehnology, eleetronies and, last but not least, computer teehnology.
A faseinating speetrurn whieh never made work boring, and we always felt the
elose link to reality and that our aetivities are really neeessary!
26
Delayed Neutron Detection (DND)
The DND method seems to be a weIl established one: It has been inte-
grated in one way or the other 1n each LMFBR, either beside the main sodium
pipe, or by a special pipework and in almost all ca ses as an information
enhancing the protection against cooling disturbances. In many examples
derived from in-pile experiments and also from reactor operation the very
high reliability and availability of the DND method could be proved. On the
other hand, the availabillty of the reactor was adversely influenced 1n
several cases by the DND system: A DND scram which had not been necessary,
as found out later, had shut down the plant.
Fission Products 1n the Cover Gas
The detection of fission products present in the cover gas 1S practiced
by different, mostly diverse techniques (indicated below in alphabetical
order):
- gamma spectroscopy uS1ng asolid state detector
- gas chromatography
- ionization chamber
- mass spectrometer for stable Xe isotopes, especially Xe-131 and Xe-134
- precipitator
- scintillation counter
- tagging
- Xe adsorption on activated carbon.
It became apparent in almost all cases that the integral methods, such
as ionization chamber and precipitator, are the cheapest methods and also
attain the highest availabilties whilst gamma spectroscopy, which 1S very
expensive without any doubt, furnishes detailed information which can hardly
be dispensed with.
Location and Preliminary Location of Failed Fuel Elements
Several methods have been applied so far for location or prelocation,
i.e., determination of the subassembly group affected by the failure (in-
dicated below in alphabetical order):
- Determination of burnup by means of Xe-131 and Xe-134 and of the half-lives
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of fission gases, respectively. Approximate group estimation.
- DND with individual sodium sampling. Very high investment cost, very good
results of location.
- DND with sectorial sodium sampling. More or less satisfactory preliminary
location depending on the design.
Dry sipping. Many fuel element handling operations.
- Flux tilting. Approximate group estimation for smaller sized reactors.
- Tagging. Capital costs and recurrent core costs ~ery high. With increasing
number of fuel elements only approximate group estimation possible.
- Wet sipping. Often less successful.
CLASSIFICATION OF FAILED FUEL ELEMENTS
The previous operating exper~ence has revealed two different types of
failure:
- The leaker. A cladding tube failure accompanied only by the emission of
fission gases and volatile fission products, but not generating a DND signal,
which means that there is not yet a contact between fuel and sodi\w. This
damage may prevail .~n the reactor over weeks or months until it develops
into a DND failure by extension or by one or several secondary failures.
- The DND failure. There is a direct contact between fuel and sodium. Follow-
ing the occurrence of the first DND signal - which has given the name to
this type of damage - attainment of the scram level can be expected within
days to weeks.
Although much experience with DND failures has been gathered all over the
world, the determination of the geometric area of damage on the basis of the
DND signals is still very inaccurate. In general, the accuracy is within
plus/minus one order of magnitude. The cause for this relatively high inaccu-
racy are the following facts:
- At the moment when a failure occurs, the fuel may have a very different
structure. Both the open porosity due to fabrication and the crack pattern
and shape of the central channel influenced by operation greatly affect
the release of the short-lived DN precursors. However, all these parameters
are not very weIl known at the time of occurrence of the cladding tube
failure.
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- The diffusion controlled release mechanism is not yet accessible theoreti-
cally on account of the fuel structure mentioned before.
- Frequently bursts have been recorded of DN precursors which make a corre-
lation of signal amplitude and free fuel surface no longer meaningful.
Although this non-steady-state release is understandable as a phenomenon,
it has not yet been described until now theoretically by a model.
TARGETS SET, FüR THIS MEETING AND FüR FUTURE WüRK
Besides the exc~ange of new results from research work and reactor
operation, the following subjects should be paid particular attention:
Modeling and Codes
The discrepancies indicated above between the results of post-
irradiation and the free damage surfaces calculated according to the recoil
model must become smaller. A great help could be provided by the improved
post-irradiation examination which is capable of still better quantifying
the fuel crack pattern and of yielding measuring values about the open porosity.
Efforts in this direction could start by compiling a table of all previous
DND damage including the greatest possible number of fuel data, plant
specific data as weIl as operating parameters concerning the failed fuel
element.
Methods of Measurement
It seems meaningful to work out a table for the individual reactors,
containing among others the following data:
- type and location of the fission product measuring points
- sodium transit time
- sen~itivity
- type of location and preliminary location of failed fuel elements
- DND scram and other methods.
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Fission Gas Bursts
When a c1adding tube fai1ure occurs, the activity concentration of the
fission gases in the cover gas may rise by severa1 orders of magnitude. In
the absence of special precautions, this automatica1ly resu1ts in the over-
flow of a gamma spectrometer equipped with a semi-conductor counter. To
avoid this, the fo110wing procedures have been proposed so far:
- dilution of the gas concentration
- automatic eo11imator rep1acement
- use of severa1 detectors with different sensitivities.
It is desirab1e to establish an intensive exchange of experience in
this sector.
Contamination of the Primary System
As a1ready mentioned, loop contamination plays a major part with a view
to repair and maintenance work in case fuel element failure occurs on account
of fue1 and fission products. Regarding the continuation of reactor operation
with a fai1ed fue1 element, the fo110wing question arises:
"How much 10ss of fue1 and how much fission product contamination are
still tolerable or reasonab1e?"
Operation in the Presence of Fai1ed Cladding Tubes
It has been mentioned that it is desirable to continue reactor operation
unti1 a given date despite the presence of failed cladding tubes. The fission
product signals measured under such operating conditions and to be measured
in the future should be exchanged and discussed. This as well as the comparison
with post-irradiation examinations carried out at a 1ater stage may provide
a major support in decision making regarding future operation.
Location of Failed Fue1 Elements
In the 2. Chapter the usua1 methods were indicated for locating failed fuel
elements together with the important advantages and drawbacks of these methods.
It becomes evident from this 1isting that a convincing method does not yet exist.
This statement is supported among others by the fact that different methods are
still tried out in new reactors. Therefore, it seems reasonable to publish
all experience - both positive and negative - accumulated with the individual
methods ~r to exchange it. Maybe, a joint effort will bring the desired
success.
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PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
OF SESSION I:
REACTOR INSTRUMENTATION
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I - REACTOR OPERATION -
The risk that the plutonium es capes from a fuel
element when the clad is br~achedimposes a continuous
surveillance of the fast reactors.
Since no direct and continuous means of measure-
ment of released fuel is avai lable in a reactor, the sur-
veillance of the fuel is performed indirectly by surveil-
lance of the fission products released when the clad is
defected.
The French in-pile experience with RAPSODIE and
PHENIX, supported by in-loop experiments, proves that, for
detection and localization of the defected fuel subassem-
blies, DND is a means both efficient and sufficient. Rou-
9h l y, a DND s i 9na l c ha ra c t er i ze s a fa i l ure a t t he l e v e l of
the fuel column, and the higher the signal - the greater
the defect. At relatively small levels of DND signals and
durations of irradiation, no evidence of fuel release by
the defected fuel elements could be shown. On the other
hand, the experience of RAPSODIE and PHENIX proves that,
as long as no DND signal is detectable, the contamination
by gaseous, ,volatible and soluble fission products can be
tolerated for a normal operation.
Therefore, at SUPER-PHENIX 1, detection and loca-
lization of the fuel elements' failures will be performed
by DND. As soon as a DND signal will be detected by the
surveillance system (DRG), the operator will start the
rotating selectors of the localization system (LRG) that
is able to localize the defected subassembly in about
30 minutes. During this time, a scram level on the DRG
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system will protect the operator of a possible fast evolu-
tion of the DND signal.
11 - R ÄND D WORK -
It is oriented towards three main objectives.
The first is to minimize the number of reactor's
shut-downs because of fuel element fai lures. Therefore, a
gas plug inserted in the LRG system of PHENIX is being
checked. 8y that way, the gas emitting fuel elements are
localized while the reactor is under operation, and can
be removed during anormal reactor's shut down before a
possible evolution into DND stage.
The second 1S to make the surveillance instru-
mentation safer and cheaper. A simplification of the DRG
system can be obtained with the use of integrated DND
counters (high temperature fission chambers). They are
now under development and testing •.8ut their predictable
sensitivity being less than the sensitivity of the exis~
ting DRG system, their use requires to bring the proof
that the DND failures can be irradiated in a reactor up
to h;gher DND levels than reached now. This is the aim
of the plan MARGO, that is supported by experiments of
pin failures irradiations as well in loops as in reactors
(program VOLGA) and by the program PARKA that aims to un-
derstand better the neutronuclides' release mechanisms.
The third is to define the field covered by the
DND surveillance system with respect to subas~embly acci-
den t s. F0 r t his 0 b j e c t i v'e-, i n a d d i ti 0 n tot h e k no wl e d ge 0 f
the neutronuclides' release when the fuel temperature is
very high, and when the fuel is disintegrated, it is neces-
sary to study and modelize the transportation of the neutro-
nuclides by a diphasic coolant.
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EVOLUTION OF FFD - FFL
ON 'FRENCH FAST
INSTRUMENTATION
REACTORS
by C. BERLIN
- PROGRESS IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAUSES AND
IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE FAILED PINS,
•
- INCREASE OF THE SIZE OF THE POOL REACTORS,
- VOCATION OF THE REACTORS :
RApSODIE EXPERIMENTAL REACTOR,
P.HENIX
SPX 1
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FFD - FFL DEVICES,
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- FOR SPX 2, THE OBJECTIVE IS TO MAKE THE
INSTRUMENTATION SAFER AND CHEAPER
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IN PILE CALIBRATIONS
by P. Michail1e
YEAR RAPSODIE
r=_ 11um""""
PHENIX SUPER' PHEN I X
1970 U-CR
VARIOUS P, Q
:;wu;
1973
- ...................""""""--------1F-------ß--=..........~~.u.w..r~ PN~-~;%~L_=Ol"c""""""" ...............""'"t"Y""""'""'...............,,,........,....,..,
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Diseussion
N. Sekiguehi, PNC:
We have an interest 1n the durabilitv of the rotating meehanies of DRG-LRG in
Rapsodie or PhEmix. What li fe do you' ant ieipate or r.ave, you'any exp~rienee
on the life time of the equipment?
C. Berlin, CEA:
We expeet that the PHENIX failed fuel loealization deviee will work property
during a long time 1n G3 and Gn mode. Up to now, only the little seleetor value
failed. The large one have been always working property. - Eaeh week a eomplete
seleetion is realized.
M. Relie, IA:
a) Hav,e you exper1enee 1n deteetion of gas failure by the loealisation plug
at PHENIX?
b) Why do you not apply. this gas loealisation at SUPER PHENIX?
C. Berlin, CEA:
a) 'The first gas FFL plug failed during the eomrniB sioning of Phenix
In 1980 a seeond new one was installed - up to-day we loeated two gas fai1ures
with the new FFL p1ug.
b) We think that only the DND failures have to be diseharged out of eore. So· on
SPX1, the deteetion and the loealisation are by DND on1y.
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
Are breeder assemblies on SPX sampled by a loeation system?
C. Berlin, CEA:
Only the fuel subassemblies are samp1ed by the loealisation system on SUPER-
PHENIX 1.
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S. Jacobi, KfK:
You explained the results from your calibration tests in RAPSODIE.
Could you please tell us about the influence of the reactor,power on
the transit time, signal level and repartition ratios of the sodium?
M. Michaille, CEA:
The answer ~s g~ven ~n one of the tables. Power has a linear influence on
the signal. The transit time varies roughly inversely proportion~lly to the
flow rate. In Rapsodie, the flow rate 1s constant. But in PHENIX and SPX,
power and flow rate vary.
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REACTOR INSTRUMENTATION FOR FUEL FAlLURE
DETECTION AT KNK 11 AND SNR 300
G. Hoffmann, S. Jacobi, G. Schmitz
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
Institut für Reaktorentwicklung
J. Dauk, M. Relic
INTERATOM, Bergisch Gladbach
Federal Republic of Germany
A. FUEL FAlLURE DETECTION AT KNK 11
The equipment for fuel failure detection of the experimental
fast breeder reactor KNK 11 can be devided up into the opera-
tional system and the test system. ,The experience of both in-
strumentations are important for the design of the fuel failure
detection instrumentation at SNR 300.
Fig. 1 shows the instrumentation of the two systems. The
operational system consists of the delayed neutron detection
(DND) instruments, of a fission gas monitor and of a defect fuel
element localization equipment.
Fuet Failure Detection at KNK 11
Esipping
Fig. 1: Instrumentation for fuel failure detection at KNK 11
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KNK 11 is a loop reactor with two primary sodium loops.
In order to detect the delayed neutrons from the whole core
and to have a possibility of a fuel failure pre+ocalization
both loops were equipped by a DND monitor. The DND monitors
are classical systems with He-3 neutron counters. After more
than 280 operational days no changement of its sensitivity and
of its characteristics was noticed.
The backgröund signal oE the DND system at KNK 11 depends
on the reactor power and gets up to about 100 cps for the
full reactor power. The calculated detection sensitivity de-
pends on the reactor power, too, as the transit time for the
delayed neutrons from the defect fuel pin to the DND system
decreases by reactor pow~r increase. The countrates calculated
by recoil model for 1 cm fuel surface are given in table 1.
Table 1: KNK 11: Transit time for delayed neutrons to
the DND system and calculated countrates for
1 cm2 free fuel surface (k = 1)
Reactor power
30
50
70
80
100
Countrate for 1 cm 2
recoil surface
L-cpsJ
6
12,5
17 ,5
1 8,9
22,1
Transit time
73
44
31
28
22
The in-pile calibration of the DND monitor is planned for the
next experimental period.
The scram level is set2at 2000 cps, this corresponds to
a clad defect of about 8 cm at reactor full power, taking into
account the factor k = 10. The alarm level amounts to 1500 cps.
The released fission gas is detected in the argon cover
gas by a NaJ(Tl) crystal. Only the Xe-133 activity is measured.
In order to eliminate the influence of Ne-23 a delay line is
installed between the reactor and the meas~ring point. The
sensitivity of the monitor is 560 cps/Ci/m , when the measure-
ment is done in presence of an argon specific activity of
1 ,1 Ci/m3 .
The localization of defect fuel elements is performed by
a dry sipping method. After the reactor shut-down the fuel ele-
ment is lifted up into the handling machine. The gas cooling
is interrupted and the volume of the handling machine evacuated
to about 0,1 bar. The evacuation time lasts approximately 8
minutes.
Th t ·· t f 85 131 d 133 .e ac lVl y 0 Kr, J an Xe ln
by a NaJ(Tl) crystal. The sensitivity of the
85Kr ~ 7 . 103 cps/Ci/m3 and for 133xe ~ 5,2
the gas is measured
syst;.em is for 3
. 10 5 cps/Ci/m .
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The test systems for fuel failure detection at KNK 11 can
be devided up into equipments which are already working and
devices which will be tested during the next defect fuel program
at KNK 11 and during the next KNK 11 operation. The first group
is constituted by an improved NaJ(Tl) instrumentation and by
an on-line GeLi system. The other devices are precipitators,
gamma gaschromatography, charcoal trap technique and wet sipping
equipment for defect fuel element localization.
The on-line GeLi system and the wet sipping equipment are
particularly interesting because they are foreseen for the in-
strumentation of S~R 300.
The GeLi system measures the cover gas activity continuously,
that means, it takes the gamma spectra one after another with-
out pauses and calculates the activity concentration immediately.
In order to measure the activity in both cases at reactor ope-
ration without and with defect fuel elements a countrate range
of 107 is necessary. For this reason a special collimatl?r which
will cllange the sensitivity of the system over a range· of \·0
is in construction.
The wet sipping equipment of KNK 11 is similar to that of
SNR 300 and will be described later.
B. FUEL FAlLURE DETECTION AT SNR 300
At SNR 300 following fuel failure detection systems are
foreseen:
- Cover gas monitor with GeLi diode
- DND
- wet sipping device.
The system for the gas activity measurement is similar to
the test device at KNK 11. The sensitivity is adjusted by moving
the GeLi diode in relation to the gas probe. An automatical
setting of the sensitivity as a function of the total countrate
is foreseen.
The main parts of the DND system are:
- The sodium " sniffing" pipe. This pipe surrounds the core and
is situated between the pressure surge shielding tank and the
dip plate, Fig. 2. Its diameter is about 5 m. The " sniffing" pipe
is devided up into three segments of 1200 , and each segment is
connected to one pipe. The three pipes lead sodium samples from
the respective core section out of the reactor tank. Fig. 3 shows
some details of the construction. There are 60 sampling holes
altogether. The sampling pipe is fixed at the pressure surge
shielding tank.
I~I " I
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Fig. 2: SNR 300 reactor tank
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- Connection pipes between the "sniffing" pipe and the DND
monitor. The three sodium sampling pipes (50.mm diameter) coming
from the three "sniffing" segments lead sodium from the reactor
tank to the sodium level tank room. The sodium flow in these
three pipes is controlled by sodium flow meters and valves be-
fore the connection to one ~ipe happens. The mass flow in the
pipe amounts to about 100 m /h. This pipe leads sodium to the
DND safety monitor, Fig. 4. On the other hand sodium sampies
from the three pipe segments can be analysed in the reactor
operational DND monitor. The sodium sampies are taken directly
from the three pipes coming from reactor tank and chosen by
automatical valves. The sodium of the three core parts can be
analysed only one after another.
Pressure surge sh:~ld;n;
Na
fI
Safety system (
Safety system 11
Fig. 3: SNR 300
DND sampling pipe
Fig. 4: SNR 300
DND monitor system
- DND monitor. It is a classical monitor with a neutron shiel-
ding of serpentine/concrete. For each channel two He-3 counters
which can be exchanged during reactor operation, are taken.
The design data are:
0,6 R/h gamma dose for reactor operation without defects
-2 -11,5 cm s neutron flux for reactor operation without defects
0,5% efficiency for delayed neutrons.
In order to be sure that the sodium at the DND monitor is
representative of the whole core and that the sodium in the
three sampling pipes corresponds to the sodium of the given
reactor section, water tests at the 4:1 tank model were per-
formed. This model simulates the core pressure drop by blends
at the core inlet. The delayed neutrons were simulated by the
50
colour tracer "Methylenblau". It was injected at several core
positions and its density was measured at positions around the
reactor tank. Fig. 6 shows the relative colour concentration for
a central injection, Fig. 5 for an injection at the core border
position. The tests were performed for flow rates which corres-
pond to a reactor power between 30% and 100%. The main conclu-
sions from these experiments were:
. The survey of the three core sections is efficient.
The 250 mm net of sampling holes around the core is sufficient.
The transit time in the reactor tank lies between 2 s
(for 100% flow rate) and 15 s (for 30% flow rate).
The total transient times between the core and the DND monitor
are given in table 2.
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Table 2: Transit time for delayed neutrons to the DND
monitor (SNR 300)
Reactor power
N [%J
Transit time
t L-s_7
30
50
70
80
100
42
36
32
31
29
51
The countrate at the monitor Zs was calculated by the re-
coil model and with the recoil factor k = 1. In the following
table 3 the calculated values for 2the signal background ZB (sur-face fuel contamination 10-8 g/cm , core neutrons, gamma in-
fluence) and the highest+) and the lowest+) countrates Z for
defects of 1 cm 2 in the fuel area are given. s
Table 3: Calculated performance of the DND monitor (SNR 300)
Reactor power Background Countrate for 1 cm2 defect
countrate
::;) L-%J ZB CcpsJ Z /cps7 U1in) Z /J-pri} (Max)s- - s
30 31 0,82 1 ,62
50 37,1 0,99 1 ,95
70 41 ,9 1 , 12 2,21
80 43,2 1 , 1 6 2,28
100 46,1 1 ,23 2,43
+)Depends on the power of the defect fuel pin.
For the ~ND system of SNR 300 the lowest detectable count-
rate ZMin L-cps~ is defined as the signal whose amplitude is
four times the standard deviation of the background countrate.
At S::;)R 300 the localization of defective fuel elements is
performed by individual examination of all fuel elements after
reactor shut-down. The device used for this purpose is called
Brennelement-Kontrollvorrichtung (BKV).
The BKV 11 uses the housing and the drives of the invessel
handling machine. It contains an adapter tube that can be
connected to the head of a fuel element in the core. Inside the
tube agas overpressure lowers the sodium level inside the tube
nearly to the lower end of the tube.
After connection to the fuel element head (sealing accor-
ding to the diving bell principle) the sodium flow through the
fuel element is blocked. In this situation the sodium in the
fuel bundle is - in the case of a fuel pin leak - enriched with
fission gases. Afterwards the gas overpressure in the tube is
compensated with the reactor cover gas plenum causing rising of
the sodium from the fuel bundle into the tube. There the sodium
is rinsed by a carrier gas stream (fresh argon) and the activity
of the released gases is measured in the gas circuit unit, which
is attached to the head of the in-vessel handling machine housing.
The connection between the circuit and the tube (vertically
moving about 500 mm) is made by means of a connection plug in-
side the housing. After passing the measuring circuit the carrier
gas is introduced in the reactor cover gas plenum.
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Discussion
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
What is the exact method of obtaining sodium for DND ~n the SNR 300?
M. Relic, IA:
It is a by-pass system with directly Na-sampling in the reactor tank.
K.Ch. Stade, KBG:
Have I correct understand you, there ~s only one electromagnetic pump ~n
the DND-circuit of SNR 300?
M. Relic, IA:
No, we have two EM pumps at SNR 300.
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FAlLEn FUEL ELEMENT DETECTlON AND IDCATION IN
FAST BREEDER TEST REAC'I'OR
D.B.Sangodkar
REACTOR RESEARCH CEN'mE
KALPAKKAM, INDlA.
1. Introduction
Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) 113 a 40 MW (ib.) sod1um cooled
fast reactor under construction in lnd1a. 'Ib~ reactor des1en
is based on the French reactor, RAPSODlE-FORTlSSlMO. However, a
sod1um heated steam generator and a turbogenerator are added to
generate about 16 MW of electrical power. Each fuel sub-
assembly will have 61 mixed oxide fuel pine end the nominal core
will have about 65 fuel subassemblies. 'lbe reactor has two
primary coolant loops. Two delS3ed neutron detection (mD) blocks
are provided, one on each primary loop. 'IN signals are
incorporated in the reactor scram circuit. Gaseoue fission
product detection (GFPD) is done with the help of a gas flow ion
chamber. N1 instrument for gamma spectrometry of cover gas
after gas-chromatographie separation of its conetituents is
utilized for prediction of the age of a failed fuel element.
'Ibis presentation gives abrief description of these ~stems and
the developnent work done in support of design of FBTR.
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2. Fa.1led Fuel Element Deteetion
2.1 DND §retem
'lbe nm system eonsiete of two DND blocks, each positioned
around a sodium pot eonnected in a by-pase primary coolant
loop aerose the intermediate heat exehanger (mx). Six boron
eoated counters are arranged in a houree-shoe shape geometr,y
in the moderator portion of the block. 'lbe shield portion
of the block ie constituted by 14 cm of lead thicknees
between the moderator and the sodium pot. 'lbe lead shield
attenuates the gamma flux on the detectors to .:::::: 2R/h
and also helps in redueing the probability of "i-n
reactione in the moderator. 'lbree signals are generated
by swnming the signals from a pm of detectore for
aetuating the reactor scram circuit in 2/3 mode.
2.2 GFPD §'rstem .
Gaeeoue fission product detection i8 done'ueing a gas-flow
ion chamber in the O:>ver gas sampling circuit •
A theoretical assessment of the signal-to-background
ratio which can be obtained w1th a gas-flow ion chamber
of about 1 litre volume gave the following results:
Cause
1. Background due to residual
41 Ax + 2'Ne activity (after
a delay of 210 seconds)
2. Background due to tramp
fissile material in the
core.
,. Background due to ambient
gammas.
4. Signal due to f ailure of
Central pin after 10,000
H"1d/T
5. Signal due to faillU'e of
peripheral pin after
2000 MWd/'l'.
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Ion chalIlber
current in
amperes
Negligible*
-81 .3x10
Signal-to-
background
ratio
*Note: The detector is predominently a beta detector, the specific
ionization by gammas being less by a factor of 10C.
The failures considered in this study are pinholes or
microfisslU'es involving release of all the accumulated fission
gases in the gas plenum. Applying S/B=1 as the detectability
criterion, it has been estirnated that arelease of 0.5% of
accumulated fission gases from a central pin after 10000 NWd/T
is detectable whereas for the peripheral pin with a burn-up of
2000 Ni1d/T the detectable fraetion is 5~f.
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3. lD calisat ion
Small loop-type reaetors like FBTR cannot accommodate the
required in-vessel equipment for individUal coolant channel
scanning for d.n. activity. Moreover, methods based on cover
gas analysis are adequate. Their paor resolution might
ultimately resul t in a longer dela,r in localisation.
Gas-chromatographie separation of the consti tlAents of the
cover gas followed by gamma speetrometry to determine the age
of the failed element and sUbseQuent localisation by substitution
of the "suspects" is the only method of localisation adopted
for PBTa.
Sampled Cover gas is first passed through agas
chromatographie eolumn for separating the constituent gases
viz. argon, neon, Xenon and Krypton. The separated gases
eluting from the colwnn are passed around a eodium iodide deteetor
through a helieal tube eoiled around H. The activities of any
six of the fission gas isotopes can be measured with the help
of six single ehannel analysers. From the ratio of the
aetivities of some selected isotopes it is possible to estimate
the age of the failed fuel element. The ratio of the aetivi ty .
of an isotope whieh has not reaehed equilibrium to that of an
isotope which has reached, equilibrium is a funetion of the
age of the fuel element in the core.
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4. Ievelopnent work in support of Iesign
4.1 INn instrument charmel
A complete instrumentation channel including detector has
been developed and field-tested. The detector
developed i8 a boron-coated counter of 4 Cps/nv sensitivity.
The input stage of the instrument channel is operated in
current-mode to reduce the eff~ct of gamma pile up and to
dispense with any electronics (pre-amplifier) close to the
detector. Field tests in zerlina have shown satisfactory
performance of the channel upto a countrate of 105 cps with
a 100 m cable. The detector plateau 1s not affected by a
gamma flux of 10 R/h (a gamma flux of 2 R/h is expected at
tbe detector location). These tests have established the
sensitivity of the instrument channel. Life test on the
detector 16 in progress.
4.2 Choice of moderator
At the design stage polyethylene was chosen as the
moderator material in the INn block. This was changed to
polyprolylene wUh a view to facilitating the machining of
the block in the desired shape. Experimental comparison of
the two material showed that there was no significant difference.
However, later it was found that use of permali, a wood veneer
product in place of polypropylene would be more cost-effective.
It has been experimentally established (Fig.1) that the lose
in countrate due to the use of permali in place of polyethyl~e
is only about 15% and hence permali has been accepted.
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5. Cbnclusions
'Ihe design basis of FBTR instrumentation and the modest
experimental effort, executed and planned, point to a
eatisfactory performance of the system when implemented
on the reactor.
FIG1: COMPARISON OF MODERATI'JG MATERIALS
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Discussion
S. Jacobi, KfK:
Could you please g1ve us more information about the composition of PERMALl?
D.B. Sangodkar, RRCK:
Permali is a wood veneer product made by compression of bonded thin sheets
of a special type of wood found in South India. It~ s. composition 1S 6.5% hy-
drogen, 48 % carbon and 45 % oxygen by weight. This material with a few
percent of boron has been 1n use as a neutron shield. As moderator however,
it is used in natural form without addition of boron.
M. Relic, INTERATOM:
What are the temperature limits of PERMALI?
D.B. Sangodkar, RRCK:
From the manufacturer's specifications it was found that PEID1ALI can withstand
a temperature up to 1100C without significant change in composition and physical
properties.
FAIlO FUEl DETECTION AND LOCATION
SYSTEM IN THE JAPANESE LMFBRs
60
N. SekIguehi, R. Rindo,
Power Reaetor and Nuelear
Fuel Development Corporation
T. Miyazawa
Toshiba
c"rporation
ABSTRACT
Outline of FFDL system in the Japanege fast breeder
reaetor and the requirernents to it9 funetion i9 des-
eribed. Research and development on FFDL system, whieh
have been implemented sinee 1969, are' introducted and
reviewed from the viewpoint of availability of JOYO
and MONJU. These inelude basic experiments of fission
product behavior, eomponent development and testing,
feasibility stud~ of detection system response, and
design consideration of several kinds of loeation
methods. The diseussion extends to the role of FFDL in
other surveillanee and monitoring instruments for core
anomaly detection in LMFBR plant. One of major eoneerns
on the development of FFDL is now eoneentrated espeeial-
lyon gas tagging and in-and ex-vessel sipping.
INTRODUCTION
Failed fuel detectlon (FFD) system In the Japanese
experImental tast reactor, JOYO now operating at 75~"t,
i9 eomprised of a preeipitator and a delayed neutron
Ebnitor. The FFO syst~~, fortunately, has indieated no
fuel failure in the reaetor ever sinee the first
eritleality of JOYO in 1977, and no fission produet
radioaetivity is observed in the primary eooling system
by radiologieal analysis of sodium and cover gas samples,
whieh are periodically extracted for examination of FP
radioactivity contamination In the system. The FFO
system has been well operated(l) without signifieant
trouble for four years.
Hcwever, It is necessary to make the system
modifieation for its sensitivity, and to be prepared
an interpret model to the signal indieation in
relation with mode and size of fuel failure possibly
encountered in LHFBR. D"velopment works to in-vessel
loeation system are also under way.
FFDL system in JOVO and MONJU, and their function
are described in Table 1 and Fig.l and 2. Requirements
of minimum deteetable sensitivity of delayed neutron
monitor whieh are shown in Table 2, eome from a safety
eonsideratlons for preventing pin failure propagation
~ithin one subassembly.
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On the other hand, desIgn of FFDL system for MOHJU
ls curr"ntly under consideratlon. The detailed
gpeelflcatlon la belng aL~ost completed for the syste~
0f bath overall deter:tion and localization. Develop-
0ent of the FFDL syst~ and eomponents has been
conducted by in-pile and out-of pile loop experiments
ginee 1970. Among many achievements fr.om these R&D
\~rks, s?"clal eoncernS are direeted to tagging gas
"ystern development, outline of which is introdueed in
c~re detail In this paper.
?EQUIREl'.ElITS TC FE)L FUlICTIOlI
The roles of FFDL system in h~FBR plant should be
s~eeified in general expression as follows;
indieation of failed fuel
qunatitatlve determination of failure
eharacterlzation of failure mode
loeation of failed subassenbly
diagnosis of 10ea1 anomaly in core
Identieieation and Inspeetion oe
failed subassembly
'- " "rl;~ i.OMT/h
''' ..... JiMWV.
lIloh.,..~lr,II,....f.I"'";J""I"",
FFO monitoring system ls one of eore diagnosis and
-"1rv"illance syste."l in U'''FBR, and should fulfill its
"netion eomplementarily with other instruments and
~ystems ha'ling 9a~e purpOS2, such as reactivity meter,
~n-core flow and te~perature sensors for local anorrnaly
ceteetlon and aeoustie sensor for sodium bolling
(~,~ tee tion.
Prinelpal design requirements of overall deteetion
"/stem to deteet and charaeterize fuel fatlure are
j~nerdlly express cd as follows;
Fast response
HIgh sensitlvity(background reduetion)
Reliabillty of system and eomponents
Malntainabillty (inspeetion and
ca libration)
01versity of sensors and system
However, the criterla should be reviewed based on
s"veral experiences in foreign countries and baSle
studies.
FFOL system muet have function as an ind~cat07 to
withdrawal of failed subassembly for refuellng, lf
neccessary. Accordingly it 15 eonsider~d,to ~e ~ore
L=portant from the viewpoint of plant aV~llabllity
rather- that of safety in LHFBR.
In-vessel seleetor valve sodlQ~ s~~pling system
(s/V) had been discussed in the design of MO:lJU u,;til
1976. DeveloF~ent works of s/V concerning meehanleal
performance have been continued in order to support
the FFDL system degign, by 1/4 scale model ln-sodium
test In 1974 and ful1 mock up model in-sodi~~ test
in 1978. The system, however, has disea~ded from the
MNJU design in 1977, beeause the mechanism of SIV has
requlred too large spaea to be ingtalled in a small,
reector vessel. It is clarified and proven from thlS
Tdble.l
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Failed Fuel Oetection and Locatlon System cl JOYa and HöNJU
runc:Uon .... thod Equip...nt
OVerall dot..ection of tuel e.xpo.ure D4l.lyed neutron aonitorinq On. lIIOd.uhl
and releaso to coohnt
J O' Y 0 Onrall detection ol fission qa. CLleo... t l,n ion produc:t Hovinq-'ttire type preclpit:.ator
lOÜA<Je IIlOnitorlnq
Loc:aUon of fa..1led suba.!ll:seiWly In-vu!ull sipping (v1th eoolant lamphr, qu '.p,u'ator
rot.1.tlnq shield plU9 operation) a.nd 9~-ray detKtor
Ovuall d8ucdon (Aßd %OM loc,,- Oelayed Mut.ron =onitorinq (.nd On_ :lOdul. tor .ach 1 loopa
tien) of f uel 8aposure Md release uian9u lol t iün)
to coolant.
Overall de tectJon of Union 9"" Cueous tissi10n product IlOnlton-. F1..:Iod'l""lt'ire type pn-cipit.ator
HCJL..-U hau.,_ lng a.od q&.:lD4-ray spectremGta.r
aylttIi:D.
LoC'atLon ot {.lled lubaue:ably Cas "gglng e.u absorber a.nd 9•• mal.
Ex-va".l iruP'4'c~on ~t..ra:.lIt.r
ea.. separator and 9.a.:zo,.a-ray
dete.c:tor
Ta.ble.2 RequirementS on Delayed ~eutron Honitor
Item J 0 Y 0 MO:-lJU (design basis)
Instrumentation Monito:r; (Y.anual Scram) Xonito~and Reactor !Purpose of
Safety System (Auto
Scram)
\
Minimum Detectable 2.4"'4.7 gr ::~el meat I50 gr fuel meat releaseSensitivity I release frc::l pins from pinsi
Response Time I ",-45 sec within 60 sec I
~·1ain tenance of :lot speci:i~d To be ieleased in
Detectors reactor operation
experience, that loop-type reactor in practical
designing can not easily accommodate mechanisms and
shieldings in its relatively small vessel.
Develop~ent of another loeation method based on
sipping (2) is under way in order to provide JOYO and
MD:1JU with a means for in-ve:lsel inspeetion and ex-
vesse1 ex~~ination, respectively.
Study of tagging gas method began in 1970, and
several prellminary tests on eapsule fabrieation and
irradiation, analysis of burn-up, and gas concentration
proeedure have been earried out at aiming to Use JOYO
MX-lI. These efforts have been extended to the
adoption for MOllJU. The status and review of the
development activity on tagging gas system (3) are
emphasised in this article.
GAS TAGGING SYSTEM
Fig.3 Gas Togging System Block Diogrom
Cov.r Go,
CI."" ~
System
Toble 3 Fundomcnlol Porometer 01
T099in9 Gos Syslem
ReleoSild T099;n9 Gos Volume In Ar : O.02ml
T099in9 Gos Concenlro~on Yo Ar: O.1ppb
T099,n9 Gos Concenlrolion 01 Anolysis : \Oppm
1. Description of system
The ga~ taggin system concept is illustratcd in
Fig.J. The system is ccmprised of the tagging gas
fi11ing fuel pins, gas sampling and enriching
equipment, gas mass spectrometer for isotopie ratio
analysis and da ta proeessing computer. In dcsigning
agas tagging system for L~FBR plants, fundamental
parameters are selected as shown in Table J. This
system is actuated automatically by the failed fuel
detection signal in cover gas system.
2. Gas Tagging System Develcpment
Tc implement agas tagging system for LMFBR it
is necessary to research various subjects menticned
above.
Fliled TO~9in9 Gos Volume
Rcquir-cd Enric~menl Foe lor
: 2 ml
: 100,000
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11 Tagging Gas Capsule
In developing the tagging gas capsule, gas
and capsule volume should be as low as possible
for reducing fuel size. Capsule materials
should be compatible with fuel and the cladd-
ing material.
Three kinds of tagging gas capsule Were
fabricated for test, and its results were
evaluated. These are (a) fusible alloy, (b)
coil spring, and (cl bimetal categories.
Descriptions of the three tagging gas capsules
are shown in Fig.4.
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Fig. 6 Tagging Gas Enrich ment Process
Tagging Gas Capsule
(CI Bimelai
Fig 4
Leakage rate measurement for the welded sec-
tion and metallographie examination were carri-
ed out to verify welding integrity. The result
provided that the leakage rates were sufficiently
small ("'" lO-8a tm.cc/sec). Tagging gas release
tests were also carried out using an electric
furnace. As a result, though the coil spring
unit released tagging gas, depending on the
heating rate, every tagging gas capsule released
tagging gas at the expected temperature.
PtIWlralC)t' To, 9U1]tJ Ip''''"~Sol.,... rr I ,611= '.~===.I.
I - - \ 'Oooplro9"'
Bim.,of RtIU'l:U P'Jf'"
After [[Wjfp.
2) Tagging Gas Enrichrnent Equipment
Because the escaped tagging gas from a failed
fuel pin is transfered into the cover gas via
sodi~~ coolant and diluted in the cover gas,
the tagging gas concentration was estimated to
be on the order of ppb or less. Thus, it is
necessary to enrich the tagging gas about
100,000 times to be able to identify the tagg-
ing gas isotopes by conventional mass spectro-
meter.
Based on the preliminary investigation
results, low temperature activated charcoal
enric~~ent equipment with two activated charcoal
colurr~s has been fabricated, as shown in Fig.5.
The enrichment process in this equipment is
also shown in Fig.6. The Ar feed gas, contain-
ing Xe and ~r of low concentration, was intro-
duced into the 1st stage activated charcoal
bed. The 1st stage bed temperature was control-
ed to -lBJ·C by liquid oxygen for an adequate
pericd. In the next step, the 1st stage char-
coal bed temperature was raised by changing the
coolant from liquid oxygen to freon (CClJF)
coolant. Haintaining an adequate temperature,
He gas was flowed into the activated charcoal
bed for Ar gas desorption by exchanging He
adsorption. After this process; the 1st stage
activated charcoal bed was heated up to 400·C
by electric heater for Xe, Kr, Re and Ar gases
desorption with adequate time. The desorbed gas
was introduced to the 2nd stage activated
charcoal bed with a temperature of -lBJ·C for
easy handling of gas to mass analysis.
Experimental results, as shown in Fig.7, 8
and 9: provided that Xe recovery rate was not
strongly dependent upon He flushing parar.eters.
However, Kr recovery rate and Ar residual anount
ware greatly affected by He flushing par~~eter9.
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He Flush,ng Lineor Veloeily (ern/sec I
Fig. 8 He Flushing Volume Effeet
Diagr'om
NfUIRONICS
Computer Code l\ TAG 11
Spacing faetor (ri+l=rlS i );
for 129xe/l28 xe, rl=1.0, S=0.883
for 129Xe/126xe, rl=IOO, S=O,8
Reaetor operation time ; maximum 740 days
Neutron flux density corresponds to
demonstration class FBR, such as MO:lJU
pin failure oceurs after 740 days reactor
operation
Analyzed tag ratio
129Xe/128xe = 0.97
129Xe/126Xe = 3.0
(2)
(3)
(4 )
( 6)
(5)
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Thus, operationa1 parameters for the deve1op-
ed equipment were selected as follows;
Co~puter Code "TAG"
Co~puter eode "TAG" was deve10ped to have
t~o functions, "Burnup" and ~Failure Detect"
ealculation. "Burnuo" can deterrnine the change
in ta~ ratios as a fünction of reactor operation
ti~e. 'Pailure Deteet" can locate the failed
fuel suba9sembly. Fl~ 10 shows a computer
codo "TAG" diagram.
Fig. 1! sho·.s the initial tag gas ratios
and the ratios after 740 days reactor operation.
It indicates that any tag ratios after 740 days
reactor operation does not cross the naxt
initial tag ratio, therefore tag ratio 'uni-
gueness" is maintained for any assemblies.
o I n,tlol log Gos RollO
• lOg Go> Rcli 0 crl 740 COJ'
... Ano~/zed Rcl;o
/
0000000 00 00000 0 00
•• 00 •• 0 •••• 0 &19 005
OOOOOOOOOQooooboo
! .
A
1.0
09
08
-l83'C
4 =/sec
15 ern/sec
-80'C
850 times activated
eharcoal bed volume
Ho flushing linear flow
velocity
Adsorption temperatura
Sa~pling gan linear flow
veloelty
He flushing te~perature
He flushing volume
3)
ENDF/B-IV is a computer code for calculation
of tagging gas burnup. In this calculation.
neutron flux was divided into 26 energy groups.
Failure loeation ealeulatlon is carried out
with reqard to only Xe t~q g~s iaotopic ratlos.
In the caleulation, the fOllowing f~ctors are
a3su."Tled~
!o,liol To~g'ng Gas i':JI,os ond
,ollos after 740 DG)s R~(Jetor Cper~: en
(1) 12~NI.L~er of Xe tag ratios is 54 (18 of Xe
/i2bXe x 3 of 129Xe/ l28 Xel
T I , , • "
5 10
12' lZ6
'lei Xe
I!
50 100
3. Future R , 0 Program
Some improvernents are required to estab1ish the
gas tagging systems described in this paper.
The fo11owing plans will be carried out in the
future.
(1) Tag gas capsule
Establishment of a commercially available
fabrication technique
(2) Tag gas enrichment system; Lew temperature
activated charcoal equipment
Oevelopment of a large scale activated
charcoal bed to manage a 1arge quantity
feed gas
Oevelopment of the easy maintainance eooling
system
(3) Computer code ·TAG"
Verification of the tagging gas burn up
effect
Investigation on tagging gas isotope
production from a indirect fission yield
SU~~RY ~~ CONCLUSION
Several R , 0 works on Failed Fuel Oetection and
. Lecation System and equipQent have been reviewed in
this article. As conclusions of this article, follow-
ing items are summarized.
1) In MONJU, ONO will be designed to have plant safety
systen based on previous R , 0 works, and some
in-plant calibration should be considered.
2) Cover gas monitoring system function, in MONJU, is
the monitoring to fuel failure including gas
leaker. The system will be designed based on the
performance test at C~~TF (~)
3) Gas Tagging Method is considered to be one of the
most promissing method by reffering several works
on the performance. (5) (6) The major problems are
the tagging gas cost reduction and multiple failure
pin location.
4) Sipping method will be applicable in any type of
k~BR. The problem of this method is the operation
time reduction.
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Discussion
F.E. Holt, HEDL:
What is your DND countrate at full power operation?
T. Miyazawa, Toshiba:
The DND background countrate at full power ~s 2500 cps.
M. Relic, IA:
DND at Monju is the same as at Joyo?
T. Miyazawa, TOSHIBA:
No. We will modify the JOYO module.
M. Relic, IA:
Contribution of Ne-23 to the precipitator counter?
T. Miyazawa, TOSHIBA:
Precipitator countrate due to Ne-23 was about 70~80 cps at full power
(About 60 % of total background).
But we are not sure the sensitivity on the precipitator to Ne-23 (cps/~Ci/cc or
cps/mR/H.)
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
What is the contribution of (y-n) neutrons on DN monitor?
T. Miyazawa, Toshiba:
Below 10 %. Thus we did not use lead shield to polyethylene for reducing
photo-neutron contribution.
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C. Ber1in, CEA:
How many DND monitors are there on Joyo and Monju reactors?
N. Sekiguchi, PNC:
On1y one module is equipped on JOYO now, but one modu1e/each two loops will
be equipped prior to the initial operation of JOYO-Mk-II (100 MWt).
In MONJU, installation of one modu1e/each three loops is p1anned and expected
to reinforce fai1ed fue1 location by DN signal triangulation.
(P1ease refer to the distributed paper of session V.)
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REACTOR INSTRUMENTATION FOR
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FAST REACTORS
SUMMARY
The detection and location
of failed fuel elements is
regarded in the UK as an
important aid to the operation
and safety of large fast power
reactors. Al though exper ience
suggests that fuel failures will
be infrequent tpe very large
numbers of pins contained in
present and future reactor cores
means that some failures must be
expected, whether as a result of
manufactur ing defects, prolonged
atypical operation, or simply of
exhaustion of the clad at high
burn up.
Continued power operation
with failed fuel pins in a number
of fast reactors and for a range
of severity of failures has shown
that it should not normally be
necessary to remove a defect fuel
pin immediately the failure is
detected. Nevertheless even if
the pin is to remain wi thin the
core it is of benefit to the
reactor operators if such defects
are detected and located as early
as possible to allow. any
implications upon future
operations to be considered and
thecharacter and progress of the
failure to be monitored. In
particular i t is of interest to
identify whether the failure is
likely to be 'quiescent', as the
majority of 'endurance type'
failures have proved to be, or
whether subsequent release of
fuel and fission products to
contaminate the primary circuit
may be expected. This emphasises
the need to understand the
characteristics of signals from
different types of fuel failure,
particularly if the reactor is to
be operated with a number of
failures in the core.
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Work in the UK relevant to
the detection and location of
failed fuel in sodium cooled fast
reactors is reviewed in an
appropriate paper in each
session. A description is given
of the bulk sys tem used in PFR
for the detection of rare gases
in the cover gas and for the
detection of delayed neutrons in
the primary sodium. Methods
used, and proposed, for the
location of failures are also
described, including the
detection of fission gases and
delayed neutrons from individual
subassemblies and the detection
of radon tags in the reactor
cover gas. An outline is also
given of the tentative scheme
proposed for CDFR wi th a br ief
discussion of design philosophy.
Experience with the PFR
systems is reviewed including the
detection and location of two
failures in experimental pins.
The release of fission products
from fuel and from fuel pins to
the coolant is being studied at a
number of laboratories in the UK
and models for the release of
fission products are being
developed. It is evident that
this release is complicated and
depends on many factors including
the type and s ta te of· the fue 1,
which affects diffusion of
fission products, as weIl as
fuel-coolant reactions, and the
fuel-clad gap and coolant
velocity, which affect the
release by scour ing of the fuel
surface by coolant.
In addition to the
continuation of these studies a
substantial programme of work
with natural and proposed
defected pins has started on PFR.
This programme which is
principally to study the
behav iour of defect fuel dur ing
operation and to characterise
signals from failures, is also
discussed.
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(a) The PFR Monitoring Systems
REACTOR INSTRUMENTATION FOR
ffIEEö-FÜEL-DETECTIO"N-IN-UK"-F"AST
REACTORS
each subassembly. These samples
could be mixed to provide a
second bulk monitor the
subassembly, 'S/A', bulk monitor
while at the same time one of the
samples is selected by a rotating
valve and is monitored separately
by another delayed neutron
monitor. In addition the
location loop was fitted with a
gas str ipper, as descr ibed by
Cartwright (3), to enable fission
gas to be removed from the sodium
for activity measurement with a
gas precipi tator similar to that
used on the cover gas.
A new improved location loop
(Fig 4) is shortly to be fitted
to PFR, the Mk IV loop, which
will provide the same detection
facilities as the original loop
but with the additional facility
that the subassembly location and
bulk systems can be operated
independently. The new Mk IV
loop uses an advanced sodium pump
design.
A location facility has also
been achieved by using asparge
pipe to inject argon into the
exit sample pipe from the
rotating valve. This acts as
both a gas-lift pump and gas
stripper and a1though only a
small flow is obtained the
efficiency is high. It was this
system which was used to
successfully locate failures in
the two experimental fuel pin
failures in PFR. Following the
method successfully developed for
DFR (4) provision is provided to
monitor the cover gas for radon.
Radon capsules are incorporated
in a number of experimental pins
and failure of such a pin
releases radon to the cover gas
so that these failures may be
distinguished from these in the
normal dr iver charge. Detection
of radon in the cover gas is at
the UK
reactor
briefly
tentative
for CDFR
a system was
take samples
the outlet of
In th is sect ion of
presentation the PFR
instrumentation is
described and a
instrumentation scheme
is presented.
The cover gas circuit is
shown in Figure 2, the gas is
monitored continuously using a
precipitator of the same type
used on AGRs (1) and shown in
Figure 3. The precipitator
enaqles some of the shorter lived
fission product gases ego Kr 88,
Xe 138, to be monitored whi1e
suppressing the effect of other
activities. Gamma spectrometry
on the cover gas is also carried
out virtually continuously to
monitor for longer lived fission
gases.
The reactor was designed
wi th systems to moni tor both the
cover gas and the primary sodium
coolant for fission product
activity. A design of the PFR
primary circuit is presented as
Figure 1.
The original delayed neutron
system was designed by Hackney &
Wood (2) . A bulk system
continuous1y monitors samples
taken from each of the six
intermediate heat exchangers
(IHX's); the six separate samples
are mixed in a single IHX bulk
moni tor. The uni t is con ta ined
in aseparate thimble simi1ar to
the location monitor.
In addition
also provided to
continuous1y from
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(b) The CDFR Proposed Monitoring
Scheme
A scheme for CDFR has not
yet been decided although a
tentative scheme outlined below
and in Figures 5 and 6 is being
studied.
present performed by sampling
and subsequent measurements of
the alpha activity. However a
9r8cioitator system has been
developed and is currently being
commissioned and will enable the
cover gas to be monitored for
radon on-line.
The bulk coolant will be
monitored for delayed neutrons
using monitors which receive
samples continuously purnped from
the outlets of each heat
exchanger. To ensure full
coverage for safety two
independent monitors are planned,
each receiving four sampIes from
each of the eight heat
exchangers. A simple location
system is also being considered
to give an approximate guide to
the position of a failure.
(c) Monitor Design
A further. possibility being
explored to locate assemblies
containing defect pins is to
sample the sodium from
subassemblies in turn for fission
gas release after the reactor has
been shut down. For this purpoge
a moving or 'roaming' probe is a
possibility.
assembly from the outlet to a
sample pipe connecting the
diagrid to two monitors mounted
in the fixed roof. Such a scheme
could also be used to locate
breeder faults either to an
individual assembly or to groups
of assemblies using a rotating
sampling device for selection of
the sampIe. Location of core
failures is achieved sirnilarly by
sampling subassemblies in turn.
In this case pipes from S/A
outlets can be fed directly to
monitors in the rotating shield.
Six monitors are being considered
each sampling 60 assemblies. The
type of monitor has not been
decided but DN and gas detection
are both being considered.
The DN moni tors in PFR are
all cylindrical in construction,
the sample volume being
sur rounded by annul i of lead,
polythene and then lead, wi th
suitable heat barriers and steel
supports. The inne~ lead annulus
reduces the gamma radiation at a
ring of BF 3 counters in thepolythene annulus to an
acceptable level for pile-up and
damage purposes. The gamma
activity is also such that
gamma-neutron interactions
generate a negligible background.
Sufficient polythene is present
ou ts ide the ou te r ring to reduce
neutron leakage and to make the
count rate due to external
radiation negligible, while the
outer lead reduces the external
gas will be
PFR to measur e
to ind ica te the
the core.
The cove r
monitored as on
its activity and
overall state of
Such a system is considered
satisfactory for detection of
failures in the core but
sensitivity for failures in the
low rated breeder assemblies will
be lower than for the core. To
improve breeder detection
sensitivity the possibility of
monitoring the breeders
separately is being studied. One
proposal is to take individual
sampIes from each breeder and to
monitor the mixed breeder sampIes
with a DN monitor. For this
purpose a pipe would be brought
down the cen tre of each breede r
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The gamma spectrometer is a
standard Ge-Li detector connected
to a mul tichannel analyser' 3 Thecounting volume is 135 cm and
the sensitivity can be adjusted,
if this should become necessary,
geometrically to give a suitable
sensitivity.
The output signals are
mostly connected to the PFR DRE
computer .and are presented to the
operator directly or in other
suitable forms. The bulk
monitors have independent signals
fed to safety circuits for alarm
and trip purposes.
radiation to a radiologically
acceptab1e level. With this
design the count rate in the
absence of failures is the result
of contamination of the core by
'tramp' fuel. The basic
sensitivities of the monitors are
gi ven in Table 1. These can be
checked by a neutron source
lowered into the moni tor. The
relative sensitivities for
detection of fission products
released from the core are, of
course, also dependent on
dilution of the signals, these
are also given in Table 1.
The sensitivity to failures
is deduced from calculations
based on fission rates and on·
estimates of sample dilution etc
from experiments and on the
transit time to the monitors
which is of the order 20-30
seconds.
Moni tor design for
still being considered,
be based on experience
with the PFR design.
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TABLE 1. Sensitivities of PFR DN Monitors
IHX Subassernbly Loeation
Basie jensitivity
e/n/ern
100 100 5
Relative sensitivity
for failure deteetion
1 1 10
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Discussion
D.B. Sangodkar, RRCK:
Your slide on DND location showed a sampling pipe coming from the bottom.
What exactly is the arrangement for sampling?
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
Sodium is I.directed from each siA to impinge on the neighbüuringcontrol
or shut off position: SampIe p1pes run down inside these positions and
a sampIe pump taWes sampIes to the monitur.
F. Gestermann, IA:
How many times do you need to e~am1ne the whole core with your FFDL System
a) under continuous operation without p1n failure?
b) during location procedure?
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
Für DN monitoring the core can be scanned in about I hour, with the precipitator
about 3 hours.
P. Michaille, CEA:
Can you give some details about the calibration with UO z?
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
The UO Z fission source is a small cylinder of UO Z with high UZ35 content.
It is mounted in a breeder pin position at the outlet of fuel assembly
modified to enable this to be done.
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The main cover-gas activity monitor now in use is
the Germanium-Lithium Argon 'Scanning System, or GLASS
(5) which was developed from previous systems (6). Argon
is extracted from the cover gas, aged for ~4 m. to allow
Ne-23 activity to die away, and measured in a 25-mL
chamber above a coaxial Ge(Li) gamma detector. Signals
are fed into a dedicated NOVA computer which acts as a
1024-channel analyzer~ The dynamic range of the system
may be increased by 100 by dilution wlth fresh argon to
give an overall signal-to-background capability of 104•
The activities' of Kr-85m, Kr-87, Kr-8B, Xe-133, Xe-135,
Xe-135m, and Xe-138 are routinely monitored by GLASS.
Ouring normal full-power operation there is a smal!
cover-gas activity due to the fissioning of 2-5 mgm. of
"tramp" uranium. This background has remained remarkably
constant and is believed due to some fixed contamination
in-core which resulted from use of reprocessed driver-
fuel pins over 1964-68. Background activity is entirely
swamped by fission gas released from breached pins. For
example, Fig. 1 shows a typical change in cover-gas
activities from failure of an experimental driver-fuel
pin. Such failures, are characterized by an initial in-
crease in Xe-135m activity; this arises from decay of
iodine in the sodium bond that escapes before stored
fission gas.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. breeder reactor program presently has one
operating facility, a new test reactor, and a prototype
commercial plant which is nearing the end of its design
phase. Each reactor has operating, or planned systems
for the detection and monitoring of fuel-pin failures;
they are briefly described herein. Parallel papers (1-3)
describe U.S. experience in identifying failures.
The operating facility is of course EBR-II, located
in the state of Idaho and operated since 1964 by Argonne
National Laboratory. It has been used for numerous tests
of fuel, absorber, cladding, and structural materials.
The reactor also 5upplies 18 ~~ of electricity to the
local grid, and has been recently cited for aState
award as a "co-generation" facility.
The new test reactor is FFTF, which achieved its
initial ascent to full power. (400 ~R) in December 1980.
FFTF i8 operated by Westinghouse Hanford Company at the
lIanford Engineering Development Laboratory, in the state
of Washington. FFTF will soon become the major facility
in the Uni ted States for irradiation of full-size LMFBR
fuel pins and components.
CRBRP is the U.S. '5 first prototype of a commercial
UIFBR. Its design.is near completion, but its construc-
tion schedule is not firm st this time. CRBRP will be
operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority, a publicly-
owned utility, and will generate 380 ~e of power.
Slightly different fuel-failure monitoring systems
are employed on each of these reactors. In part, these
differences reflect the different reactor designs; and
in part, different operating philosophy toward fuel-pin
failures. For example, EBR-II is a small hybrid-pool
reactor; FFTF and CRBRP are larger-size loop reactors.
Cover-gas activity due to Ne-23 and Ar-41 is less im-
portant at EBR-II than it will be at the other two; the
cover-gas monitors differ accordingly.
Similarly, the initial operating philosophy at
EBR-II and FFTF has been to detect, locate, and remove
subassemblies containing a breached pin. In contrast at
CRBRP "gas leakers" will remain in-core and will only be
removed when sodium-fuel contact is evident or suspected.
1I0wever, EBR-II has also recently been used for fuels
endurance tests, and several intentional breached-pin
tests. Reactor operation has then continued until an
administrative limit on delayed-neutron (DN) activity
has been exceeded. The results of such tests in the
future (4) may allow a more relaxed attitude toward
fuel-pin failures.
The fission-gas activity monitors, the delayed-
neutron detectors, and the methods to measure primary-
sodium activity are described for the Experimental
Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II), the Fast Flux Test Facil-
ity (FFTF), and the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant
(CRBRP) in the United States. Operating experience with
these systems is briefly described.
;,
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Fig. 1. GLASS Activity Data during a
Metal Driver-Pin Failure
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At FFTF and CRBRP
As ear1ier indicated, the 1ike1y faster disengage-
ment of entrained gas from sodium in FFTF and CRBRP,
and the higher neutron f1uxes than at EBR-II, will give
substantia11y higher Ne-23 and Ar-41 activities. Also
at CRBRP, "leakers" \~i11 remain in-core to give poten-
tia11y much greater intrinsic cover-gas activity. Thus,
two refinements in monitoring will be required over the
GLASS at EBR-II: a means to drastica11y reduce the un-
wanted neon and argon activities in the samp1ing stream;
and a device to increase the range of activities which
can be monitored in it.
The monitoring systems at both reactors will be
similar (Fig. 2). As at EBR-II, the stream of active
cover gas will be first aged for ~5 min. to reduce as
far as possib1e the Ne-23 activity. But then it will be
passed through a co1umn of activated charcoal held at
about 1°C, which has at its end a 5-mm. thick planar
germanium diode detector. This co11imator/diode arrange-
ment reduces the impact of Ar and Ne activities. Tests
at Hanford (7) have shown that no more than 3 gm. of
charcoa1 will produce an enhancement of Xe-133 (81 KeV)/
Ar-41 (1293 KeV) of ~3x104; and ~106 for Xe-133/Ne-23.
A simi1ar arrangement will be used at CRBRP. Between
the detector and the column is an absorber/co11imator
device (Fig. 3) which contains five tungsten cy1inders
located in a stee1 disc, driven by a stepping motor.
Four of the cy1inders are co1limators, with two contain-
ing absorbers in the co11imator holes; the fifth con-
tains a ca1ibration source. Change in col1imator posi-
tion is triggered by count rate (8).
The activities of Xe-133, Xe-135, Xe-135M, and Xe-
125 will be routinely monitored at FFTF; Xe-125 is the
activation product of the stable tag isotope Xe-124, and
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Fig. 2. The FFTF Cover-Gas Monitor
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Fig. 3. The Rotatab1e Co11imator/Absorber
in the FFTF Cover-Gas Monitor
will be used to indicate fai1ure of a contro1 rod.
The FFTF system was of course functiona1 during
the steady rise and hold at fu11 power in December 1980,
a 1ength of time sufficient to reach equi1ibrium in
short-1ived gas activities; none was detected in measur~
ab1e amounts. This gratifying resu1t indicated that there
was essentia1ly no tramp fissile material in the active
core region, a conc1usion confirmed by the absence of
de1ayed-neutron (DN) activity in the primary sodium.
DELAYED-NEUTRON MONITORS
The monitoring of DN activity in primary sodium is
simi1ar at all three reactors, although because of their
different geometries the monitoring stations are located
differently. At EBR-II the primary sodium out let pipe is
inaccessible. Therefore a samp1e stream of sodium is
pumped from the discharge of the single intermediate
heat exchanger (IHX) to a detection station (FERD) out-
side of the primary vesse1, and back in again to the
primary tank. At FFTF and CRBRP there are three dete~­
tion stations, one on each of the primary out let pipes,
upstream of the pumps. Figure 4 shows the p1anned ar-
'rangement of DN detection systems on CRBRP (9).
In all three systems BF3 proportional counters are
or will be used; they are 1ead-shie1ded against primary
sodium activity and moderated; severa1 detectors are
ganged together to yie1d appropriate sensitivity. De-
tails of the recent1y upgraded FERD system at EBR-II are
given in a parallel paper (2). At FFTF and CRBRP the
detectors are housed as close as possib1e to the 1arge-
diameter primary sodium pipes. The time between DN's
entering primary sodium in-core and their detection by
the counters is 18-20 s. in EBR-II, 27-28 s. in FFTF,
and 38-40 s. in CRBRP. The DN detectors are not in the
plant protection system at any of the three reactors,
but there is or will be an administrative shutdown limit
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CALIBRATION AND TESTING OF MONITORING SYSTEMS
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Fig. 5. EBR-II Fission-Product Source Test
a: Recoil range in source material
b: Gas activities approach equi1ibrium
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At all three reactors primary sodium has or will
be monitored routine1y for oxygen, carbon and the trace
impurities associated with normal operations; and for
fission products and possibly fuel resu1ting from fue1-
pin fai1ures. Although severa1 methods of. samp1ing have
been developed at EBR-II (12) the main one used unti1
recently has been a simple overflow samp1er located in
the sodium purification ce11. In this device up to four
lO-mL Pyrex beakers are fi11ed to overflowing with
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Meanwhi1e, the cover-gas monitoring systems for
FFTF and CRB'RP have been. ful1y tested at EBR-II, making
use of the frequent fission-gas releases from breached
pins to finalize counter geometry, and other operating
characteristics. The FFTF cover-gas monitor has supplied
a backup, alternative view of gas releases at EBR-II.
In particu1ar, the system has often a110wed identifica-
tion of Xe-125 release in-core, an isotope which GLASS
is not set up to monitor. Tests on the FFTF system have
been successfu11y concluded; tests of the CRBRP system
are now underway.
PRlMARY SODIUM ANALYSIS
·1.!Wl2!iUUUlD IMOfftATOPI
",ut,"LV
-"1mrm~~:--111 fI,.",UVIL
Fig. 4. Configuration of DN Monitors at CRBRP
The monitoring systems at EBR-II--GLASS and FERD--
were calibrated in 1977 (10), and again in 1978 (after
an upgrade of the FERD). To do this a recoil source in
the form of a dilute uranium-nickel alloy was irradiated
in-core for a full reactor run. The recoil source
strength of the alloy had been previously measured in
the known flux of the thermal reactor CP-5 (Fig. 5a).
The equilibrium activities of fission-gas isotopes in
the cover gas could then be related to their known
source terms, allowing the counting efficiency to be
directly calibrated; similarly for FERD (2). Fig. 5b
shows how the isotope activities approached equilibrium
over the first 1-2 days irradiation. The overall source
strength was chosen to allow good counting statistics
on both GLASS and FERD. A simi1ar source test is being
investigated for the FFTF, using the same al10y material.
An added feature of such a calibration will be to proof-
test the concept of DN source location by triangulation,
using the signals from the detectors on the three pri-
mary outlet pipes (11).
on DN signal count rates.
At initial full power in EBR-II the background DN
signal count rate is 55 cps, rising to ~60 cps over 2-3
days due to build-in of Na-24 activity and (y,n) reac-
tion in the Benelexmoderator. Approximately 40 cps are
due to tramp uranium, the remainder being due to the
(y,n) effect, counter off-set, and other minor factors.
The tramp count rate is a component which changes
promptly with reactor power change, as has been observed
in recent power-cycling tests of the driver fuel. The
history of DN signals over and above this well-defined
background is reviewed in another paper to this meeting.
Fig. 6. The On-line Distillation Unit at EBR-II
for Analysis of Primary Sodium
sodium in an inert atmosphere; after 5 days cooling the
beakers are removed and analyzed. Similar procedures
will be adopted at FFTF and CRBRP (13).
Throughout the course of EBR-II history plutonium
has never been detected by the overflow sampier to the
limit of detectability of 5xlO- 12 gm/gm. Similarly, only
once or twice has uranium been detected above the detect-
ability limit of lxlO-9 gm/gm. This experience tends to
confirm that exposure of metal or ceramic fuels to pri-
mary sodium has been minimal.
With advent of limited breached-pin testing a more
sensitive device--the on-line distillation unit or OLDU
(14)--was installed and made operational in 1978. In the
OLDU (Fig. 6) a sampie of about 150 gms of primarv so-
dium is heated and volatalized. Non-volatile impurities
are left in the sampie cup' and may be analyzed immedi-
ately, since cooling of the Na-24 activity is not re-
quired. With the OLDU operational, plutonium has been
detected on one or two occasions above its detectability
limit. The highest value occurred in February 1979, when
a value of ~lxlO-10 gm/gm of plutonium was measured.
This value followed the endurance failure of a fuel pin
with a particularly brittle cladding, although no fuel
loss was apparent by visual examination or weight loss.
The value declined to its detection limit over the next
ten days operation, indicating that the fuel was prob-
ably dispersed as minute particulates which had gradu-
ally settled out in the cold primary-sodium tank.
....
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The method of DN monitoring is the same at all
three U.S. reactors, and is similar to monitoring on
LMFBR's world-wide. It involves the detection of DN'
activity in primary sodium by lead-shielded, moderated
BF3 detectors, and associated electronics. EBR-II differs
from FFTF and CRBRP in having a by-pass loop of fresh
primary sodium to interrogate in this manner; at the
loop reactors, of course, rnonitoring can take place on
the hot leg of the three primary outlet pipes. The con~
siderable experience gained at EBR-II (described at this
meeting) should be directly of benefit to the other two
reactors. The same may be said for the analysis of pri-
mary sodium.
The main conclusion to be drawn from U.S. experi-
ence to date is that the detection and monitoring of
fuel-pin failures in LMFBR's is quite weIl developed.
A parallel paper addresses the state-of-the-art with
regard to the identification, or location, of fuel-pin
failures.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Fission-gas and delayed-neutronmonitors have been
developed and thoroughly tested over the years at EBR-II
for immediate use at FFTF and eventual deployment on
CRBRP. •
Cover-gas activity monitors use rugged, well-tested
y-ray detectors to monitor up to seven of the indi-
vidual fission-gas isotopes released from breached pins.
Operating experience has shown these systems to be ex-
tremely sensitive and reliable devices, being capable
for example of readily detecting the presence of minute
amounts of "tramp" uranium in EBR-II. Steps must be
taken at FFTF and CRBRP to reduce the high Ne-23 and
A-41 activities which arise from loop sodium operation,
and to handle the potentially high cover-gas activities
expected at these plants. Proof testing of these systems
has been carried out at EBR-II.
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Diseussion
E.K. Yakshin , SRIAR:
How many sodium probes have been distilled at this method?
F.E. Holt, HEDL:
About 100.
C. Berlin, CEA:
How is plutonium measured ~n the primary sodium of EBR-II?
F.E. Holt, HEDL:
By distillation of 150 gms of primary sodium & examination of the residue.
C. Berlin, CEA:
Could you define the units of the last pietures you showed us?
(Pu in primaty sodium versus to time after release).
F.E. Holt, HEDL:
. 1 -12 / f d'Un~ts are 0 gm gm 0 so ~um.
F. Gestermann, IA:
Do you have any other system to loeate p~n failures, if the tag-system has
not found the tag-gas?
F.E. Holt, HEDL:
At EBR-II they have developed a number of nonspeeifie methods whieh were de-
seribed on Tuesday, a.rn. For FFTF-CRBRP there are not systems other than gas
tagging for loeation.
V.F. Efimenko, lAEA:
What ~s your experienee in Ioeation of failures ~n blanket region?
F.E. Holt, HEDL:
No experienee to date.
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J.G. Gauvin, GEA:
How long is the delay to can make the first control of subassembly by
dry sipping?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
~ 15 days, depending on the subassembly type.
M. Relic, IA:
Have you done experiments to measure fuel element temperature due to heat
decay?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
Yes.
D.K. Gartwright, UKAEA:
How long does dry sipping take per assembly?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
Approximately 2 hours.
A. Merkel, IA:
Gould you give us the limit for the decay heat during dry sipping?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
It~slto5kW.
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F. Gestermann, 1A:
1s it true that in America reactors the DND-system has no influence on the
automatie SCRAM system?
F.E. Holt, HEDL:
That is true. EBR-11's DND System was initially connected to its Plant
Protection System but was removed when that plant began its Run-To-Cladding-
Breach program. FFTF+CABRP DND systems are not connected to the Plant
Protection System.
J. Dauk, 1A:
Do you have special purification procedures concern~ng covergas for tagging?
F.E. Holt, HEDL:
A cover gas cleanup system includes a cryogen~c still which will remove
Xe and Kr from the argon cover gas.
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TIlE RESULTS OF TESTING !ND EXPERIENCE IN THE USE OF
LEAK DErEOTION METHOns IN FAST REAOTORS
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V.I. Lenin Research Institute of Atomic Reactors,
Dimitrovgrad, USSR
Part I
Introduction
Part 2
PERFORMANCE OF TRE DETECTION SYSTEMS AND TRE
EQUIPHENT USED IN LMFBR' S IN TRE USSR
t
Abstract
Briefly reviewed are the available LMFBR failed fuel ele-
ments detection systems. Presented are the main characteris-
tics (and instrumentation) of delayed neutron anä fission gas
monitors as weIl as the instrum.entation for failed fUel sub-
assembly control during the reactor shut-down. The features
of delayed neutron and fission product release during and
following a fuel pin failure are described. Present-day and
futüre research aimed at leak-detection methods improvement
are covered. It 18 concluded that the available failed fuel
detection systems prevent the development of failure into a
wide-open crack leading to fuel-coolant contact and resulting
in. contamination of the primary circuit exceeding the perm! -
ssible limits.
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I. mTRODUOTION
Economic efficiency of nuclear power plants operation may
be lnereased by aehievlng higher fuel burnups and decreasing
the number of refuelling outages. On the other band this re-
sults in higher number of failed fuel and longer periods of
operation with failed fuel elements present in the core. In
this ease, operating the power plant with failed fuel elements
in the core will lead to deterioration of radiation situation,
prolonged maintenanee, higher eosts of protection measures and
.deeontamination.
For every nuclear power plant the limits on the number and
the extent of fuel defects are imposed. Achleving these limits
must be followed by the reaetor shutdown and failed fuel Bub-
assemblies loa~lization and discharge.
As an example, for the BOR-60 plant normal operation with
0.1-0.2 % of failed fuel pins was set allowable in ease of re-
moval of long-lived 137qs and 1340s nuclides. The fission pro-
duct aetivity within the coolant was in this case comparable
to that of 2~a and corrosion products and did not affect
signifieantly the radiation situation.
The radiation safety of a nuelear power plant may be en-
sured provlded the activity deteetion of such long-lived ra-
dionuclides as 131 I , 1340s, 1370s, 9~b, 14üBa both in the
eoolant and in the cireuit will be carrled outas well as.with
the knowledge of the relationsbip between the release fractions
of the above radionuelides and the measured values of delayed
neutrons and fission gas activities.
For the operated nuclear power plants the possibility has
been provided to continue the operation with the occurrenCe of
pin (gaseous) leaks in the fuel cladding. An increase in the
delayed neutron deteetor signal is considered to be an indiea-
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tion of direct fuel-coolant contact requiring reactor shut-
down to discharge failed tuel subassemblies. However, the
BOR-60 experimental data shows that even at constant delayed
neutron signal the activity buildup for such radionuclides as
13?Os, 1340s, 131 r oceurs up to undesirable level. The release
fraction of 13?Os was 20-40 % on the average in BOR-60.
The knowledge of fission product release, regularities of
fission product removal from the eircuit through the clean-up
systems eombined with continuous control over their level in
the circuit make possible operating the power plant with an
imposed limit of failed fuel elements.
In the USSR the following three techniques are used for
defected fuel pins detection and localization in the core :
- delayed neutron control in the primary cireuit,
- fission gas control in the cover gas,
- fuel subassemblies control in the core during reactor
outages.
In addition, sodium and cover-gas sampIes are taken from the
primary cireuit to eontr?l fission product concentrations.
The reactor is properly instrumented and equipped for
every of the above control techniques. The control equipment
and technology are improved. Fission gas detection in cover
gas was formerly accomplished with gas-discharge counters and
scintillation detectors. Now Ge(Li) detectors are used as weIl
as the electrostatic precipitation technique for fission gas
decay daughters : 88Rb and 1380s o Subassembly detection was
initially carried out only from fission gas control. In the
last few years nongaseous fission produc"lis are also measured
for this purpose.
Selective detection of fission products in the coolant
against the 24Na background under reactor operation holds con-
siderable promise for the purpose.
The information of this paper is to a large extent based
on the BOR-60 data. This i8 due to the fact that the BOR-60
reactor was specially created for investigations, testing fuel
materials, fuel element design and its performance under real
power plant conditions.
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2. PERFORMANCE OF TEE DETECTION SYSTEMS !ND TEE EQUIPMENT
USED IN LMFBR'S IN THE USSR
Delayed neutron detection system makes possible continuous
control end is designed to guard against the accidental fuel
element failure end considerable contamination of the circuit
when a fuel element failure leads to a direct fuel-coolant
contaci.
Neutron detectors (corons counters) are placed into the
polypropilene moderator in the vicinity of the primsry loop.
The detectors may operate at 10QoC end in gamma-radiation
fields up to 1500r/hr at a maximum irradiation dose up to
5.107rad and 1012n/cm2• Maximum sensitivity of the detectors
is (0.6-1) pulses e cm2/hr. The time of coolant transport from
the core to the delayed neutron detectors location is about
30s. The system sensitivity is about 50pps/cm2 öf fuel-cool-
ant oontact surface area. Initial background of the system
in BOR-60 reaetor was determined trom the leak neutrons (about
1OOpps).
Cover fissis>n gas control technique is also weIl known.
'So it will be outlined briefly here.
Cover gas is taken trom the reactor to a special loop
containing a sodium cold trap. a pump and messuring section.
For detecting beta-counters are used mounted along a stain-
less steel tube or on rubidium end cesium electrostatic pre-
cipitation eell. The delay time is chosen such that the short-
lived23Ne may be 8ufficiently decreased. To better the measure-
ment information NaI(Te) crystal gamma spectrometers and Ge(Li)
detectors are used.
The method is characterized by high signal-to-background
ratio end sensitivity. However, the procedure of the analysis
of the detected radionuclides activity dynamics requires to
be improved.
Sampling of cover gas and primary sodium is applied tor
detection equipment calibration, for measuring both cover
gas low active fission gases end solid fission products ( I,
140Ba, 140La , 134Cs , 137Cs , 95Zr radionuclides etc.) in so-
dium. Sampling is accomplished with special sampling devices.
The sampIes are analyzed with Ge(Li) detectors.
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The delayed neutron signal on the reactor control panel
may be ueed to aome to a decieion about an unecheduled reactor
ehutdown.
Three methode of subassembly detection during the reactor
schutdown are known. In the USSR reactors two procedures are
used: the failed fuel subassembly detection both in-situ and
after their discharge into a flask. In future it is suggested
to detect failed fuel subassemblies on their removal into the
gallJ~Fig. 1 shows a flow diagram of a special BOR-60 fa.iled
fuel subassembly detection facility. The cover gas is passee
through the activated charcoal absorber prior to detection.
Then a special tube 18 lowered and placed over a care fuel-
less channel for bubbling the coolanto Pure argon is supplied
to the lower end of the tube and the coolant encloaed in the
tube is degassed to decrease the measurement background. Dur-
ing the detection the lowered tube is tightly placed on the
upper end of the subassembly end sodium i8 displaced with
argon. After fitting the tube on the.fuel bundle wrapper sod1-
um coolant i8 additionally displaced o In such q condition the
detected subassembly is held for aperiod required to hest it.
Then the tube gas section is connected to the measuring loop.
The wrapper end lowered tubes are filled with sodium. The 00-
d1um in the lowered tube is bubbled with argon over the sub-
assembly. The bubbling time depends on the time of the tube
gas change and sodium degassingo The blow-gas is passed through
a particulate filter and a meaaur1ng cell equipped with beta-
detectors o
The conclusion about failed fuel pins is drawn from the
fission product activity in the blow-gas. The fuel subassembl-
ies are heated due to fuel residual heat. This imposes limits
.
on the schedule of the onset of the fuel subassembly detection o
It i8 usually 1nitiated in 6-10 days after the reactor shut -
down and assures the fuel subassemblies temperature rise up to
600-6500 0 in 3-5 mine The fuel subassembliefl heating time i8
calculated to within 10-15%.
After all the fuel subassemblies are checked those with
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suggested failed pins are selected. To this end, the cri-
terion is used of successive exclusion of those resuits which
fallout of the normal distribution rule for the obtained data
set. It is suggested that a significant deviation of blo~gas
fission product activity levels are due to the failed fuel
subassemblies. With a great number of failed fuel subassembl-
ies their selection by the above criterion becomes less trust-
worthy.
In the BOR-GO plant the reliability of true failed fuel
subassembly selection was increased due to non-volatile fi-
ssion product mea8uring in addition to that of fission gases.
6
Fig. 1 Flow-diagram or ra11ed fUel subassembly detection
system
1 - movabl~ tube, 2 - valve, 3 - particulate filter,
4 - sodium cold trap, 5 - dosage vessel, 6 - gas gauge,
? - particulate rilter, 8 - rlowrate meter, 9 - measu-
rement vessel.
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Discussion
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
Are systems on BN 350 and BN 600 simi1ar to the BOR 60 you· described?
E.K. Yakshin, SRIAR:
These reactors have simi1ar systems.
D.E. Mahagin, HEDL:
In BOR 60 is there a level of coo1ant contamination by fission products
that limits the power level or causes shutdown?
E.K. Yakshin, SRIAR:
We are working on this question - status will be discussed by V.I. Schipilov
at this meeting.
P. Michai1le, CEA:
Did you observe fuel 10ss from defected pins?
Did you measure some solid fission products on the circuits (Zr, RU)?
E.K. Yakshin , SRIAR:
We measured Ru-106,Ba-La-140, Nb-95, Ce-141. They were predominately measured
on the surfaces.
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
You say you watch DND and fission gas activity together, is this to watch
for other fai1ures?
E.K. Yakshin , SRIAR:
Yes, but only in BR5 reactor, and did not ~n BOR 60.
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D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
Please deseribe the teehnique used for loeating failures in BOR 60.
E.K. Yakshin, SR1AR:
The answer to this question is ~n my paper. I omitted it ~n my presentation
to save time.
M. Relie, IA:
a) Can you eontrol the temperature of the fuel element during your
loealisation?
b) What ean you say to the tightness between the loeation tube and the
fuel element head?
E.K. Yakshin, SRIAR:
a) Only for experimental subassemblies and for typieal fuel subassembly partly.
b) The tightness is eontrolled by level of argon pressure. We say O.K.
when the level is eonstant.
P, Miehaille, CEA:
When you say that the DND threshold eorrespond to I em2 of failure, how
did you ealibrate it?
E.K. Yakshin, SR1AR:
This is a ealeulated data.
F. Gestermann, IA:
1s your DND-system only eapable for controlling the development of p~n
failures or is there any automatie SCRAM-level?
When do you deeide to shut down the reaetor?
E.K. Yakshin, SR1AR:
In our DND-system we have alarm and automatie SCRAM levels. They depend
on DN background.
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ABSTRACT
The German KNK 11 experimental fast breeder reactor has two different
systems for detecting faulty fuel elements, namely the measurement of de-
layed neutrons (DND system) and the examination of the primary cover gas
for radioactive noble fission product gases. The control system for the
primary cover gas is installed in aseparate circuit and consists of two
NaI(TI) detectors with amplifiers and rate meters, an on-line y-measuring
station with high purity germanium detector, multi-channel analyzer and
computer, and a sampling station.
Since KNK 11 was commissioned in October 1977, there have been total of
two failed fuel elements. The first defect occured on April I, 1979 and
was discovered by a sudden, step rise of fission product activity in the
primary cover gas. When the plant was subsequently shut down, increased
signals were also observed in both DND moni torso.
The second fuel element defect starts onMay 21, 1980 as a "leaker", Le.,
with an increased gaseous fission product activity in the primary cover
gas without, at the same time, giving rise to a DND signal. The leaker
phase las ted for 30 days of reactor operation at 96% power until, on
August 19, 1980, the leaker developed into a fault generating a DND
signal; accordingly the reactor was scrawmed after the DND limit had been
exceeded.
Prior to localization and unloading of the second failed fuel el~ment,
the plant had been operated with this "open" fuel rod defect at 40%
power for two weeks in order to allow the development of the DND signal
and the gaseous fission product activity to be foll~'ed under this con-
ditions.
Especially the following techniques were used after the second fuel
failure forpr~localizationof the defective fuel element concerned:
( ) .. h 131 /134 .. h . (d'1 Determ~n~ng t e Xe Xe r,at~o ~n t e pr~mary cover gas ~s-
tinction between plutonium bearing test zone and the non-plutonium
bearing driver zone).
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(2) Operation with skewed absorber position ("flux tilting") at 15%
reactor power (to narrow the area with the defective fuel element
by way of different signal levels of the DND monitors at the two
primary sodium outlet pipes).
(3) Comparison of the two DND signals at the primary sodium outlet
pipes.
(4) Precise monitoring of the outlet temperatu~e and calculating of
the burnup of the elements in the plutonium bearing test zone.
Testing this pre-localization methods were so successful that the de-
fective fuel element causing the second fault was found within three
days after start the normal localization technique by a modified dry
sipping technique.
This report describes the experience accumulated in the detection, pre-
localization and localization of two defective fuel elements in KNK 11.
1. INTRODUCTION
KNK 11 went first critical on October 10, 1977 and attained its full
power of 58 MWth (= 20 MWe ) on March 3, 1979.
The KNK 11 core (Fig.l) consists of a central U02/Pu02 test zone with
7 fuel elements surrounded by a U0 2 driver zone with 22 fuel elements.
The fuel of the test zone contains 30% Pu and 83/93% enriched uranium.
The uranium in the driver zone is enriched to 37%. A summary of the core
and fuel element da ta is shown in Table 1. The reactor is controlled
by five control rods; three additional absorber rods provide redundant
reactor protection.
The fist fuel element failure occurred on April 1, 1979 after 65.4 full
power days and an average burnup of the fuel elements in the test zone
of 11,6 MWd/tHM 1
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The second failed fuel element intitially occurred May 21 t 1980
after 158 full power days and an average burnup in the test zone
of 27 t 5 MWd/tHM t appearing as a "leaker" in the test zone. After
another 30 full power days the leaker developed into a failure with a
DND signal during normal start up operation.
Thereactor was then operated for another two weeks at 40% reactor
power with this defective fuel element which t when localized by the
dry sipping technique t had thus attained an average burnup of
39 t l MWd/tHM.
KNK 11 has two systems for failed fuel element detection. The first
system consists of two DND (= ~elayed ~eutron ~etector) monitors t one
of each is attached to the two main primary sodium pipes (Fig.2)
downstream of their outlet from the reactor vessel. Each monitor con-
tains eight 3He counters connected in pairs to an amplifier. Three
pairs make up three redundancies in the DND system t one pair serves
for standby purposes. The counting tubes are enclosed in a moderator
block made of polyethylene and are strongly shielded against y-radia-
tion and core neutrons. Each DND measuring station has a y-dose rate
monitor and is equipped with a temperature sensor. If a limit value of
the DND counting rate of 2000 cps is exceeded t the reactor will be
scrarnrned. Alarm is given by 1500 cps.
The second system consists of measuring the fission product gas con-
centration in the primary cover gas. For this purpose t the KNK-II
facility has a separate gas circuit (Fig.3) for failed fuel detection.
It contains two NaI(TI) detectors equipped with amplifiers t single-
channel discriminators and ratemeterst an on-line y-measuring station
wi th high puri ty germanium detec tor t mul'ti-channel analyzer and micro-
processor as weIl as agas sampling station ("grab sampIe"). The
amplifier and the discriminator are set to the 80 KeV y-peak of 133Xe •
The single-ehannel discriminators of the füur amplifiers of the second
133 135 87 41NaI (T I) de tec tor are set to' Xe t Xe t Kr t and Ar.
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11. BEHAVIOUR OF THE FAILED FUEL DETECTION SYSTEMS DURING KNK 11
OPERATION WITH INTACT FUEL ELEMENTS
11.1 DND Monitor
KNK 11 had been operated for 65.4 full power days without any
failed fuel elements until April I~ 1979.
In that period of operation~ the background counts rates of the
DND monitors were determined at various power levels (30 - 100%).
This indicated that the measured background signal was one order
of magnitude below the level precalculated under conservative as-
sumptions. Out-of pile experiments were conducted to find that the
sensitivity of the KNK 11 DND monitors was 0.0023 counts per
emitted neutron. Including KNK 11 parameters and an assumed
surface contamination on the KNK 11 fuel elements of 10-7g/u02/cm2~
the recoil model according to 2 was used to calculate the expected
count rate as a function of various reactor power levels when ope-
rating the plant with intact fuel elements. The result is shown
in Fig.4. For comparison~ also the count rates measured at the
respective power levels are plotted after reaching the 24Na sa-
suration activity. This also shows that the actual surface con-
tamination of the fuel elements of the KNK 11/1 core is consider-
-9 2
ably lower~ amounting to approx. 1.4 x 10 g U0 2/cm .
In KNK II~ the sodium flow is constant up to 30% reactor power.
It is only above this level that the flow increases parallel with
the reactor power. The transport times from the reactor core to
the positions of the DND monitors drop from 73 sec at 30% reactor
power to 22 sec at 100% power.
Analysis of the development as a function of time of the DND sig-
nals after reactor scram allowed the follwing contributions to
the bulk background signal at 96% reactor power to be determined:
(y,n) reaction of 24Na
surface contamination
core neutrons
bulk count rate
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73 cps
26 cps
11 cps
110 cps
For KNK II it was provided the reactor to be shut down as soon
2
as a geometric fault area of 8 cm was exceeded.Taking inta
account a background count rate of 110 cps, this results in
a shutdown level of 2000 cps. The resultant detectable geo-
metric fault areas for alarm and shutdown levels for
KNK II are listed in Table 2.
II.2 Cover Gas Monitoring
The gaseous fission product concentration ~n the primary cover
gas was measured both with y-spectrometer and by means of gas
sampIes at various reactor power levels up until April 1,1979.
The results are summarized in Table 3. It should be noted that
h .. . f 133 d 133m.. h .t e saturat~on concentrat~on or Xe an xe w en operat~ng
with intact fuel elements has not yet been reached because of
the lengths of the periods of operation so far. The maximum
levels so far measured under these operating conditions were
33.0 x 103kBq / m3 for 133Xe and 1.4 x 103kBq / m3 for I 33I1]{e.
The reason for these gaseous fission product concentrations in
the primary cover gas when operating with intact fuel elements
is the surface contamination of the fuel rods ("background
fission source"). The fission gas release from sodium into the
cover gas was calculated for KNK II from the measured gaseous fis-
sion product concentrations. The release rate determined
-5 -I
amounts to A = 1.6 x 10 s ,which corresponds to a delay in the
3leakage of 17 h•. The surface contamination determined from the
gaseous fission product concentration agrees with the values cal-
culated from the DND signal.
III.
III. 1
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. . 1 d d f 41 A d 135 ..Flg.5 lS a p ot of the epen ence 0 r an Xe actlvlty con-
centrations in the KNK 11 primary cover gas when operating with
85m 88intact fuel elements. For Kr and Kr, this dependence has a
similar shape. The non-linear dependence of the gaseous fission
product activity on reactor power above 80% could be due to the
major differences in the sodium flow rates between the test zone
and the driver zone and to the well-known KNK 11 gas transport
bl . 1 3pro em, respectlve y
The first operating experience with the cover gas monitoring
system for failed fuel element detection dates back from the
operating phase of KNK I (KNK with a thermal core until 1974).
At that time, there were no on-line y-spectrometers. It was
found that the measured count rates of the first NaI(Tl) crystal
in that system were falsified considerably at the 80 KeV peak
(133xe ) by the high 23Ne activity. This disturbance was reduced by
the installation of a delay vessel between the reactor plenum
and the NaI(!I) device, which increased the translt time from
the reactor plenum to measuring device from 6 to 15minutes.
Since then, the spurious influence has been removed, but it is
no longer possible now both with gas sampIes and the on-line
t h · f 23spec rometer, to measure t e concentratlon 0 Ne and very short-
lived fission products.
At 97% reactor power and intact fuel elements, the firstNaI(Tl)
detector produces a counting rate of 2.0 x 102 cps, which cor-
responds to a 133Xe concentration of 33.0 x 103kBq/m3 in view
of the efficiency of that measuring device.
The second NaI(Tl) detector in the cover gas monitoring system
under the same reactor conditions shows a counting rate of
2 41 2 85~~ 872.5 x 10 cps for Ar and 1.3 x 10 cps each for Kr, Kr
and 135Xe .
BEHAVIOUR OF THE FAILED FUEL DETECTION SYSTEMS IN THE PRESENCE
OF A FAILED FUEL ELEMENT
Fhst Fuel Failure of April 1, 1979
On April 1, 1979, the counting rates of the fi~st NaI(Tl) detec-
4tor of the cover gas monitoring system rose to > 10 cps within
25 minutes, and those in the four channels of the second NaI(Tl)
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detector rose by a factor of 60 - 100 in the same time (Fig.6).
The on-line y-spectrometer only supplied one more measurement
after the increase of the primary cover gas activity, because
the upper limit of the counting rate of the detector was sub-
sequently exceeded. Two gas sampIes could only be extracted in
a makeshift way through the feed line to the gaschromatograph
because,as a consequence of a leak in the rotating plug of the
reactor vessel the containment could not be entered for ~n­
creased radioactivity and thus the gaq sampling station of the
cover gas monitoring system was no longer accessible. Both gas
sampIes had such high radioactivities (D 2 r/h) that theyy
could measured and evaluated in an off-line Ge(Li)-spectro-
meter in the laboratory only after serveral days of decay time.
From the results it was possible to calculate among other facts
that in this fault characterized by a sharp burst of fission
9 9 133 9product gas 9.4 x 10 - 11.1 x 10 kBq of Xe and 6.3 x 10 -
9 135 .7.4 x 10 kBq of Xe were released from the defect~ve fuel
rod within 25 minutes. Under the assumption of only one rod be-
~ng defective, this release provided a first indication of the
element involved being located in the area of the plutonium bear-
ing test zone.
Fig 7. shows the development of the DND signal in this defect.
Simultaneous with the fission gas burstobserved, only the DND
monitor at the' primary sodium outlet pipe 1 ("DND east") shows
an increäse ~n the counting rate by approx. 1-2 cps. 1h later,
the first DND burst was observed in the two monitors. Because
of the cover gas activity in the containment, the reactor was
stepwise shut down by gradual power reduction 1.5 hIater.
Thirty minutes after the onset of power reduction the largest
DND burst was found in the two monitors, which was followed by
three other signal peaks at· intervals of 1.5h each. For sub-
seqent pre-localization it was very important that the signal
of the DND monitor coming from primary sodium circuit 1 (DND
east) was 4.2 times higher than that coming from primary so-
dium circuit 2 (DND west). Calculations performed to deter-
mine the geometrie fuel area (recoil model,K=10) indicated
values of 1 - 1.2 mm2 .
rrI.2
100
In the meantime, the defective fuel element has been examined
in the hot cells of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center; one
pin of this assembly was partly filled with sodium. The exact
location of the defect has not yet been found.
Second Fuel FaiLure of May 21 and August 19, 1980 respectively
On May 21, 1980 a rise in the cover gas activity wasobserved
during 100% power operation. It reached a factor of 10 below
the concentrations measured after the first fuel failure. This
,'las the first "leaker" experienced in the KNK 11 operation. By
August 19,1980there had been no increase in the DND signal but
only for the cover gas activity, After the beginning of the
leaker, the following period of operation at 96% power for
30 days exhibited two phases with different patterns of be-
haviour of the leaker. The first phase lasted for 16 days and
was characterized by periodic gaseous fission product bursts at
intervals of 1 -1.5 days. Fig.8 shows the counting rates in
133this phase as measured by NaI(TI) detector set at Xe.
F ' 9 h 'f h 135 .~g. s ows a sect~on 0 t e Xe concentrat~on curve as
measured by the on-line y-spectrometer. In this phase, a to-
9 133 9 135tal of 2.0 x 10 kBq Xe and 3.2 x 10 kBq Xe were released.
In the second phase, which las ted for two weeks under the same
reactor conditions, there were only four prolonged gaseous fis-
sion product bursts (some of them lasting up two days). Fig.l0
shows the typical development of the gross 133Xe counting rate
as measured by the first NaI(TI) detector in this phase. The
activity released in this second phase amounted to 1.3 x 109kBq
133 9 135
of Xe and 2.2 x 10 kBq of Xe. By the end of the leaker
9phase, this had accumulated to activity release of 3.3 x 10
133 9 135kBq of Xe and 5.4 x 10 kBq of Xe. These levels indicate
that the fission product gas inventory generated was largely
blown off in the first phase.
All detectors of the cover gas monitoring system including the
gas sampling station worked weIl und permitted continuous balanc-
ing of the fission product gas quantities released.
101
On August 19, 1980, the plant was serammed thirty minutes after
having attained 95% power, beeause the DND signal limit setting
in the eireuit 1 monitor (DND east) had been exeeeded. The s~g­
nal developments in the two DND monitors are shown in Fig. 11.
The eurves indieate that the elear inerease in the DND signal
began 30 minutes before reaehing the set limit and that the
signal of the monitor in eireuit 1 was slightly higher than
that of eireuit 2.
IV. BEHAVIOUR OF THE FAILED FUEL DETECTION SYSTEMS OVER TWO WEEKS
OF OPERATION WITH DND SIGNALS
A probable geometrie fault area of 0.5 em2 was ealeulated for
the seeond failed fuel element from the DND signal by means of
the reeoil model using a K-factor of 10. This relative small
failure and the objeetive to observe the development of the
DND signal as a funetion of time for subsequent eorrelation
between DND signal and fault size (following post-irridation
examinations) led to the deeision to eontinue reaetor opera-
tion for two or three weeks at 40% ra ted nuelear power with
open fuel (i.e., with DND signal) up until a DND signal of
approx. 1000 eps. The development of the DND signal in the two
weeks of this operation mode is plotted in Fig. 12. Raising
the plant to 40% power led to a short DNDburs~ The signal then
stabilized for four days at 80 - 100 eps and within another
five days rose to 400 and 600 eps, respeetively. At. this level,
the signal rem8ined eonstant until the end of this operating
phase. The geometrie fault area ealeulated for this eounting
rate under the same eonditions was found to be 1.3 em2 .
The eover gas monitoring system only showed some short rninor
fission product gas burts in the first 3 - 4 days of this op-
erating phase. Afterwards, the fission product gas eoneentra-
tion in the eover gas stabilized at a eonstant level.
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V. EXPERIENCE IN KNK 11 IN THE PRE-LOCALIZATION OF DEFECTIVE FUEL
ELEMENTS
Three methods of pre-Iocalization of defective fuel elements
are used at KNK 11:
(I) Determining the I3I Xe /I34Xe ratio in the primary cover gas.
(2) Operation wi th skewed absorber position ("flux tilting")
at 15% nuclear power while observing the DND signals of the
monitors at the two primary sodium outlet pipes (DND east
and DND west).
(3) Comparison of the DND signals from primary circuits and 2.
Method (I) can be used already if the fault is a leaker;
method (2) and (3) require a DND signal resulting from the size
of the faul t.
V.I Determination of I3I xe /I34Xe Isotope Ratio in the Primary Cover
Gas of KNK-II
For the determination of Xenon isotope ratios in the KNK primary
cover gas a combination of gas chromatography and mass spectro-
metry was used. With this procedure up to six selected Xenon iso-
topes are monitored continuously and the results processed by a
lab da ta system. For gas concentrations in the 10 - 30 vpb range
(i.e. 10- 7 volume percent range) isotope ratios may be determined
directly with a standard deviation better than ± 5%.
Taking into consideration the fission yields, neutron energies, ~r-
ad·· d l' h' , f 131 /134 11r . ~at~on an samp ~ng ~story the rat~o 0 Xe Xe a ows a
clear distinction of fuel element failures from Pu02 containing
test elements and enriched uranium driver elements.
The technique was applied to the two fuel element failures of KNK 11.
131 134, +During the 1979 failure a Xe/ Xe rat~o of 0.437 - 0.001 and
0.439 ± 0.004 was observed. Interpretation based on EBR-II experi-
mental data 4 suggested a failure in the driver zone. More accurate
data (iodine-I3I-decay) after the dry sipping confirmed the de-
feet of a test element (calculated ratio 0.422 for test element,
0.383 and 0.375 for driver element).
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In 1980 during the appearanee of a leaker the isotope ratio was
. 131 /134 .
measured over a per~od of serveral months. The Xe Xe rat~os
h . bl 4' 1 d' . 1 f 131 Xare s own ~n Ta e ~ne u ~ng eoneentrat~on va ues or e.
From the data (ratio 0.46 : 0.02 the leaker eould be elearly as-
signed to the test zone. The eorresponding isotope ratio during
"dry sipping" was found to be 0.444 ± 0.002 and 0.46 ± 0.02 t re-
speetively.
V.2 Operation with Skewed Absorber Position (Flux Tilting) at 15%
Nuelear Power
Arrangement of the five absorber rods of the reaetor eontrol system
in the eore and the geometrie arrangement of the two primary so-
dium outlet pipes with the DND monitors relative to the eross see-
tion of the reaetor eore (Fig.13) allows the regions of test zone
and driver zone to be subdivided into four quadrants by skewing the
power distribution t in whieh quadrants more DND emitters are re-
leased in ease of a fault under the respeetive skewed absorber po-
sition t whieh will then lead to different signal levels in the DND
monitors of primary eireuits 1 and 2.
The result of this flux tilting operation after the seeond fuel
failure with four different skewed absorber positions is plotted
~n Fig. 14. The results elearly pointed at a defeetive fuel rod
~n the south-eastern see tor of the eore t whieh was later eon-
firmed by loealization.
V.3 Comparison of DND Signals ~n Primary Cireuits land 2
The geometrie arrangement of the two primary sodium outlet pipes
mentioned above t with the DND monitors positioned relative to
the reaetor eore t ean lead to different DND signals in the two
monitors t depending on the position of the defeetive fuel element
and the sodium flow distribution above the reaetor eore. This has
also been found in the two KNK-II fuel failures eneountered so far t
however with major deviations in the differenee between the two
signal levels; the eonelusions resulting from this finding with
respect to pre-loealization were eonfirmed in subsequent loealiza-
tion.
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VI. EXPERIENCE IN FAILED 'FUEL LOCALIZATION AT KNK 11
Faulty fuel elements are localized by a modified dry sipping
method (Fig.15). Localization is possible only with the reac-
tor shut down. The fuel element to be tested is pulled out öf
the core above the sodium level, flushed with hot argon and
then drawn into aseparate flask, capable of evacuation. After
cooling with argon, this procedure is interrupted briefly and
the flask with the fuel element is evacuated to 0.2 bar. The
gas evacuated is collected and measured with NaI(TI) detectors
and, 'by ;'ay of gas sampIe wi th subsequent evaluation, counted
in the laboratory in a Ge(Li) detector withmulti~hannel ana-
lyzer. Handling and measuring a fuel element takes four hours.
h .. . f 85 d 133 d .T e act~v~ty concentrat~ons 0 Kr an Xe are measure ~n
the collecting fission gas; ~n the grab sampIes, also 131~e is
measured.
After the first fuel element defect, 11 driver elements and 4
elements of the test zone had to be unloaded, also for insuffi-
cient pre-localization, until, 11 days after the start of the
examination the failed fuel element was localized in position 203
of the test zone (Fig.16).
The pre-localization process described under V. above produced
good results. After the start of the localization test the se-
cond failed fuel element had been indentified in position 202
of the test zone. The activity concentrations measured in this
case by dry sipping are listed in Table 5.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The instrumentation for fuel failure detection at KNK 11 proved
to be useful. According to the experience from the first fuel
element failure the systems were improved so that during reactor
operation with the second fuel failure more detailed informa-
tions were available.
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Amendments in the pre-localization resulted in a localization
time of two days for the second failure compared to eleven days
for the first failed bundle.
A pre-localization is difficult as long as the fuel element
failure is a fission gas leaker only.
So far, it is necessary to remove each fuel bundle from the
core into a special flask for a dry sipping test. However,
a new device is in preparation according to the method des-
cribed in 5 which will avoid the removal of the tested fuel
bundle from the core.
At present, the cover gas monitoring system 1S extended and
will be equipped with three different precipitators, a Xe-
adsorption system including a NaI(TI) detector, agas chroma-
tograph also including a NaI(TI) detector, and a new on-line
y-spectrometer with an instrinsic germanium detector, automa-
tically operated collimator, multichannel analyzer and a com-
puter.
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Fig. 4: DND-Background
Nuclear Power
Signal VS.
a) calculated
b) after 24Na Saturation measured
Background Caun t Caun t Rate at Faul t Area Fau 1 t Area
tluclear Power Rate 1 cmlFault Area r egarding regarding
Limit Value
Alarm Level
( % ) ( ·1 ) ( 5 ·1 ) ( cm 2 ) ( cm 2 )5
30 27 60 : J3
40 40 95
'.
21
50 54 125 ~ ;: 16
60 67 150 i::' 13
70 81 175 : 11
80 94 189 10
90 107 210 . 9
100 120 221. 9
Table 11: DETECTABLE FAULT AREAS WITH DND MONITORS KNK 11
Huclear Power
••••••••••••••••••••••••• kBq/m 3
21,5 37,0 ) 2,8xI0 6 3.4xlO
4 2.1xlO 4 B.2xlO 2 2,9xl0 3 3,Oxl0
3 3,8xI03
4.1xlO 6 5.1xl04
0) ')
6.0xlO 3 6.5xl0 3 7.7xl0 336.0 62.0
47,6 82.0 5.4xl06 7.9xl0
4 2.2xlO 4 -l1*> 1.lxl0 3**) 8.3xl0 3 7.4xl0 3 1,Oxl04
**) **)
1,4xl0456.3 97.0 7.0xlO 6 1,Oxl0
5 3.3xl04 1,4xl0 3 1,2xl04 9,5xl0
3
.. )not measured
** )no saturation
Table 111: PRI~~RY COVER GAS ACTIVITY DURING OPERATION
WITH INTACT FUEL ELEMENTS
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41Ar 135Xe [10 3 kBqm- 3)
110
100 /9080
8000 70 /7000 60
6000 50 '/: ,/5000 40
"/<4000 30 />'h .// ' . 41 Ar3000 20 / ';
2000 10/ ,//
1000
/ ,//
0/
/ NI h[o,o]0
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Fig. 5: 41 Ar and 135Xe Activity vs. Nuclear Power
Date Time Pressure 1n Subassambly 133 Xe 8S Kr 131m Xe
the Ory-S1p-
___ kBq/m 3
p1ng Flask
( ata )
.*) *)
Oetober lS S3 YN-20S-IA 4.2x10 2 n.d. n.d.o.1B
13,1980 Test Zone
Oetober 1046 0.19 YN-202-IA 5.7xl06 l.lxl07 S.Sxl0 S
14,1980 Test Zone
*) n.d.= not deteetable
Table V: ACTIVITY CONCENTRATIONS IN TRE COLLECTED
DRY-SIPPING GAS
109
f
'''''''''"''l~~ (\ I
;~ -------------- TI';,i-
6 5" 'I '3 '2. 0 I
"1tI-tt.tl~tr:=~~~rrmOfll1nIITrT11111"'f"""'rT't"rtl.l.J._l."'U Ij
Start Pour Decrease
flnlon Ca. Bunt
Fig.6: Cover Gas Signal April I, 1979 Fig.7: DND Signal Behaviour April 1,1979
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AcUvlly Conccntr.nlon
( kßq/m))
Xe-135 2~9,8keV
105
10~
103
10'
10
'
00 , 11
" 020<
Hay,1981
Date
O.. 6~rst U"mber
"Date
..
,Strom
('j)<l> ®
REACTORQPER"UOH
(j)
26. 22 28, 29. ]0, II l6. 2.
<D
\04 Count Rate
(cps)
215.22. 23 K 25. 26. n 28. 29. 30. ]1. 1.6. 2,
'/. Pc>"erl~~f- ---;ISC((lm
60
"20
10 3
Fig.8: 133Xe Count Rate during First "Leaker"
Phase May/June 1980
F · 9 135 . d' .~g.: Xe Coneentrat~on ur~ng F~rst
"Leaker" Phase May 1980 with perio-
die Bursts
16S7 1421 u H u 27 Cl\lc~ U"'e
_____ AU9,,,t 19, 1geo------
r·-,·-., ...;I:.~:'·~'··-:: _~-.·::.:~.I-·.O_.7. ±-...~ .. C;·'=~-:·'·I:j~',:~'J:
...
- - ,,- ..
::~-E.:,:·-:
..~ ~~ Jf~I~ -~;~·~l·"· ,'O, 1 ~~
: :-.7~'·· '.-.,,,;;; .:.
.~
.. ,.._. -
~ lo)(q,sJ .,--r-=o~>l-.:~:E
._ ._. ·/IpIA,/ 0'. c':!· ~.,
>:;,' ::, .:. ,. ~I\: ., -0. ::"••••
Date
n 28. 29. ]0.6.
ISerom
,Scrom
24. 25. 2622. 21(j)
REACTOR OPER"TIOrl
18. 19. 20 2l
~lJneJ 1980
'/'Po"er100
.,
60
"20
HF I
126. 11 It 15,
Jfig.IO: 133Xe Count Rate during Seeond "Leaker"
Phase June 1980
Fig.11 Reaetor Seram by DND Signal
110
600 ONO Count Ilate
(cPll
- ~UgUlt HeO - ----Septe~ber I~~o-O- __
,) not measured
Sampl1 n9 time Ratio 1HXe/l)I+Xe Concentration 1J1 Xe
( ... pm)
Bay 23,1980 be1o" detecU on < 0.002
I~ay 27,1980 belo" detection < 0.002
Bay 28,1980 0.36 ~0.1 0.002
June 9,1980 0.1+68 ~O. 001+ 0.155
June 12,1980 0.1+78 ~0,005 ,)
Ju1y 18,1980 0.5 ~O. 1 0.02S
August 19,1980 0.403 !0.02 ,)
Sept. 10,1980 0.1+56 !0.02 0.009
Sept. 11,1980 0.46 !0.02 0.Q23
Sept. 12,1980 0.46 =0,02 0.023
Fig.12: DND-Signal during Reactor
Operation with "Open" Fuel
Table IV: 13IXe/134XENON RATIO IN THE PRIMARY
COVER GAS DURING LEAKER PHASE
DND COUN T RA TE
(ops)
I-NORTHt-SOUTH---I- EAS T -+-WES T-----1
FLUX TIL TlNG
14 TIME ( r
North Sec tor etc .
6 10 12
North = Reduced Power in
25
24
23
22
21
20
18)9
J8
17
16
1514"------,----,..__-,-__.,...-_..........__-,-__-,-__...
• Contol Rod
Fig.13: Location DND monitors and -Flux
Tilting
Fig.14: Result of Flux Tilting Operation
at 15% Nuclear Power
slep 1 slep 2
CJ.
detector
pump
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Argon
~ig. 15: Detection of Defective Fuel
Elements
. 16 133 , fF~g.: Xe Concentrat~on or
Tested Elements
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Discussion
P. Michai11e, CEA:
When you speak of a geometrica1 size of a fai1ure, which assumptions do
you use and on what are they based?
H. Richard, KBG:
We use the recoi1 model with a k-factor of 10.
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SeME ExPERIENCES Of FUEL fAllURE DETECTION SYSTEM IN JOYO
T. Hikichi, S. Ishiyama, ~. Odo,
H. Taniyama and Y. Nara
Power Reactor and Nuclear
Fuel Develop~ent Corporation
Jl,BSTRACT
The Japan Experimental Fast Reactor, JOYO, has two dif-
ferent types of Fuel Failure Detection (FFO) systems, the
Delayed Neutron Monitoring (D~) system and the Cover Gas
Monitoring (CGM) $ystem. Operational results of both
systems are s~~rized as follows:
1) The total bac~ground of the ONM Syst~4 was reduced
to about 1/70 of its initial value by additional instal-
lation of polyethylene shielding. At 75 Wd of reactor
thermal output, background is 2500 cps, which satisfies
the design requirement. About 8.5\ of the bac~ground
is due to the photoneutrons from the polythylene shield-
ing and the remainder is due to the leaking of core neu-
trons through the primary piping penetration.
2) The total background of the CGM syst~ at 50 Wd and
75 MW is about 80 eps and 120 cps, respectively. From
the results of this 50 MI'/ power up test, .about 60\ of
th3 total background is eontributed by Ne-23, 20\ by Ar-
41, 5\ by Na-24, and the other 15\ is from unid3ntified
.sources"
3) Neither the D~M ncr the CGM system deteeted signals
from tramp fuel in the sodi~~.
4) The transfer time of Ne-23 fro~ the coce to the CGM
system is about 130 seeonds, which agrees well with the
design value.
5) The transfer fraetion of Ne-23 from scdi~~ to argon
eoVer gas is about 1.4%.
1 ~iT?09UCT Iml
The Japan Exrerimental Fast Reactor, JOta, has two
kinds of ruel Failure oetection (fFD) system. These are
(1) Oelayed Neutron Honitoring (0:::1) system, and (2) Cover
Gas Monitoring (CGM) system.
Since the first criticality of JOYO on April 24,
1977, both systClns have operated satisfactorily.
SYST~~ DESCRIPTION
(1) Delayed Neutron Monitoring (ONM) system
Thc D~~ system is installed beside one of the two
reactor outiet primary·pipes as ~hown in Figure 2.1.
The system consists o~ the neutron shielding of poly-
ethylene and boral, lead blocks, araphite blocks, and
two ~inds of neutron detectors, BF3 proportional counters
and boron lined counters.
In order to"assure a broad sensitivity range for
the DNM syst~n, the BF3 counters having a high neutorn
sensitivity were employed to detec~ a small amount of
fission product emission ~nd the boron lined detectors
were installed for a large breach of the fuel el~ent.
The polyethylene neuron shielding was installed
after the reactor eritieal test to reduce the bacxground
of the core neutrons leaking through thc primary piping
penetration •
The transfer-time of sodium from the eore to the
DNM system is estimated aS about 30 seconds from the
results of the thermal transient test in the SO Wdpower
up test.
(2) Cover Gas Monitoring (CGM) systew
The CGM system eonsists of piping syst~~s, t~o vapor
traps, a compressor, and a precipitator. The"reactor
cover gas is extracted from the reactor gas ple~u:.1 and
driven to the precipitator through one inch piping.bY
a f'ompressor.
The pre~ipitator has three nozzles, a sample gas
inlet, a clean argon gas purge lioe and agas outlet
nozzle. Clean argon gas flows from scintillator side
to the ehamber through th" wire guide hole to prevcnt
the sa~ple gas flowing to the"detector and to reduce
the background.
o-t---+----eoo-----\---I
Fig. 2.1 Delayed Neutron Monitoring Block
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In JaVa, the gas flow rate of main piplng in the
CGM systcr.l Is 100 11min. , and the flow rates or the
sampling gas froM main line to the precipitator and of
the purge gas .to the precipitator are 250 cm 3/r.lin. and
50 cm3/min., respectively.
The CGM system diagram Is illustrated in Fiq. 2.2.
Main background of this detection system is from
gases, Ne-23 and Ar-41, which come to the scintillator
through thc penetration hole for tho collection wire,
and from Na-24 which are carrled by COVer gas and pre-
cipitate on the wire.
In addition to the CGM system mentioned above, A
gamma area monitor is installed in the FFD room to
detect and record the gamma dose rate contlnuously.
This measureroent Is also used for the'. analysis of the
reactor cover gas activity performance and of the C~~
system function.
OPERATION EXPERIENCE
(1) Delayed Neutron Monitoring (DNM) System
The count rate vs reactor power during the low power
nuclear test perIod Is shown in Fig. 3.1. This back-
ground level was euch larger than anticipated.
To recluce the background, a modification was done
to the system be fore the power up test by installation
of the polyethylene shielding illustrated in Fig. 2.1.
!
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Operating experience of the Fuel Fai1ure Detection
(FFD) system for the Japan Experimental Fast Reactor,
JOYO, is s~~arized as fallows:
1) Two systems using the DHM method and the CGM method,
have been opera ted satisfactorily and have verified
their functiona1 requirements.
2) .... Since· the. first critica.lity in 1977, no fission pro-
duct has been released in JOYO.
3) The background of the mi:1 system at 75~ro'/ of reactor
thermal power is about 2500 cps, about 8.5\ of which
i5 by the photo-neutrons from the polyethylene shield-
ing and the rest of which is by the core fieutrons
leaking out thrOl.:sh the prirnary piping penetration.
4) The background of the CGM syst~u through the first
50 Y<o'/ duty cycle .as about 40 cps. It has changed
to about 80 cps in the second 50 ~rn of reactor.po·...er.
5) The major COD.Fonents of the CG:oI background are l:e-23,
Ar-41, and Na-24. Contributions of Ne-23, Ar-41, and
Na-24 are about 601, 20\ and 5\, resp~ctively. The
remainder of 15' Is unidentified isotopes.
6) The ba~kground due to the tra~p fuel mateirals in
sodium is so small that it has not been detected by
either the DHM or the CG:1.
7) The transfer ti",e of Ne-23 from core to the CG:~
system was rneasured sevcral ti~es. The average w~s
130 seconds, w~ich shows good agrec~cnt with tha design
value calculated on lhe basis of piston flow.
8) The transfer rate of Ne-23 irOl' scdil.L~ to argor. re-
actor cover gas 15 estJmated to be atout 1.4\.
~fter the ~odification, the background was reduced by
1/70, and is 2500 cps at 75)·\'(/ reactor power, about one
half of the expected level at the system design stage.
Abuut 8.5\ of the background is due to the p~oto­
neutrons jrom the polyethylene shielding and/or the
concrete of the building structure, ano the r~"ainder
is due to the leaking core neutrons.
The Ar-41 and 1Ia-24 contrib~t,ons are s~~,arized a$
about 20\ and ~\, respectively, altho~gh they vary
from test to test.
The nnalysis indicated no background by fission
products of fuel elements and trdmp fuel materials in
sod i lL1\.
The PN~ responses after reactor scram during
the low po~er nuclear test is show~ in ~ig. 3.2.
The contributions of the pllotoneutrons were :::ea-
sureä at the reactor scram tests, showing a post5cram
decay that coincices with the l5-hour half-life of
Na-24.
Measurer.'ents and analysis have indicated nei ther
any release of fission products from the fuel ele"-ents
nor signals from tramp fuel nuclides.
(2) Cover Gas Honitoring (CG:oI) SysteZl
1) Back~round characteristics
The background characteristic5 of the CG~ system
are affected by system operation conditions.
Operating experience of these past two years
indicates th~t the deviation of total background
is less than 301.
The total background at 75Hl'/ of renctor thermal
power is about 120 cps.
Changing the CGM system operation conditions
indicated that no core fission products were released
to the reactor cover gas.
About five days are required for the count rate
to reach the saturation value. Analysis revealed
that this 1s because of Na-24 build up (15 hr ha1f-
lite) •
2) Ne-23 Background and Transfer Time
:he major.background nuclide is Ne-23, produced by
sod1um activation, Na-23(n,p) Ne-23. To identify the
background isotopes, the precipitator responses were
taken during the reactor scraIn tests and the 50 Wd
power up test, in 1978.
The precipitator count rate decreases to approxi-
mately 40\ about two minutes after reactor scr~~.
The decayed isotope had a short half life of about
one minute and was assumed to be Ne-23.
A delay from reactor scram to count rate decrease
is considered to be the transfer time of Ne-23 from
the reactor core to the precipitator. This is there-
fore tha minimum response time of the JOYO CGM system.
The soak/count interval of the precipitator is set
to 10 minutes.
The measured transfer time, about 130 seconds, ex-
hibits good agree~ent with the design value of 125
seconds calculated by the ass~~ption that gas is
transported by piston flow.
The transfer rate of Ne-23 frc~ scdium to the
cover gas is estimated by the production and detection
ratios of Ne-23 to Ar-4l, and the decay term calcu-
lated from the transfer time. The detection ratio
of Ne-23 to Ar-4l was measured in the orecipitator,
preliminary test. The calculated resuit shows a
transfer fraction of 1.4% till the end of the first
50 }r.'1 duty cycle.
3) Background by Other Isotopes
The decay curve of typical p~ecipitator background
folloffing a reactor scram test is Sh6~~ in Figure
3.3.
t) Background Increase after Reactor Scram
Both the precIpltator count rate and the gamma
dose in the FFD room increase about 30 minutes
after reactor scr~~, or perhaps decrease rapIdly
just after the scram and return partially after
abeut 30 mlnutes. The reason for and Isotopes
causing this activity change (increase of decrease)
have not been found.
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Discussion
S. Jacobi, KfK:
In one of the viewgraphs a cross section of the DND monitor of Joyo was
shown. What is the reason to use graphite for moderation of the delayed
neutrons in contrast to use polyethylene to moderate the core neutrons?
Mr. Miyazawa, TOSHIBA:
At first, we designed by following the requirement on fire protection in
the reactor building. In the second step, we were permitted to use the
polyethylene as core neutron shielding with stainless steel cover.
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UK presentation to the IWGFR
Special ist Meeting
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Fai1ed Fue1
Elements in LMFBRS' Kar1sruhe
11-14 May 1981
Part 2
EXPERIENCE FROM THE P~OTOTYPE
FAST REACTOR AT DOUNREAY
EXPERIENCE FROM THE PROTOTYPE
FAST REACTOR AT DOUNREAY
In th is sect ion of the UK
presentation the signals from
tramp fuel contamination, a
defected pin, and two failures in
experimental pins are discussed.
Background Signal Levels
The signals for the IHX bulk
DN moni tor and the precipi tator
in the absence of known activity
sour ces othe r than con tamina tion
of the core are given in Table 1.
The data are consistent with a
fuel level equivalent to less
than 1 mg of Pu 239 at the core
centre.
The tramp DN signal is
proportional to power and to the
number of IHX' s in use as would
be expected.
The cover gas precipitator
activity is sensitive to core
outlet temperature and increases
by 50% if all the IHXs are not in
use. Var ia tion of flow through
the DN monitor has shown that
stray and gamma-n neutrons made
little contribution to the count
rate. These measurements and
those from reactor transients
show that the mean time from the
core to the IHX DN monitor at
full reactor. flow is 25 + 3
seconds.
The activity of the cover
gas is principally caused by Ne23
and A41. The Ne23 activity is
very variable while the A4l level
corresponds to a gas entrain~3nt
level of the order 5 x 10 %.
Ne23 measurements have been used
to measure the transit time from
the cover gas to the monitor as 7
minutes whereas the transfer of
fission products from the sodium
to the gas has an inve_l..se time
constant of about 0.7 hr .
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A defect pin with a 0.25 mm
diamete r hole at the top of the
plenum has been in the core since
June 1978. No increase in
signals was initially observed
with the defect in the core
except when the pump speed was
reduced, then gas signals were
recorded. Subsequently
occasional increases in gas
activity under steady running
have been attributed to release
from this pin as shown in Figure
1. Activities are given in Table
2 - no increase in DN activity
has been observed.
Signals from Fuei Failures
Two fuel failures have been
detected in PFR, both arising
from highly rated experimental
pins containing vibro fuel. Both
defects were initially detected
by increases in the cover gas of
long lived Xe133 and Xe135
although at first it was not
clear if these increases were due
to the defected pin. DN signals
were not observed until many days
after the initial detection by
fission gas signal. In the case
of the first failure the delayed
neutron signal rose to several
times background over several
weeks. The signal was no i sy and
increased non-linearly with
power. The signal from the
second failure increased more
rapidly so that after several
weeks it was 25 times background,
and was again non-linear with
power. Oscillation of reactor
power and rod drop experiments
suggested that during irradiation
the effective transit time of the
signal from the second defect pin
increased from 15 to 26 seconds.
At the time of failure peaks
giving an increase of several
orders of magnitude in cover gas
activity occurred but after about
20 days these reduced to a high
but steady siqnal. Dur ing this
per iod, after about. 10 days the
DN signal increased as. shown in
Figure 2.
The failures were located
using the loop and sparge pipe.
The first failure gave a
count-rate of about 10 times
background. The second failure
was si tua ted in a DMSA clus te r
and the location signal was
therefore concentrated;
correcting for this the count
rate was equivalent to about 5
times background. The
orientation of the loop was
checked using the calibration
foil and the defect pin.
Examination of the second
failure has shown one of the pins
to have aseries ofaxial crack~
with a total area of about 1 cm
whereas the signal if based upon
an effective exposed recoil area
is equ i valen t to abou t lOt imes
this value.
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TABLE 1
Signals [rom Tramp Fuel at Full Power
IHX Cover Gas
DNM Precipitator Gamma Spectrometer
count/s counts/min microcuries/m3
Xe133 Kr 85m Kr 88 Xe135 Kr87
4 5,300 80 4.5 9.0 37 7.3
TABLE 2
Activities attributed to Defect Pin
-------------------------------------------------------
Gamma Spectrometer
, ,'/ 3mlcrocurles m
Xe133 Kr 85m Kr 88
11.10 3 2 3 0 1 3O.. 10 .. 10
Xe135
14.10 3
Cover gas
Precipitator
counts/min
51.3.10
-------------------------------------------------------
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Discussion
P. Michaille, CEA:
How did you stop the reactor in the case of the DND signal of fig. 10?
Which is the level of the DND scram?
T.A. Lennox, UKAEA:
The reactor was shutdown manually to permit refuelling. The scram level
is adjusted according to the proposed operating conditions.
M. Relic, IA:
a) What sensitivity has your precipitator for Ne-23?
b) What is the transit time of gases from core to the precipitator?
T.A. Lennox, UKAEA:
b) The transit time to the precipitator from the cover gas 1S about 7 minutes.
a) Since the transit time to the precipitator is long Ne23 does not influence
the precipitator signal. We have measured the total contribution of the
gamma background to the precipitator signal by stopping the precipitator
wire. This contibution is very low about 5 % of the total signal.
C. Berlin, CEA:
About your artificial experiment, you show a picture where the gas signals
are represented you presume that the precipitator signal slightly increase
relatively to the large evaluation of the 133 Xe activity - What is your
conclusion?
T.A. Lennox, UKAEA:
The precipitator is sensitive to the level of Kr-88 activity. In the figure
presented the small change in precipitator signal implies a small change 1n the
level of Kr-88 activity i.e. the gas release is of " age d" gas containing the
long lived isotope Xe-i33, Xe-135 principally.
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U.S. Experience in Identifying Fuel-Pin Failures
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HETHODS USED FOR IDENTIFICATION
(RBCB) tests also started. During this period, which
may be called Phase 111 and includes the present, an
average of 10-15 failures have occurred per year.
Phase 111 has been characterized by an increasing
number of occasions when several failures have been
in-reactor at the same time. Although this has caused
no problems per se, it has complicated identification
of failures, as we shall later describe.
Twelve methods have been developed at EBR-II for
the identification of fuel-pin failures; they are
listed and briefly described in Table I. The first six
methods in this table were used in Phase I of EBR-II
operations when there was no accompanying release of a
xenon tag. With one exception, these methods involved
the measurement of fission-gas activity in the cover
gas and were non-specific in nature. The sixth method
predicted failure based on experience; it was of use
for homogeneous groups of fuel pins (such as the EBR-II
metal driver) in which there was a well-defined mode
of failure (9). Identification frequently involved many
reactor shutdowns and startups, and 5-10 days of lost
operating time. The acid test of iden~ification was
always the absence of short-lived fission-gas activity
on resumption of full power.
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ABSTRACT*
*Work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy.
As the.use of EBR-II as a test facility has grown
and changed with time so has the incidence of fuel-pin
failures varied (Fig. 1). Before about 1972, failures
were rare and were due to defective closure welds (6),
and the like. Although xenon tags were included in ex-
perimental pins from 1969 onwards (7), none of these
early failures had them. So this initial period, which
might be called Phase I of EBR-II operations, was
characterized by lengthy searches for sources of
fission-gas release.
From 1973 onwards, intentional endurance or run-
to-clad-breach (RTCB) tests gave an increasing number
of failures. But generally these failures were well
separated in time and released xenon tags. Experience
was gained in correcting xenon-tag compositions for
changes due to in-reactor exposure, and identification
was quite rapid (8). This per iod might be called Phase
11 of EBR-II operations.
From 1977, or thereabouts, when reference FFTF
fuels tests approached goal exposure and RTCB tests of
advanced fuel-pin designs began, the incidence of
failures sharply increased; run-bevond-clad-breach
FAlLURE INCIDENCE & CONCOHITANT IDENTIFICATION
INTRODUCTION
A general description is given of the methods used
at EBR-II to identify fuel-pin failures over sixteen
years of operation. The recent successful use of on-line
mass spectrometric analysis to identify xenon tags is
discussed in detail.
Experimental fuel pins have been irradiated in EBR-II
since 1964 and cladding breaches have developed quite
often to release radioactive fission gases to the
reactor primary system. Because the reactor cover was
not originally built to be completely leak tight, until
recently every breached pin had to be identified as
quickly as possible and its subassembly removed from
the core (1).
The installation of a cover-gas cleanup system
(CGCS) in 1977 (2) removed this prior need for rapid
shutdown and discharge of failures--to the betterment
of plant factor (which now averages above 70%). But
with an increasing number of failures in endurance
tests of fuel pins of aggressive design, this change
in operating philosophy has laid a heavy emphasis on
distinguishing between multiple xenon tags in the
reactor cover gas. Thus, although all the methods used
over the years at EBR-II to identify failures will be
briefly reviewed, most time will be spent here in
describing recent experience with on-line mass spectrom-
etry of the xenon tag-beds of the CGCS. Parallel papers
(3-5) describe the detection systems at EBR-II, and the
experience gained with delayed-neutron signals and
their analysis.
Th' wbmitted menultrlpt hat bHn authored
by • cootl'Ktor of tht U. S. Governm.nt
uDdet Contract No. W·31·1og.ENG·38.
ACCOtdlnglV, tht U. S. GOYfrnrntnt ret.lrn a
noMxclutivt. rovaltV-frtt lantlf to pobllm
er ropfoduc:t mt publlmed form of thl,
t\lGiAtrfbY.tlon, or ellow othtfl (0 da SQ, for
tI, S., GMrnmfnt P1Jrpom.
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TAßLE 1. Hethods Used to Identify Sources of Fission-product Releases in EBR-II
Method
L Fission-gas
volume
2. Ratio
134Xe/133Xe
3. Normalized
excursion
parameter
4. 135mXe
behavior
5. Heibull f ailure
analysis
6. Flux-tilting
test
7. Ratio
134Xe/ 128Xe
8. Ratio
131Xe/134Xe
9. Xenon tag
10. Fission-gas
and tag
volumes
11. Lift-and-hold
test
12. FUM isolation
test
Purpose
Identifies sus-
pects by gas
release
Discriminates
between metal
and oxide
Discriminates
betweem metal
and oxide
Ind icates release
of bond sodium
Ranks suspects
by failure
probability
Narrows down
suspects to a sec-
tion of the core
Determines
burnup level of
untagged element
Discriminates
between metal
and oxide
Identifies sus-
pects by tag
composition
Discriminates
suspects
with similar tag
compositions
Identifies sus-
pects by gas
release
Ident if ies sus-
pects by gas
release
Advantages
Eliminates low-burnup
suspects
Identif ies type and
burnup of suspect
Rapid
Rapid
Predicts breach in ad-
vance; helps rank other-
wise equal suspects
Easy to perform
Eliminates suspect with
too high or low burnup
Uses stable high-yield
isotopes of xenon
Limits choice to one to
three suspects
Ranks xenon-tag suspects
Confirms suspect
subassembly in
fuel handling
Confirms suspect sub-
assembly at operator's
convenience; minimizes
interference from
cover-gas activity
Disadvantages
Usually limited
applicability
Ratio changes for
same element; af-
fected by fuel and
breach geometry
Empirical; uses
release character-
istics that rnay
give ambiguous
results
None; occasionally
overlooked
Assumes common
mode of failure;
limited by previous
experience
Suspect rnust be adja-
cent to control rod;'
only positive response
is meaningful
For small release,
natural background
contamination can be
significant
Can be affected by
tag in low-burnup
elements
Exposure changes in
tag; sometimes small
tag releases;
contamination
As above; also, early
tag volumes were
variable
Shutdown required;
only positive
response rneaningful;
t ime-consuming
As above; can tolerate
only low decay-heat
level in discharged
su bassembly
The rernaining methods of identification shown in
Table I were in general developed and used in Phases 11
and 111 of EBR-II operations. The predominant rnethod
was, of course, the identification ofaxenon tag from
a failure. However, all rnethods were used if and when
appropriate. For example, the Xe-13l/Xe-134 ratio has
proved useful in distinguishing between failure of a
uranium-f~ssioning metal driver-fuel pin and failure
of a plutonium-bearing experimental pin.
At EBR-II tags have consisted of a ~l mL volume
of a unique mixture of the stable xenon isotopes: Xe-
124, Xe-126, Xe-128, and Xe-129, which is added to all
pins in a given subassembly. The tags were blended from
three components: natural xenon, natural xenon which
is 5% enriched in Xe-124, and pure Xe-128. All told,
140 tag compositions have been produced, with Xe-129/
Xe-124 ratio increments of 1.25, and Xe-128/Xe-124
ratio increments of 4. For FFTF and CRBR, where there
will be a need for a rnuch greater number of tags, stable
Kr-78, Kr-80, and Kr-82 will also be employed (10,11).
mal to such operation, have been encountered with the
system, but none seriously affecting its availability.
The On-line Hass Spectrometer
A7.5-cm radius 60° sector mass spectrometer was
installed on-line with the tag-trap analysis system in
1977. Although the instrument functioned weIl and reli-
ably, it had an inadequate resolution for Xe-133 (an
important isotope), and was also difficult to maintain
at optimum performance. In Hay 1980, therefore, it was
replaced with a new, l5-cm. radius spectrometer which
had been specially designed to have an abundance sen-
sitivity of greater than 30,000 at 133 AMU; to be sen-
sitive to analysis of very small sampies; and to be
more easily maintained.
The performance of this new instrument has been
extremely gratifying: it has allowed, for example, the
routine analysis of background sampies which contain
less than 0.002 mL xenon tag in the ~107 mL cover-gas
volume, and in which Xe-124 can be measured with a pre-
cision of 1% at a mole fraction of 0.0015 of the xenon
isotopes. This value exceeds the best sensitivity which
could be obtained by the 'manual' method by an order of
magnitude (the 7.5-cm. instrument was worse by a factor
of four or five).
The mass spectrometer is operated automatically by
the tag-trap system computer, and is therefore required
to be on-line whenever the reactor is at power. The
instrument has operated with a minimum of downtime.
Routine rep1acement of the source filament is required
every 5 months; and the turbomolecular pumps have had
slight bearing problems. The most serious but easily
remedied problem has been the removal of hydrocarbons
following system shutdowns.
RECENT EXPERIENCE WITR FAllURES
This somewhat reduced sensitivity of the first on-
line mass spectrometer in failure identification was
more than offset by the system's ability to produce
frequent analyses of the cover-gas composition. During
releases the changes in cover-gas composition towards
the xenon tag of a current 'leaker' could be easily
discerned, a situation which added an extra degree of
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confidence in diagnosis. Nowhere was this capability
better illustrated than during the fission-gas release
from subassembly X294 in July 1978. At that time there
were two previous failures in the storage basket, and
the on-line tag analysis had just become fully opera-
tional. Rel~ase from the helium-bonded nitride pin in
X294 began in the early morning of July 20 and continued
throughout that day. Table 111 shows how the cover-gas
composition changed steadily from a 70/30 mL~ture of the
tags from the two failures in the basket, in the early
morning, through to essentially 100% of the X294 tag by
the early afternoon.
The ability of the CGCS to: control activity; purge
previous tag contaminants; and allow frequent sampling,
when combined with the fact that if there are several
leakers in-core then only one will, in general, be
dominant at one time, has been the combination of fac-
tors which has allowed EBR-II operations to continue
under "multiple-leaker" conditions. Under such condi-
tions it has been possible to track the mixing of xenon
tags in the ·cover gas, and to not lose the ability to
identify new failures.
This ability for on-line identification at EBR-II
was weIl shown during July and early August 1980 when,
during the course of a three-week period, five failures
occurred: one in a driver-fuel pin, two in mixed-oxide
pins, and two in mixed-carbide pins. Figures 3 and 4
re1ate the history of identification during that busy
period. Figure 3 plots two isotope ratios in the cover
gas: Xe-129/Xe-124; and Xe-129/Xe-128. The figure shows
the significant changes which occurred in one or both
of these ratios at times of fission-gas release from
the failures. Figure 4 plots the same da ta in one of
the planes of "xenon-tag ratio" space. Again the shifts
in the cover-gas composition over that period show how
each of the failures, in turn, was predominant over
the others. Two shutdowns only were required to remove
four of the five failures (the fifth--subassembly X280
--remained in-core for the remainder of the run at the
experimenter's request). The lost reactor time for all
five failures was approximately 40 hours; a considerable
improvement even over affairs during Phase 11 of opera-
tions when single failures were discharged.
TABLE III
Failure in Subassembly X294 as Followed by
On-Hne Mass Spectrometer (7.5-cm. magnet)
Time of Mole Fraction of Xenon Fraction Tag Volume. 133Xe
Sampie Xe-124 Xe-126 Xe-128 Xe-129 of X294 (mL) (nCi/mL)
10105 0.0243 0.0117 0.3310 0.6330 0.0 0.0006 7
0255 0.0252 0.0132 0.3290 0.6326 0.01 0.004 36
0445 0.0277 0.0130 0.2809 0.6784 0.21 0.005 41
0636 0.0344 0.0163 0.1716 0.7777 0.72 0.009 84
0826 0.0391 0.0175 0.1236 0.8198 0.91 0.030 305
20850 0.0409 0.0182 0.1165 0.8244 0.92 0.036 350
1016 0.0391 0.0178 0.1128 0.8304 0.96 0.054 536
1206 0.0396 0.0179 0.1068 0.8358 0.97 0.072 703
1337 0.0403 0.0185 0.1048 0.8364 1.00 0.100 1022
X294 0.0416 0.0181 0.1061 0.8345Tag
IBackground composition: 70/30 mixture of X273 and X138 E tags.
2Data from a manual tag samp1e.
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When a failure occurred, the xenon contents of
about 0.5 mj of argon or (1/20-th. of the cover-gas
vo1ume) were absorbed on a coo1ed charcoal trap, 1ater
re1eased by heating, and collected in a shielded vial
for analysis on a 1aboratory mass spectrometer. In this
manual mode, sampling was 1imited to once every ten
hours, and was complicated by personnel exposure.
Nevertheless, considerable accuracy was obtairied, and
released tag vo1umes of 0.04 mL could be readily used
for identification.
Although shifts in tag composition due to in-core
exposure were early anticipated, the magnitude of the
shifts was not. Major changes were caused by burnout of
Xe-124 by neutron capture, and production of Xe-128 by
an (n,y) reaction on fission product 1-127. During
several tag releases in 1975 these effects caused con-
siderab1e confusion in identification and extra lost
operating time. But empirical correlation and, 1ater,
the resu1ts of tag-exposure tests and calculations have
steadily removed this uncertainty due to composition
change. Computer programs are now used to update the
compositions of all xenon tags in-reactor for each and
every run. Table 11 compares the as-10aded, corrected,
and measured mole fractions of the tag isotopes in
three subassemblies of different burnup and fluence.
As can be seen, the changes in tag composition can be
substantial after high exposure.
TABLE Ir
Mole Fractions of Tag Isotopes
in Three EBR-II Subassemblies
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3. Subassembly X332
Fue1 Burnup: 6.4 at.%; F1uence: 12.3xl022
2. Subassemb1y X367
Fuel Burnup: 13 at.%; F1uence: 9.3x1022
During Phase 11 most fai1ures were weIl separated
in time so that the tag from one fai1ure did not inter-
fere with the tag from a second failure. An exception
occurred in June 1976 when fai1ure of meta1 driver-fue1
pins (in subassembly X208) close1y fo11owed failure of
a mixed-oxide pin (in subassemb1y X138D). Figure 2 shows
how, on successive days, the cover-gas composition
changed from the X138D tag to that of the X208 tag. Maps
such as the one shown in Fig. 2 are frequently used to
aid diagnosis, although decisions are based on computer
generated "figures-of-merit" of the tags in-reactor
with the measured composition. Even if a fai1ure is
discharged from the core to the storage basket (as in
this case) its tag will still be a contaminant for the
10-30 days of coo1ing, because the storage basket and
the primary tank share a common atmosphere. Such con-
tamination was mitigated by judicious purging of the
'I<
Measured in the cover gas at failure
cover gas with fresh argon, and controlled venting of
activity to the atmosphere under favorable conditions.
The ability to simultaneously purge (and store)
fission gas from the cover gas and to automatica1ly
obtain tag samp1es for analysis was made possible by
installation of the CGCS in early 1977. In this system
a cover-gas flow of up to 0.3 m3/minute is passed
through a liquid-nitrogen cooled cryostill to remove
xenon and krypton, reheated, and returned to the cover-
gas space. A small flow of 0.03 m3/minute is passed
directly through three sets of primary and secondary
charcoal absorber beds, a sampie product cylinder, a
vacuum system, and an on-line mass spectrometer. All
gas processing and mass spectrometer operations are
controlled by a dedicated NOVA computer. Further details
of the CGCS may be found in reference 2.
In the tag-trap system xenon is collected on a
primary absorber bed at -100°F. It is then transferred
to a secondary absorber bed for concentration, where it
is stripped of excess argon. Finally, it is cryopumped
into the sampie cy1inder and, eventual1y, into the mass
spectrometer for analysis. Intermediate steps remove
excess argon and regenerate the absorber beds. Two modes
of operation may be used: a single samp1e mode (which
requires 220 minutes to complete); or consecutive sam-
p1ing every 110 minutes. All three sets of primary and
secondary beds are used. Again each samp1e process and
analysis is complete 220 minutes after sampling began.
Either method is available to the reactor operator, and
results are made avai1ab1e in the reactor contro1 room
via the data acquisition system (DAS) computer.
The tag-trap system has been routinely and reliably
operated since early 1978 through many cycles. Very few
component failures have occurred considering the large
number involved. A few va1ve and heater problems, nor-
THE CGCS IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
0.8662
0.8220
0.8126
0.9023
0.8969
0.8966
0.6726
0.6684
0.6658
0.0742
0.0811
0.0819
0.3010
0.3076
0.3108
0.0938
0.1474
0.1535
0.0086
0.0087
0.0088
0.0127
0.0127
0.0133
0.0077
0.0077
0.0076
0.0273
0.0177
0.0206
0.0159
0.0143
0.0139
0.0177
0.0152
0.0154
As-Loaded
Corrected
Measured*
As-Loaded
Corrected
Measured*
As-Loaded
Corrected
Measured*
RATIO: Xo·1291 Xo·128
1/
/
08ZX L __ ,
I
I
I
I
I
.- 1
ZEEX - - - - - - - i
\
Eltx \
1..-:1
OEX 1""'-
\
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
)
zax I
o 0
-'"
127
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Identification of failures in experimental fuel
pins in EBR-II has evolved over 16 years of operation
from an initial time-consuming activity of considerable
uncertainty to the present routine procedure of on-line
analysis of xenon tags. Shutdown of the reactor to
remove failures is now a matter of operational conven-
ience, or for programmatic reasons, rather than to limit
cover-gas activity. This improvement in identification
is reflected--in part--by a commensurate increase in
plant factor which, in 1980, was 77.1% despite fifteen
fuel-pin failures.
Extensive experience with xenon tagging over the
last 6-8 years has shown this method to be a viable
means of identification even when the number of tags in
use exceeds 50, and when up to five fission-gas leakers
in-core are intermittently releasing their fission gas
and tag to the reactor cover-gas space. Such experience
augurs weIl for the judicious use of tagging in large
LMFBR's. The high reliability of the systems at EBR-II
for control of cover-gas activity and for on-line mass
spectrometry, coupled with the ancil1ary methods of
source identification deve10ped through the years, adds
extra confidence to this overall conclusion.
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Discussion
W. Koop, SBK:
Do you think that each element in a commercial fast reactor will have a
different Xe-composition in the tag?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
No. The ~ 300 pins in one subassembly will all contain the same tag.
Each subassembly then has a different tag.
M. Relic, IA:
a) After tag indication will the fuel elements be discharged without
other confirmation methods?
b) What is the realibility of the automatical mass spectrometer?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
a) Y,=s
b) Very high 99.999 %.
F. Gestermann, IA:
You have the back-up method of lift and hold and hold and blow to confirm
if you have taken the right element. How much time do you need before
beginning this procedure and what was your success rate?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
Two hours after shutdown m1n1mum, i.e., during normal fuel handling.
Success rate varies, about 50-75 %.
J. Dauk, IA:
Did you make consideration concerning the cost, whether the cost is
more on the side of installation of covergas system and mass spectro-
meter or on the side of putting in the tags into the fuel pins?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
CGCS is needed whether you have tags or not, but intend to operate
with gas leakers. The mass spectrometer is a small additional cost.
Major cost is in tagging the fuel pins, but could be reduced con-
siderably by not using tag capsules.
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S. Jacobi, KfK:
We got an impressive picture about the success of tagging. But defected
pins indicated by tagging may be undangeraus leakers or serious DND failures.
How da you localize the DND failure especially in the case that there are
same failures at the same time inside the core?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
By DN triangulation technique uS1ng the DN detector on the 3 or 4 loops
of the reactor.
N. Sekiguchi, PNC:
My question may be a little apart from your presentation now. Why don't you
use on-line gas mass spectrometer for tagging gas analysis in FFTF?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
A matter of cast.
S. Jacobi, KFK:
The figure with the failure probability versus burn up give the impression
that no failures happened with burn up lower than 10 %. Because this 1S
surprising it seems we need same additional remarks to this figure.
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
The figure is correct but refers tQ the sodium-bonded metal driver-fuel p1ns
of EBR-II·
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
You have located 5 fai1ures in the reactor, present at the same time. Was this
1ucky or would you think this could always be done?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
I am fairly certain this could be done routinely, it depends on our experience
that at any one time one of the failures will predominate.
J. Dauk, IA:
Da you have experiences with mixed Kr-Xe tags in EBR II?
J.D.B. Lambert,ANL:
No, but we soon will at FFTF.
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TEE RESULTS OF TESTING AND EXPERIENCE IN THE USE OF
LEU D:&rEOTION METHODS IN FAST REA.CTORS
N.V.Krasnoyarov,V.D.Kizin,V.V.Konyashov,A.M.Sobolev,
V.I.Polyakov, D.I.Starozhukov, E.K.Yakshin
V.I. Lenin Research Institute of Atomic Reactors,
Dimitrovgrad, USSR
Part 3
OPERATING EXPERIENCE WITH FAILED FUEL DETECTION AND
LOCALIZATION SYSTEMS
At present an experience of LMFBR operation with failed
fuel elements has been gained sufficient for the analysis.
Date has been obtained about the dynamics of fission product
release trom the fuel elements with pin leskers and develop-
ed failures in cladding.
The experience in the use of detection systems summarizes
information about fission product release fract10ns both in
the very moment of failure end in the process of steady fis-
sion product release as well as that of trustworthiness of
failed :tuel subassemblies detection.
Further more investigated factors will be considered and
summarized.
The BOR-GO plant operation at typical heat rates and fuel
burnups permitted the mass testing of standard fuel elements
to be carried out. A great number of cases with fuel failures
resulted in fission gas release has been analyzed. The fuel
element testing conditions may be discribed by the following
parameters.
The standard BOR-60 :tuel subas8emblies comprize 37 U0 2
fuel pins (6 mm dia.) with 12 cm3 plenum. The average 235U mass
per fuel pin i8 56 g. Maximum temperature of 0.3 mm thick
OX1GH15M3 steel cladding of tuel pins was 700°C. The reactor
outlet sodium temperature at Go MW rating was 530-550 0 C,
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the maximum reactor heat was equal to 1100 kW/I (550 w/cm).
The achieved burnup was in excess of 12%. Initial defeets in
fuel element eladding were detected at burnup of 7.5%.
Fission gas behaviour in the reactor cover gas was stu-
died in more detail in 1972-1973. Fig.2 shows the curve of
133Xe end 135Xe activity variation during the above periode
During the years wbich fol~owed the above aetivity behaviour
was the same.
Fuel element failure is followed by a steep rise in fiss-
ion gas activity. This is due to fast gas release through the
elad defeet into the eoolant. A failure formed at high gas
pressure inside the fuel cladding results in praetically com-
plete fission gas release from the cladding. Therefore, the
fission gas release fraetion in cover gas is equal to fission
gas release from the fuel considering the delay time in mode-
rator. Then the fission gas activity in cover gas decreases.
In some tens of days of the reactor steady power operation
the aetivity smooth increase is observed. An essential fiss-
ion gas activity deerease follows after a little drop in the
reactor power. ~his may be due to the process of plugging
the tuel element defeet by sodium [2] • The analysis of a
freat number of cover gas aetivity bursts has revealed that
33Xe and 135Xe release fractions when one fuel element feils
are (5.3±1)% and (1.3±Oo6)%, respeetively [3J.
When a fuel element failure occurs in the course of slow
reaetor shutdown, the fission gas activity ettains its m~­
mum in 5-10 mine after the shutdown. Then it decreases in
aeeordance w~th the decay constants. Per this ease the fiss-
ion gas release fraction in cover gas is equal to the release
fraction from the fuel elements o The measured fission gases
have no time to decay.
The evaluation of release fraetions of short-lived gaseous
radionuclides has been carried out in the experiments, when
they were managed tobe measured just after the occurrenee of a
fuel element failure. The aetivity rate values with on~
failed fuel element for 133Xe , 133mxe, 135Xe , 85~r, 8~r,
87Kr radionuclides were respective*y, 1800, 30, 600, 40, 85 and
40 OBc. Table 1 lists the release fractions from the fuel.
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Solving the equations of fission gas diffusion in the
fuel under irradiation [4] yields in a release relation of re-
lease fractions with square root of the decay constant. The
experimental values for the relative release fractions are in
good agreement with calculations. This leads to a conclusion
that the BOR-60 fuel release is governed by a diffusion-cont-
rolled process.
Following a burst the 133Xe and 135xe activities in cover
gas decrease approximately in accordance with their half-lives.
Table r
Fission Product Release trom Failed Fuel Elements
. in BOR-60 Power Plant
N u c lid e 8 Fission product release fracture, %
133Xe
133mxe
135Xe
85Inz:r
8E1cr
87Kr
1370s
1340s
131r
133r
14~a
95Zr
9~b
103Ru
1410e
experiment
0.5 - 0.8
0.1 - 0.2
0.2 - 0.3
20 - 40
40
2
- 9
4.4
calculation
0.7
35
2.2
0.16
0.05
0 .. 43
0.11
0.08
Note : fuel burnup is 7-12 %1
fuel element linear power is 520 W/cm
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Delayed neutron signal increase in the studued cases occur-
ed in 10-40 days after fission gas burst. Solid fission pro -
duct release from fuel pins were small except for 1370s. The
obtained release fraction data is in a good agreement with
literature values. A gradual manner of defects development is
also supported by EBR-II results [61 and by loop experiments
with predefected fuel elements [7J •
Such a time shift of different stages of fission product
release is characteristic not for all the kinds of fue! ele-
ment defects. Sometimes a gas burst coincided with delayed
neutron signal increase [81 • It may be suggested that these
variations are due to different size of defects and/or their
distribution along the fuel element height.
In the BR-10 plant operated with Pu02 fuel elements at up
to 10 % h.a. burnup the occurrence of pin (gaseous leaks)re -
sulted in the pattern of the initial and subsequent fission
gas and delayed neutron release similar to that in the BOR-60
reactor.Such a pattern appears to be not dependent on the burn-
up level.ln two cases, when fuel pins failed in tuel subassem-
blies at 11,8,%plutonium burnup and in 2 fuel subassemblies at
12,6% plutonium burnup, the delayed neutron release fraction
increased·twofold and a sharp rise in fission gas activity
was observed [11J • The delayed neutron detection and the
equilibrium fission gas activity were found to be non-linear-
ly depend on the reactor power. The examination has revealed
failed fuel subassemblies. Two of them were found to release
° .fission gas during the detection (at 100 and 200 0). Six sub-
assemblies released fission gas only in excess of certain·
boundary temperature which was in the range from 380 to 500°0
for different subassemblies. On the failed fuel subassemblies
discharge delayed neutron flow decreased up to the initial le-
vel.
The delay neutron detection, unlike the fission gas cont-
rol, does not result in so true information on the very mo-
ment and the number of fuel element failures. Rere are some
features of variations in the delay neutron monitor signal:
• In absence of failed fuel elements the monitor signal is
proportional to the reactor power. It is stable at constant
reactor power.
e With failed tuel element present in the core the monitor
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signal reading i8 not stable at constant reactor power; short-
-term fluctuation in the signal occurs during fuel element
failure.
• An increase in delayed neutron detector signal is most often
observed in some period of time after a fission gas activity
burst.
• A change in reactor power leads to more pronounced variat-
ions in the detection system signal in presence of failed
fuel subassemblies in the core.
Delay neutron signal analysis presents some information
of failed fuel subassemblies in the core. However, it is usu-
ally the case with wide-open failures. Fuel pins with gaseous
leaks are not detected with this technigue. A great difficulty
during the detection is presented by background originating
from the initial contamination of fuel element cladding and
consequent contamination of the core.
Thus the control system for fission gas activity and de-
layed neutrons in the coolant provide the operating staff
with the required information on fuel element cladding condi-
tion. The fission gas activity is a means of determining the
moments and the number of fuel element failures. The delayed
neutron detection in the coolant informs about the fuel-cool-
ant contact surface area in case of wide-open failures. This
information is required to aS8ess the primary circuit conta-
mination with radioactive products and to prevent accidents
due to several open fa1lures or a single but severely damaged
fuel element.
Fur'~her the experience gained with subassembly detection
system operation during the reactor shutdo\vu will be considered.
Blow-gas activity is measured with beta-counters. As an
example of such measurements, Fig.3 shows the activity rate
variation during degassing the sodium over the core, over a
failed fuel subassemblies and over ablanket subassemblies.
A minor activity rate for the blanket subassembly is due to
the coolant degassing.
From the very beginning of using this technique it was
revealed that several failed fuel subassemb1ies were not de-
tected during the checks and 1eft in the core. Some of the
de'cected fai1ed subassemb1ies were 1eft in the core for fur-
ther irradiation. In most cases (hut not always), again they
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indueed a higher gas aetivity rate. This fact has eaused fur-
ther improvement of the technique.
12 oxide fuel subassemblies of those whieh were deteeted
to release 133xe have been examined in the hot cello All of
them have 1-2 and rarely up tö 5 failed fuel pins. However of
19 checked 11 intaettt fuel subassemblies which did not reveal
133Xe release during the deteetion 3 subassemblies (i.e.18,%)
did have failed fuel pins. The origin of this phenomenon is
not readily apparent. It should not be excluded from conside-
ration that cladding of some fUel subassemblies might be de-
fected after their discharge in the course of cleaning, trans-
portation and dismantling.
Uncertainties occuring in failed fuel subassembly detec-
tion show that the following faetors are required to be cons1-
dered during the check and its results interpretation:
• the extent of fuel heating,
• defects size and loeation,
• fuel burnup level,
• uncertainties which may occur in the course of procedures.
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Fig. 2 Cover gas activity end delayed neutron signal versus BOR-50
operation time
1 - 133Xe , 2 - delayed neutrons, 3 - 135Xe , 4 - power history.
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Fig. 3 Blow-gas activity variation I
1 - during argon bubbling of sodium, 2 - from
a failed fuel subassembly, 3 - from a "dummy"
blanket subassembly.
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Discussion
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
At zero reactor power are failed subassemblies discharged?
E.K. Yakshin, SRIAR:
They were discharged this time ~n the fig. 2, but not that time (in February)
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
What ~s efficiency of location technique for detection of failures?
E.K. Yakshin, SRIAR:
It re achs now up to 90 %.
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
Do you get an increased DN signal from open failures after restart of the
reactor?
E.K. Yakshin, SRIAR:
After discharge the failed fuel subassemblies the DN signal decreased sometimes
with a factor of 3 and more, but not to previous level.
A. Merkei, IA:
Did you find that fission gas release from mixed oxide fu~l can be explained
generally by diffusion theory, even if the fuel is at high temperature?
E.K. Yakshin, SRIAR:
We have exper~ence on uran~um oxide; statistic with respect to mixed oxide
are not good, now.
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PHENIX - TEST OF THE GAS-FFL DEVICE
by C~ Berlin
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Discussion
D.B. Sangodkar> R R C K
You have used U-Cr or U-Mo alloy for calibration of DND. Are the results
directly applicable to oxide fuel?
P. Michaille> CEA:
No, Up to now> we make a translation to oxide by calculation (mean free path
of the neutronuclides> especially).
J. Dauk> IA:
Do you know the reduction of the transport time by your SR6-system or ~s the
explanation only qualitatively?
P. Michaille> CEA:
No measurement has been made as yet. One may expect a reduction of the transit
time from 26 up to 6 sec if one considers that the main part of the delay
due to the instrumented plate just above the core.
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SUMMARY OF IN-PILE LOOP EXPERIHENTS REUTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FUEL FAllURE DETECTION SYSTEMS FOR LMFBR'S IN JAPAN,
Eiji Sakai , Tatsuo Mlyazawa and Nobutada Sekiguchi
Japan Atomic Energy
Research Institute
Toshiba
Corporation
Power Reactor and Nuclear
Fuel Development Corporation
ABSTRACT
Many extensive works performed in Japan on the de-
velopment of the fuel failure detectiqn systems for LM-
FBR's since,1972 using two sodium in-pile loops( SIL
and FPL ) and one cover gas loop( CGMTF ) are introduced
and briefly reviewed.
INTRODUCTION
Table 1 summarizes the in-pile loop experiments
carried out in the fuel failure detection( FFD ) system
development programfor Japanese LMFBR's designing. The
loop names, their locations, their reactors where the
loops were installed and their main objectives as weIl
as references[ 1 - 5 ] are indicated. The main objec-
tives were to test v~rious FFD systems for the Japanese
first experimental LMFBR "JOYO" and the second prototype
L'fFBR ''MONJU" for designing and licensing purpose, and
also to understand fission product( FP ) behavior in
sodium and cover gas from the view point of FFD design
and safety.
All the three in-pile loops 10cated in the thermal
research reactors. The SIL( Sodium ln-pile Loop )[ l,Z]
and the FPL( Fission Product Loop )[ 3 - 5 ] used only
new uranium metal plates, UOZ pellets or UOZ balls as
fission sources which were immersed in sodium flow. The
CGMTF( Cover Gas Monitor Test Faci1ity ) used only heli-
um cover gas containing rare gas FP's produced from the
residual uranium contamination in the reactor as a re-
sult of some fuel fai1ures in the past.
SIL EXPERIMENT[ 1 , Z ]
The SIL, a sodium in-pile loop located at Japan
Research Reactor-Z( JRR-Z ) in Tokai Research Establish-
ment, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute as shown
in Fig.l, contained 8.5 liter sodium in which uranium
metal plates[ 1 ] or UOZ pellets[ Z ] had been irradiat-
ed by a thermal neutron flux of 5 x 1010 n/cmZs at the
reactor full thermal output power of 10MW. The calculat-
ed fission rates fr om the former and the latter fissile
materials were 3.5 x 1011 and Z x 1011 f!ssions/s, res-
pectively. The cover gas·was helium. A delayed neutron
monitor, a moving-wire ,type precipitator( Plessey MK-XI)
and a cover gas reservoir - Ge(Li) gamma-ray spectromet-
er had been tested. The counting efficiency of the de-
layed neutron monitor( Fig.2 ) was measured in a simula-
tion experiment using a ZCi Am-Be neutron source embedd-
ed' in a ZOcm cubic lead block which produced a simulated
delayed neutron spectrum as shown in Fig.3. The obtained
counting efficiency was 4.6 x 10-4 cts/n for the grap-
hite moderator. Using this counting efficiency with the
obtained counting rate of the delayed neutron monitor,
the FP release fraction from fuel can be evaluated as
shown in Table 2. When these fractions were compared
with those calculated from the neutron flux with a re-
coil length of 5~, the fissuring factor became 1.Z8 for
the metallic uranium plates and 3.5 for UOZ pellets.
These fissuring factors are reasonable since the experim-
ental conditions limit the FP release only due to recoil
mechanism. The release fractions induced from sodium and
cover gas gamma-ray spectrometries[ 6 I are also listed
and show the same order of the magnitude.
From the cover gas gamma-ray spectrometry, the FP
release fraction.from fuel fand the FP transfer rate
from sodium to cover gas n were calculated using a met-
hod shown in Table 3. For Kr and Xe, n's calculated were
7.7 x 10-3min-l ( Tl/z-90min ) and 5 x 10-3 min-l ( Tl/Z-
138min ), respectively.
.The delayed neutron counting rate was measured as
a function of the temperatures of the irradiation sec-
tion and the main cooler. The results are shown in Figs.
4 and 5, which show some adhesive .natures of de1ayed
neutron precursor nuclides on the stainless tube wall.
The effect of the SIL operational conditions on
the counting rates of the delayed neutron monitor, the
cover gas gamma-ray spectrometer and the precipitator
is summarized in Table 4.
The results obtained in the SIL experiment as far
as testing of FFD systems concerns show nothing so pecu-
liar and the test results of the delayed neutron monitor
and the precipitator were used to obtain the licensing
of "JOYO". The precipitator was transferred to "JOYO"
and are being used as an actual cover gas monitor.
FPL EXPERIMENT [ 3 - 5 ]
The FPL( Fission Product Loop ), a sodiumin-pile
100p located at Toshiba Training Reactor( !TR ) in
Nuc1ear Engineering Laboratory, Toshiba Corporation,
had 4.8Kg sodium with natural UOZ balls of l50g exposed
to a thermal neutron flux of 1 x 1010 n/cm2s at 100kW
reactor thermal power. A simplified diagram oE the FPL
is shown in Fig.6. The fission rate was. calculated aso
1.4 x 1010 fissions/s. Argon was used as the cover gas
in the expansion tank. !wo delayed neutron conitors, a
newly-developed fixed-wire type prer.ipitator and a Ge
(Li) gamma-ray spectxometer were used to obtain their
performance as a function of the sodium flow rate and
temperature as weIl as the reactor power.
The newly-developed precipitator systeme 5 ] are
constituted with three tubes as shown in Fig.7, and the
tubes act as FP collectors collecting positively-charged
nuclidcs on the central wires during a soak time with
cover gas flow and also act as proportional counters
during 'the fo1lowing counting period with pure-Ar count-
ing gas flow. The proportional counters count ß-partic1-
es emitted from the nuc1ides collected on the wires. In
the system as shown in Fig.8, the gas Elow was control-
led to the three FP co1lector/proportional counter tub-
es by a switching valves. A precipitation voltage of -
ZOOV and a proportional counter voltage of +1500V were
switched sequentially. The average precipitation effi-
ciencies for Rb and Cs were found to be (65 % 15)% aud
the counting efficiency of Au-198 ß-particles( 962keV )
0.73 ± 0.04 cts/ß.
Figure 9 shows an examp1e of the precipitator res-
ponse to a reactor power change. The delayed neutron
counting rates are also shown. From the other experi-
ments, no accumulation of Rb and Cs was found on the
wire although the reason is not exactly understood. In
order to prepare the method of el1m1nating any accumu-
lated long-lived nuc1ides on the wire, a test was per-
formed by heating the wire at 400°C for 300s in 0.1 torr
vacuum and resulted in 20% reduction in the precipitated
nuclides. This type of the precipitator i8 under consi-
deration in designing the FFD systems of '':10NJU".
The other group in Toshiba Corporation[ 4,5 1 made
an extensive study on FP behavior in sodium and cover
gas using the FPL. They found the cover gas flow rate
bad no effect on the release rates oE FP gas from sod-
ium to cover gas; the release fractions of Kr and Xe to
from sodium to coyer gas depended strongly on sodium
temperature( Fig.lO ); and the release fractions of Kr
and Xe increased as sodium flow rate increased( Fig.ll ).
They also found two kinds of degassing halflives as
shown in Figs. 12 and 13. One was 80 to 200min calculat-
ed from the release fractions after reactor shut down
and also from 10g(R/B) plot as a function of log Ai'
One of the examples is shown in Fig.12. The other was
17 to 32min calculated from the increasing release rates
after the reactor start up, and found to be independent
of nuclide halflife and to depend on sodium temperature •.
The latter was caused by the diffusion through the liq-
uid sodium-cover gas interface as shown in Fig.13 •. For
Xe-135 and Xe-135m release, Xe atoms produced by the
decay of iodine absorbed on the colder wall of the loop
was found not to be transported to the cover gas; the
same phenomenon was also observed in the SIL experiment
( Table 4 ).
CGMTF EXPERIMENT
The CGMTF, a cover gas monitor test facility locat-
ed at Japan Research Reactor-3( JRR-3 ) in Tokai Resear-
ch Establishment, JAERI, was built totest various types
of cover gas monitors using the reactor helium cover gas
·which contained gaseous FP's of about 0.01uCi/cm3 for
each of the nuclides and Ar-41. A cover gas reservoir-
Ge(Li) on-line gamma-ray spectrometer system, a moving-
wire type precipitator, a fixed-wire type precipitator,
a room temperatute charcoal chamber for high-sensitivity
cover gas gamma-ray spectrometry and a membrane unit for
enriching gaseous FP's are being tested. Tables 5 and 6
show the examples of the results obtained from the room
temperature charcoa1 chamber and from the membrane unit.
These results will be reflected in the design of the FFD
systems and also of the tag gas system of ''MONJU'' [7] •
CONCLUSION
The experiments carried out in two sodium in-pile
loops( SIL and FPL ) and onecover gas loop( CGMTF)
have resulted in a very informative basis for testing,
designing, licensing the FFD systems for Japanese L~BR'
s "JOYO" and ''MONJU'', and also for understanding the
basic mechanisms of FP behavior in sodium and cover gas.
Operations of the SIL and the FPL had been terminated in
1976 and 1979, respectively. The second FPL is under
construction for studying FP behavior in primary coolant
systems of LMFBR's. The operation of the CGMTF will be
continued for testing reliability of the performance of
FFD components and systems until the next year( 1982 ).
The experimental UIFBR "JOYO". has no experience ··on
fuel failure up tonow and also no tramp fuel has been
detected[ 8 ]. However, it is prerequisite to maintain
any FFD system performance at 40y time and to understand
the correspondenee of various FFD signals to fuel fail-
lure in any FBR plant. In this sense, an appropriate
means of in-pile ealibration of the FFD systems should be
considered in order to confirm the designed counting ef-
ficieneies of the "JOYO" FFD systems[ 9 ].
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IN-PILE EXPERIMENTS IN THE UK
Ex?eriments with artificiallyy
defected pins carried out in the
CEA Scarabee loop are descr ibed
together with subsequent
investigations in the
Universi ties Reactor, Risely, to
study the influence of a number
of parameters on signal size.
Measurements of the signals
from artifically defected new
fuel pins were made in 1973-74
under contract wi th CEA in the
CEA in-pile sodium loop Scarabee
(1, 2) shown in Figure 1. These
experiments were originally
planned to measure the emission
from fuel pins containing U0 2hollow fuel pellets with slit::
defects in the fuel section of
the can parallel to the axis.
In addition experiments to
determine means of encouraging
emission for location purposes
were planned. However at a fuel
rating of 160 w/g the delayed
neu tron release from each of the
four pins with 0.25 x 6 mm long
slits indicated the equivalent of
a recoil area 1000-4000 times
that of the superficial area of
the slit Q and was in the range15-60 cm effective recoil area
with a transit time of 46 sees.
With a shorter transit time the
recoil area was smaller showing
that the emission contained an
excess of longer lived
precursors. In fact measurements
with one pin in which fission
product da ta we real so analysed
were consistent with arelease
model which assurnes that the area
in the vicinity of the defect
releases recoils directly to the
sodium while recoils from the
rest of the fuel are released
with a delay of 40 seconds.
Although water model tests
descr ibed below have shown tha t
some sweeping of the fuel can
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occur, this is only in the
immediate vicinity of the defect
and thus the additional signal is
expected to arise from diffusion.
The experiments in Scarabee were
made over only a few hours and
thus the burn-up of the fuel was
negligible although some sodium
attack caused break-up of fuel
into grains and some chemical
interaction occurred.
So that. a better
understanding of the exper iments
described'above could be obtained
some simple experiments were made
in a water loop in the
Universities Reactor, Risley, and
the effect of slit size, slit
shape and fuel/can gap examined.
The rig is shown in Figure 2.
The experiment.s were pe~50rmed
with a fuel rating of 10 w/g,
so that diffusion was negligible.
The results confirmed that the
signal is enhanced over that
expected from slit area al~ne. A
6mm long slit, area 1.5 mm , gav2
an effective recoil area of 6 cm 2
which compares with the 3-7 cm
obtained in Scarabee at 25 w/g.
However, these water experiments
show that the whole signal came
from the rapidly swept area
around the defect and from about
1 cm above and below the defect
as shown in Figure 3. This
suggests that although sweeping
of the fuel by coolant is a major
mechanism for fission product
transfer the details of release
from the fuel may be different at
high power to that at low power.
This could resul t from enhanced
diffusion of fission products or
different hydraulic conditions
when the fuel is at high
temperature. However, the main
observed difference is that the
signal is increased at high power
and is relatively independent of
defect area in the range tested.
Experiments to attempt to
check the effect of closing the
fuel-clad gap were made in the
Universities Reactor by swaging
cans on to fuel. These showed
that whereas for slits 0.25mm
wide wi th leng ths up to 6mm the
signal was reduced by a factor of
10 compared with those of
clear ance fit, for longe r sI i ts
the ratio decreased so that at 37
mrn no reduction occurred as shown
in Figure 4.
Further experiments were
made with circular defects. With
a 3mm dia hole the signal was
similar to a slit of the same
length while the signal with
smaller holes fell approximately
linearly to about 1/40 of the
signal for a 0.25mm hole. On the
other hand two 0.25mm holes
separated axially by 37mm gave
the same signal as a 37mm x
0.25mm slit, thus confirming that
the length of the defect and not
the area is the more important
parameter.
More recently experiments
have been started to try to get
some indication of how fission
product release depends on the
state of the fuel, and in
particular if vibro fuel behaves
differently to pe'lleted fuel.
Although the first results show
considerable scatter it is
evident that ON signals from new
low rated vibro fuel are about
5-10 times those from whole
pellets. Signals from chipped
and broken fuel pellets give
intermediate signals.
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U.S. Experience 01 Delayed-Neutron Monitoring
J.D.B. Lambert R. V. Strain and R. M. Fryer
Argonne National Laboratory
Argonne, Illinois & Idaho Falls,
Idaho
ABSTRACT*
A history is given of the delayed-neutron signals
observed at EBR-II during sixteen years of operation.
Special tests to calibrate the monitors are described
and the character of signals from some recent special
breached-pin tests are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
of the pipe. Two channe1s were used for operations
and each contained seven, ganged BF3 detectors; a third
contained six 2.5-cm. diameter boron-lined detectors;
and the fburth, six BF3 detectors. This FERD configur-
ation was calibrated in April 1978 with the same a110y
tubes that had been used a year previously.
HISTORY OF SIGNALS BEFORE 1976
The first DN signal from a fue1-pin fai1ure
occurred on December 30, 1973. This signal, accompanied
by some fission gas, rose rapid1y from a background of
~60 cps to near 120 cps, a va1ue which caused the re-
actor to trip. The signal remained high for 60 s, then
rapidly dec1ined (Fig. 1a). The source was 1ater identi-
fied as a sodiurn-bonded carbide pin and the signal was
assumed due to release of DN-rich bond sodium to the
primary sodium before, during and after reactor shutdown.
Approximate1y a year 1ater the reactor scrammed a
second time as the resu1t of a DN signal (Fig. 1b). The
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Fig. 1. Transient DN Signals from Fuel Failures
a: OUring release of bond sodium
b: OUring rapid release of fission gas
The detection of delayed neutrons (DN's) released
during the decay of fission products carried by the
primary sodium of an LMFBR has long been recognized as
a means to detect fuel-pin failures. Such a system,
known as the fuel-element rupture detector, or FERn,
was originally installed on EBR-II and has been in use
since 1964. This paper describes the considerable ex-
perience gained with FERn since that time. Two parallel
papers (1,2) describe the methods also developed at
EBR-II for failed-pin identification and for DN signal
analysis.
'"Work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy.
DESCRIPTION OF FERn SYSTEM
The FERn system interrogates ~rimary sodium from
the outlet of the intermediate heat exchanger (IHX).
Approximately one eightieth of the IHX discharge is
collected by a rectangular scoop and funneled into a
5-cm. diameter pipe of the loop to FERn. An electro-
magnetic pump draws sodium through this pipe to the
detectors at 6.3 L/s during normal operation, and then
discharges it back to the primary tank. The transit
time for sodium from a fai1ure in-core to the FERn
detectors is 18-20 s. In its original configuration,
the FERn 100p passed through a 9l-cm. cube of graphite
surrounded by lead shielding. Three independent count-
ing channe1s were provided and severa1 different types
of detectors were used. The axis of the detectors was
perpendicu1ar to the sodium, and they were cooled with
forced air. The FERn in this initial configuration was
calibrated by Smith and others (3) in 1968-9, using two
exposed driver-fuel pins as a source of DN's.
After that calibration, the detectors were rep1aced
with pairs of Reuter-Stokes BF3 proportional counters
for each of the three channels. An effort was also made
to reduce gamma f1ux from sodium and to enhance moder-
ation by p1acing 5 cm. of lead and 2.5 cm. of polyeth-
ylene around the sodium pipe. This FERn configuration
was reca1ibrated in 1977 by Strain and others (4) with
tubes of a di1ute uranium-nicke1 al10y as the source
of DN's. This calibration showed that FERn signals were
slight1y unstable during the first day or two after
reactor startup, but that reproduciblemean count rates
were obtained thereafter.
FERn underwent a substantial modification in March
1978. The graphite moderator was rep1aced with Bene1ex
Type 401 because of its relatively high hydrogen content
and the 5-cm. diameter BF3 detectors were replaced by
longer, 2.5-cm. diameter detectors 1aid a10ng the axis
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source of this signal was identified as a mixed-oxide
fuel pin which had failed in the fuel-column region, a
fact later confirmed by leak checking the pin while it
was internally pressurized under alcohol in a hot cello
The lack of a plateau in the DN signal and the very
small size of defect found on the pin suggested that
the signal arose from DN precursors which had escaped
in the va par phase during rapid release of fission gas.
This DN signal was the first ever to be detected from
a mixed-oxide fuel pin in EBR-II.
Later in the same reactor run, EBR-II was again
scrammed as the result of a DN signal accompanying a
rapid release of fission gas. The shape of the FERD
response was different this time in that the count rate
reached a plateau and remained there for a short time
after shutdo\<n (Fig. 2a). Subsequent examination in the
hot cell revealed that the signal came from a mixed-
oxide fuel pin which had developed a small split in its
cladding due to wire-wrap wear (5). The initial flat
portion of the signal probably represented release of
DN precursors from fuel exposed to the coolant, and
was the first example of such a phenomenon. The signal
magnitude was much greater than could be explained by
recoil release of DN's from the very sma1l area of fuel
exposed by the cladding split.
During March 1975, a fourth DN signal was recorded
by FERD, as shown in Fig. 2b. The reactor was operated
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for about seven days with a DN signal significantly
above background levels, but less then the scram limit.
The subassembly with the failure was identified finally
as an instrumented subassembly containing untagged met-
allic driver-fuel pins (6). Postirradiation examination
showed that in fact six pins had breached, three of
them exhibiting quite Iarge failures. The DN signals
were consistent with a recoil release only from the
exposed metal fuel. However, the possibility that the
post irradiation handling of the subassembly had enlarged
the breach ~ites could not be ruled out.
A fifth DN signal occurred in Ju1y 1975, about five
days after the start of a reactor run. This DN signal,
which was similar to the one in Fi~. Ib, was accompanied
by a particular1y rapid release of short-lived fission
gas and a xenon tag. The failure was easily identified
as being on a mixed-oxide fuel pin with a bot tom plenum
which had just been loaded and which had operated at a
very high cladding temperature. In this instance, high
fuel temperatures, a bot tom plenum, and low burnup of
fuel had allowed plenum gas stored below the fuel
column to be swept unimpeded over the fuel surface to
the failure, bringing with it volati1e DN precursors.
FERD SIGNALS SINCE 1977
In May 1976 Fryer deve10ped the basis for and per-
formed a FERD-flow reduction (FFR) test to determine
the transit time for DN precursors from the core to the
FERD detectors (7). Concurrently, the case was success-
fully made to remove FERD from the automatie shutdown
system after analyses (8) had shown: (a) reactivity
measurements were a prompter method for dealing with a
core perturbation which could have safety implications;
and (b) propagative fuel-pin fai1ures would likely take
place at rates slow enough that manual shutdown would
effectively limit circuit contamination. FERD was taken
out of the scram system for run 87 (January 1977). This
act freed FERD from its former dedicated function, and
calibration and testing of the system began in earnest.
Operation with a Recoil Source
Fig. 2. DN Signals from Exposed-Fuel Failures
a: From a mixed-oxide fuel pin
b: From several metallic driver pins
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The irradiation of the uranium-nickel source in
EBR-II during run 87 provided new insight into the
behavior of FERD. The system was shown to respond in a
sensitive and linear fashion to the strength of a re-
coil source, and in way entirely consistent with that
of the independent cover-gas monitor GLASS. Figure 3a
shows the DN signal count rate versus reactor power for
two core locations. The short-term fluctuations in the
count rate of ±lOi. which were observed at all steady
power levels (Fig. 3b) were almost certainly due to a
variable mixing of sodium in the upper plenum of the
reactor, and cannot be eradicated. However, averaging
the count rate recorded by the data.acquisition system
(DAS) showed stable mean count rates over very long
periods of time.
The FFR technique was proved as a method to deter-
mine the average "age" of DN's emitted from a source,
while transit times also appeared to differ slightly
for the two core locations. Similarly, movement of the
control rods adjacent to the source was also proved as
a possible means of source diagnosis. For the exercise
reactor power was reduced slightly and the pair of con-
trol rods next to the source raised while the opposite
pair of control rods was lowered (to mainain reactor
power). This maneuver tilted flux in the vicinity of
the source. The procedure was reversed to tilt flux the
opposite way. Whether this technique could be used in
other reactors, or for non-recoil sources could not of
course be determined.
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such as to suggest that the U02 was sodium-logged at
power. A FFR test also indicated an " ag ing" of the DN
precursors of 12-18 s. Thus, enhancement and aging in
this instance may have been due to release from a large
surface area of fuel via a sodium bond.
The lower curve in Fig. 4b shows that the DN signal
behavior of the second mixed-oxide pin during initial
ascent to power was different and almost exponential
with increase in power. Just before full power was
achieved the reactor was scrammed for an unrelated
reason; the count rate was then ~25 cps. On the next
rise to power (upper curve) a similar non-linear rise
in count rate occurred, but at a higher level than the
first time. The full-power DN count rate was ~575 cps.
During the next 2-1/2 hours operation th~ average
count rate increased to ~650 cps. However, the actual
signals showed considerable variation, and the shutdown
limit of 800 cps on FERD was soon exceeded and the
reactor tripped. The fuel pin had extended its defect
considerably, increasing its geometrical area from 0.35
to 0.71 cm 2. The final count rate was equivalent to
about 100 times the recoil release of DN's from the
geometrical area of defect. Increase in signal between
the first and second rise to power could be well ex-
plained by defect extension. The cause of enhancement of
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Fig. 3. FERD Response to a Recoil Source in EBR-II
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Fig. 4. DN Signals from Predefected Fuel Pins
a: U02 pin in two core locations
b: (UPu)02 pin during two power ascents
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Operation with Predefected Pins
Four predefected fuel pins were irradiated in 1977:
two pins contained unirradiated U02 and two pins con-
tained mixed-oxide fuel at medium burnup. The first U02
pin had a 0.75-mm. diameter hole in the cladding in the
fuel-column region but gave no discernible DN signals
in-core. The second U02 pin had an axial cladding slit
which measured 1 mm. by 20 mm. The preirradiated mixed-
oxide pins were machined in the hot cell to give slits
in the cladding of about 0.8 mm. wide and 22 and 58 mm.
long respectively. The DN signals from the second pin
of each type will be described here; furt her details of
all the pins may be found in reference 9.
During rise to power with the U02 pin the DN signal
count rate increased in an essentially linear fashion
to a full-power value of 55-60 cps above background, as
shown in Fig. 4a. The count rate stayed constant through
ten days of irradiation. The pin was then relocated to a
higher-power position in EBR-II. The DN signal count
rate on the second ascent to power is also shown. Very
little change in signal occurred over the next 33 days
irradiation.
The DN signal count rate at full power was about 25
times the value expected due to recoil release from the
geometrical area of defect. The cause of enhancement is
not precisely known. However, fission-gas release was
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Fig. 5. DN Signal Count Rate during First ~atural Breached-Pin Test in EBR-II
the DN signal is again unknown but could have beendue
to a number of factors. For example, both the surface
temperature of the fuel and its burnup were higher for
this pin than for the U02 pin, which may have enhanced
the release of bromine DN precursors to the primary
sod ium (10).
Typical Behavior of Natural Failures
The first continued irradiation of a natural breach
was carried out in 1978. The pin, which contained mixed
oxide fuel at 11 at.% burnup, had developed a small
leak of fission gas (and tag) in mid 1977. Its subas-
sembly was kept under sodium in the EBR-II storage
basket while procedures and approval for performing the
test were obtained. Its subsequent DN signal behavior,
which is believed typical of natural failures, will be
described here; other details of the test appear in
reference 9.
Figure 5 shows the DN signal count rate from the
breached pin during the course of its 5-day irradiation
in EBR-II. Significant DN activity was first observed
at 40 and 50 ~ft. peak count rates of 500-600 cps being
achieved. At full power (62.5 MWt) averaged count rates
were at 500 cps, and declined slowly for the next 12
hours of operation. The signals slow1y increased with
time over the next 4-1/2 days. The prescribed DN shut-
down limit was then exceeded and the reactor tripped.
A FFR test was performed towards the end during a
temporary plateau in the count rate increase. It showed
a significant aging of the DN precursors, of about 8 s.
Postirradiation examination of the fuel pin showed
a 4-cm. long split of the cladding toward the top of
the fuel-co1umn region; the maximum width of split was
1 mm., corresponding to a geometrica1 area of defect of
0.21 cm2 • As before, the magnitude of the DN signal was
severa1 hundred times that expected from recoil release
from the exposed fuel surface (even a1lowing for a much
roughened and cracked fue1 surface at the defect site).
Once again, therefore, fue1 surface temperature and
burnup, as we11 as perhaps fue1 density, appear to be
important factors in release of DN's.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
During endurance test of fue1 pins carried out to
1976 there were five times when genuine DN signals from
fuel-pin failures were recorded by FERD. During that
per iod FERD was inc1uded in the reactor' s automatic
shutdown system. It was removed from the scram circuits
in 1977, enab1ing breached-pin tests to start. As a
resu1t interest in DN monitoring was revived and FERD
was reca1ibrated; the system was upgraded a year 1ater.
Freedom to operate under these conditions has a110wed
greater EBR-II uti1ization and has also 1ed to a better
understanding of both the emission of DN precursors and
the "systems" effects on their transport and detection.
For examp1e, experience has shown that transient DN
signals may accompany severa1 types of initial fai1ure
but that sustained DN signals only emanate from exposed
fue1.
Artificially increasing the transit time for DN's
to the detectors can supply additional information on
the "age" of the DN precursors. Similarly, experience
has shown that exposed oxide fuel will give much bigger
signals than weuld be expected by recoil release from
the surface area of defects. This fact augurs weIl for
detection and monitoring breached fuel pins in a large
LMFBR. However, the relationship between the magnitude
of DN signal and the area and condition of exposed fuel
is not now known. This relationship must be studied in
depth and be understood before significant breached-
pin operation may be contemplated in future reactors.
A parallel paper (11) discusses what werk needs to be
carried out in this and related areas.
REFERENCES
L F. S. Kirn, et aL, "us Experience in Identifying
Fuel-Pin Failures," this meeting.
2. K. C. Gross and R. V. Strain, "Delayed-Neutron
Signal Analysis Techniques," ibid.
3. R. R. Smith, et aZ., ANL-760S (1970).
4. R. V. Strain, et aZ., ANL-78-58 (1978).
5. J. W. Weber and M. Y. Almassy, TANSAO, 27,
p. 227-8 (1977).
6. B. Y. C. So, et aZ., ANL-78-58 (1978).
7. R. M. Fryer, et aZ., TANSAO, 28, p. 710-1 (1978).
8. R. M. Fryer, et aZ., ANL-76-94 (1976).
9. D. F. Washburn, et aZ., Proc. Conf. Fast Breeder
Reactor Fuel Performance, p. 100-111-zI979).
10. J. R. Findlay, et aZ., IWGFRAT16, p. 17-21 (1979).
11. D. E. Mahagin and J. D. B. Lambert, "Breached-
Pin Testing in the US," ibid.
162
Discussion
D.B. Sangodkar, RRCK:
In all the cases described in your presentation a DND enhancement is observed.
I remember to have read areport that when fuel was irradiated in the form
of tiny granules in aperforated container in EBR-II there was no enhancement.
How do you explain this difference?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
Difference in fuel form, absence of temperature gradient, and low fuel
temperature
S. Jacobi, KfK:
One of the table indicates that there was noDND signal till 1973: Does this
mean there was no DND failure or the DND system was not sensitive enough
during this time (sensitivity was improved by some steps)?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
No DND failures before 1973
W. Glauner, KfK:
Did I understand, that you don't know exactly the release mechanism?
You come to this point later under "Models, Sess. lV"?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
Correct.
S. J acobi, KfK:
Could you give an explanation for the negative peak in the DND signal plot
from the data aquisition mashine, because the peak is out of normal statistics?
Mr. Lambert, ANL:
A spurious data point, I think.
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M. Re lie, 1A:
a) Did the eomposition of the groups of DN-preeursors show that there is a
minor quantity of short lived fission produets then predieted in the literature?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
Yes, the DN signals appeared to be "aged'!.
P. Miehaille, CEA:
ls the flow rate eonstant at EBR 2 when power is ehanged?
Did you examine the age of the DN bursts?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
Yes, yes.
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THE RESULTS OF TESTING AND EXPERIENCE TI{ lliE USE OF
LEAK DETECTION I.1ETHODS IN FAST REA.CTCltS
N.V.Krasnoyarov,V.D.Kizin,V.V.Konyashov,A.M.Sobolev,
V.I.Polyakov, D.I.Starozhukov, E.K.Yakshin
V.I. Lenin Research Institute of Atomic Reactors,
Dimitrovgrad, USSR
Part 4
RESEARCH !ND DEVELOPMENT WORK ON llTSTRUMENTATION AND
DETECTION METHODS
When applying delayed neutron detection method in large
power plants the signal/background ratio becomes insufficient
for detecting the occurence of single fuel element failures.
The tollowing disadvantages of the delayed neutron detection
system should be noted:
• short transportation time is not easily assured when design-
ing this system,
• delayed neutron signal does not provide information about
fission product concentrations in the coolant,
In few cases a pronounced Cs activity buildup in the circuit
and radiation situation deterioration were observed while the
delayed neutron signal remained constant.
Fission gas detection system provides information about
gaseous leak tuel elements availibility and permits the eva-
luation of failed tuel element number. However , this infor-
mation does not allow to assess a primary circuit contamina-
tion.
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At present adequate experimental data are not available on
the release fractions of such fission products as 9~, 131I ,
1340s, 13708 , 14üBa as a function of fuel type, defect size,
temperature, reactor operation time and of fission gas and
delayed neutron monitor signals. This prevents the complete
knowledge of defects occurence and development and activity
buildup in the circuit from being obtained based only on the
above system signals. Therefore the efforts of investigators
throughout the world were directed to ensure higher detection
system sensitivity to definite fission products.
The developed methods may be subdevided into two direc-
tions: those, based on physical and chemical extraction and
concentration of fission products from coolant and those ba-
sad on the improvement of input properties and selectivity
of detection devices. As a rule, many of them are too compli-
cated and inadequately prompt in service.
A theoretical analysis has been carried out of potentia-
lities of the latter approach- through adequate instrumenta-
tion - to decrease the lower detection threshold of gamma-
-spectrometerso The following tasks have been posed:
• the choice of semiconductor detectors for a particular
measurement geometry in a single-crystal gamma-spectrometer;
• the choice of a spectrometer capable of operating at maxi-
mum counting rates with no reduction both in energy resolu-
tion and in the efficiency.
• improvement of instrumentation to provide possibility of
long-term measurements;
• to reduce the interference background and Compton distri-
bution contribution under the studied peak of total absorp-
tion by anticompton schielding; the use of summing Oompton
spectrometerso
The studies have revealed that thin composite planar de-
tectors in the summing spectrometer scheme are more sensiti-
ve compared to a single crystal detector. Fig.4 shows the
summing Oompton spectrometer block-scheme. The spectrometer
was tested in the BOR-60 primary circuit by-pass sodium loop.
A Ge(Li) duod consisting of two planar detectors with a thin
berillium layer between them. The total sensitive volume was
12cm3• In the apparatus gamma-spectrum forthe measurement
time of 150min. the total absorption peclcs were obtained for
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1311 (364 and 637 KeV) and 1370s (662 KeV) on the 24Na back -
ground. The useful-to-interference activity ratio was about
10-4 •
The detector design and size optimization, improvement
of spectrometric path inputproperties at a less counting loss,
the choice of energy thresholds make it possible to reduce the
lower detection threshold.
To detect 13708 on 24Na background, for example, within
20 %, with a conventional single-crystal Ge(Li) detector a
longer holding period (about 70-80 hrs) is required at mass
1370s activity in the sodium coolant up to 108 Bc/kg.
Further the detection of fission products in cover gas is
considered.
The data gained during BR-10, BOR-60 power plants opera-
tion reveal (as is mentioned above) that an oxide fuel eIe -
ment failure is moreofteu, followed by the same pattern of
fission gas ac'tivity burst. Each time about the same activity
amount is released to the primary circuit. These events iden-
tification i8 easy due to high signal-tc-background ratios.
In most cases fission gas release through a defect is
fast because the fission gas pressure inside the cladding by
the time of its failure i8 about 2-5 MPa while the external
coolant pressure being an order of magnitude lower. In the
moment a failure occu~s agas fraction (large bubbles) comes
fast from the circulating coolant iuto the cover gase The rest
fission gas breaks into small bubbles and release trom the
coolant after an average delay-time of 8 - 10 hrs.
Fission gas release through a defect doesn't remain con-
stant. The sodium coolant tills fuel/cladding gap in the de-
feet vicinity both on failure induced pressure drop and after
apower decrease as well as during long-term reactor outage.
Radioactive fission gases release from such a fuel element is
very weak. Rere the measured fission gas activities levels
are due to the release of easily dissolved iodine and bromine
precursor-nuclides through the sodium plugging. In some reac-
~or operation days fission gas releases through the defect in
the form of bubbles as a result of pressure increase inside
a fuel element. The delay time of gases inside failed element
during the bubble mode release i8 determined from the plenum
volume and the rate of fission gas release through the defect.
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These factors were taken as a base of counting techniques
for the determination of a failed fuel elements number on the
basis of the dynamies pattern of fission gas release into the
cover gas.
Instrumentation allowed to carry out rather frequent (with
0.5 h intervals) mea~urements of 133Xe • 135Xe , 8~r radionu-
clides. Their release fract10ns in cover gas are listed in
Table 2. Gamma-ray detection efficiency in 80-250 KeV energy
range considering collimation was (2-4)010-3 pulses per quan-
tum from 1 cm3 of gas. At radionuclide concentrations higher
than 5.105 Bell the measurement statistical error was no more
than 5 % for 300 s measurement time.
Failed fuel element detectiQn was carried out by one of
the following ind1cations 3
• the increase in 133xe activity per day operation i8
more than by 50 %.
• the increase in 8~r and 135xe activities per a day
operation 18 more than twice_
• the increase in beta-counting from the beta detector
per a day operation i8 more than twice.
Detection mode
radionuclide release fraction,
%
in the moment of during the re-
fuel element fai- actor 8hut -
lure down 583 1.3 0.5
at stea~ re-
actor power 5.1 0.9 0.2
bubble mode re- at steady re-
lease actor power 4.4 0.25 0.02
Detection error, % + 20 + 50 +100-
- 70
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The best precisionin tailed elements number determination
may be aChieved for 133xe. Howevetl:', a background tor further
tailures detection grows with this radionuclide bu1ldup. The
release tractions of 135Xe and 8~r gases in the cover gas are
low due to their decay inside the tuel el ement and in the c00l-
ant. The signal-to-background ratios tor the above radionuclides
are fairly high~r. Thus, at the relative measurement error of
10 % it is difficult to detect the next new failure against the
133xe background fram 10 failed elements at steady gas release
process. These limits for 135xe and. 8~r are p respectively,
40 and 200 failed elements in the reactor core.
The assessment shows that one tuel element failure may be
with any assurance detected against the background activity
caused by BOR-GO cora contaminated with 1 g of 23%. Continu....
ous cleanup of cover gas fram radioactive fission gas favours
better counting efficiency based on 133Xe data. With the decon-
tam1nation factorof 100 the efficiency increases by a factor
of 20.
Trustworthiness of the method used for counting the failed
fuel element number was verified by fission product measure -
ments in sodium, fuel subassembly examination during the reac-
tor shutdown, selective material investigations of subassembl-
ies. As was seen from material investigations during one of
the reactor campaigns the mean number of failed fuel elements
per subassembly was 2-3, i.e. (5-8) % of all the·elements in
a subassembly. The mean fuel burnup was 7.3 % h.a.. In such a
situation, in the average 0.1-0.2 % of failed fuel elements
should be present in the core by the end of the reactor cam-
paign. This was in agreement w1th the results of fission pro-
duct detection in the reactor under operation.
The ultimate goal of failed tuel detection in the reactor
under operation cGnsists in more precise defining the level of
the primary circuit fission products and fuel contamination.
Fission gas measurements provide adequate information about
cover gas contamination.
Recently a new approach to main fission product detection
in sodium against the 2~a background has been found. The appro-
ach is suggested to be promising and its potentialities are be-
ing studied at present. It is hoped that this method will allow
to carry out continuous detection of caesium and iodine radio-
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nuclides in sodium and thereby to restriet primary circuit
contamination in excess of permissible limits at both slow
and rapid fission products activity increase.
In the last 'lew years to localize failed BOR-60 fuel sub-
assemblies the blow-gas i8 analyzed not only for 133xe , but
also for those fission products deposited on particulate
filter. This allowed to better tie trustworthiness of 'lailed
fuel subassemblies detection. The activity measurements are
carried out using Ge(Li) pulse analyzer detector. The deci-
sion about the fuel discharge results 'lrom the mathematic
analysis of 133Xe , 131 r , 1370s, 9?Nb, 13~e nuclides release
data. The 'luel subassembly features (burnup, irradiation ob-
jective, fuel composition etc •• ) are considered.
rn many cases 1370s and 133Xe were deteeted simultaneous-
ly in blow-gas while 131r and 132tre being not always detected.
As an example, one fuel subassembly comprised two failed 'luel
pins and was identified due to 133xe and 1370B detection.
Another subassembly comprised one failed fuel pin with minor
failure of cladding and was detected due to all above nuclide
activity inventory. One more subassembly comprised four tuel
pins with pin defects (with no cracks) but only 1370s release
was detected during the check. Fig. 5 shows, 80S an example,
a diagram of such discrepancy check.
The reasons of the results discrepancy are unknown. They
may be due to the coolan.t contamination level, the extent of
fuel cladding failure, the defect plugging with sodium ete ••
Studying the above reasons is required to better the aSsuran-
ce in adequate removal of failed tuel elements from the reac-
tor.
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Fig. 4 Ge(Li) gamma-spectrometerblock-scheme I
1 - sodium coolant tubing. 2 - Ge(Li) - duode.
3 - fast charge-sensitive preampli~ier. 4 - linear
gate, 5 - linear amplifier, 6 - summator, 7 - pulse-
height analyzer
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Fig. 5 Subassembly detection chart
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Discussion
C. Berlin, CEA:
Could you explain us, how you do an on-line measurement of caeSlum and
iodine activities in primary sodium?
E.K. Yakshin, SRIAR:
The method and facility are now patented. We hope to explain our method
in some time in future.
K.Ch. Stade, KBG:
Do you measure Ne-23 in the primary cover gas? How much is the concentration?
E.K. Yakshin, SRIAR:
We have measured Ne-23 concentration once several years ago. The value lS
constant at steady power.
M. Relic, IA:
Have you measured Cs-l34 in your cold trap (in the gas circuit)?
E.K. Yakshin, SRIAR:
In the cold trap of fission gas detection system Cs-134 was not measured. We
have not seen a sense of such measurement.
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SOME FEATURES OF DATA AOQUISITION .!ND PROOESSING USING
BOR-60 FAILED FUEL DETEOTION SYSTl!Jl
SeM. Glushak, N.V. Krasnoyarov, E.V. Krainov,
D.I. Starozhukov, V.I. Shipilov
Abstract
Based on the multichannel analyzer/mini-computer M-6000
and the multichannel analyzer IN-96/computer Multi-6 a com-
puterized measurement system has been designed at the BOR-GO
reactor.
Gamma-activity from 9 nuclides in sod1um flow and 9 nu-
clides in cover gas are being measured at 15 minute inter-
vals by Ge(Li) detectors under reactor operation. The data on
the nuclide behaviour with time are systematized and describ-
ed by a mathematical model with the mini-computer mentioned
above~_
Information about the fission product bebaviour in sodium
and cover gas. the data on the delayed neutrons, power, tem-
perature, flowrate and pressure changes within the circuits
over the reactor campaign 1s accumulated at the Multi-6 com-
puter. A soft-ware for a conven1ent access to the data bank
has been developed.
After the reactor shut-down the computerized measurement
system hardware and software makes the localization ot the
defected fuel pin subassembly poss1ble.
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INTRODUCTION
The BOR-60 research reactor fuel pins are tested to high
burnups.therefore,is s grest probability for their clad
fsilure.
The reactor operates with the limited end controlled n~
ber of the defected tuel pins. Fission products and some por-
tion of fuel release from the defects into the coolant end
cover gas resulting in the primary circuit contamination.
To limit the consequences of such release to a permiesible
time, to estimate the size of all the defecte to 8 high accu-
racy end to assess the extent of contamination. The BOR-GO
reactor is provided with special equipment end devices for de-
tection end characterization of the defects ae weIl 8S for
estimation of the primary circuit contamdnation level.
To measure the fission product activity various methode
or the semiconductor gamma-spectrometry are widely used. A
high activity of 2~a doesn't permit the ordinary gamma-spec-
trometry measurements of relatively low activities from fiss-
ion products just in sodium flow under the reactor operation.
To solve th1s problem aseries of tests of the Ge(Li) anti-
compton- end Ge(Li) summing compton spectrometers [',2J was
carried out. The composite Ge(li) detector of a special con-
figuration WaS expected to solve th1s problem. But the diffi-
culties in the production of such detectors force to search
another ways for eolving the problem.
The fission product measurements carried out at the ope-
rating BOR-GO reactor by a standard Ge(Li) gamma-spectrometer
are provided. In this connection adecision hae been made
upon the development of hardware end software complex at BOR-
60 for 8cquisition end processing data on fission product
gamma - activity behaviour in sodium and cover gas.
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CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The computerized measurement system which block-diagram
is presented in Fig.1, is based on the multichannel analyzer
with a mini-computer M-6000 [ .3 ] and the programmed multi -
channel analyzer IN-96 with a Multi-6 computer (Intertech-
nique production, France). The data exchange between M-6000
and Multi-6 computers is realized by the perforated tape ~
the off-line mode.
The M-6000 computer base multichannel analyzer operates
around-the-clock during the whole reactor campaign.
Two Ge(Li) detector gamma-sp~ctrometers record fission
product gamma-radiation in sodium and cover gas through the
lead collimator by a set of 12 successive measurements. The
time for setting up one gamma-spectrum in the M-6000 computer
multichannel analyzer is about .3 to 5 minutes. The gamma-
peaks corresponding to 9 nuclides both in sodium and cover
gas are processed for each spectrum. The measurements are
performed at 15 minutes intervals.
The algorithm for processing the current data on each
nuclide in aseries of 12 measurements provides tha reduction
of unimportant data (for example, on a stationar.y process)
and the detail description of the transient processea. To this
end the data obtained for aach nuclide in a serieso~2 measure-
menta are described by a mathematical model using the Oheby-
shev's polinomial regression [4J. As a result of statistical
processing the valuable polynomial coefficients pointing.to
the essential changes in the controlled parameter are trans-
ferred to the printer for subsequent input into the Multi-6
computer. By this means an efficient elimination of the re-
dundant information is provided. From the memorized data one
can recover the controlled nuclide behaviour with time in
an:y time interval to a sufficient accuracy.
A comprehensive information about the controlled nuclide
behaviour in sodium and cover gas, about the reactor power
transients and the delayed neutron number variations as weIl
as the data on temperature, pressure and f'lowrate with~ the
circuit are accumulated in the Multi-6 computer.
A special software has been developed which enables :
• to maintain the data bank in working state, that is
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to perform the data input, to search and co1"1"ect the
e1"1"o1"8 ;
• to classity the data. according to various c1"iter1a;
• to select the data acco1"ding to the required criteria.;
• to send the date. to varlous peripherals (display, gra-
phecon, printer) in a convenient form (tables,diagrams);
• to prepare the data for the following analysis, 1.e. to
form a restricted data bank tor the accelerated acceSB
to the required informa.tion and for 1ts vivid presenta-
tion.
The input data analysis permits to detect new defects, to
follow thair propagation and to control the fission product
contamination level.
After the reactor shut-down a search for the defected tuel
p1n Bubassemblies 1s performed. Based on the recorded data on
the volatile fission product behaviour in the exhaust1ng gas
<F
a conclus1on 1s drawn about the occurrence ot thedefected tuel
pins within the subassembly. The analysis of probes 1s carried
out by means of the Ge(Li) detector and IN-96 computer multi -
channel analyzer. The gamma-peaks on 15 nuclides in each probe
are then processed. The software providing the preparation for
the experiment, gamma-spectra recording and processing, and the
analysis of the experimental data has been developed. The de-
viation of the measurement results above the established level
tor some fuel subassemblies may testify to the presence of
failed fuel pins,this fact being the basis of the analysis.
Some criteria based on the evaluation of the root-mean-square
error are also used for the analysis.
MEASUREMENT RESULTS AND CONOLUSIONS
The developed hardware and software prov1des the effective
detection of the following fission products: 1.35Xe(24ge6 KeV) ,
1311(364.5 KeV), 1331(529.5 KeV) , 13708 (661.6 KeV), 1321(772,7
KeV), 13408 (79508 KeV), 1360s(818.5 KeV) , and 2~a(1368.5 KeV)
as wall as the following gaseous fissio~products in cover gas:
133xe(81 KeV), 85~r(151.3 KeV), 88xr(196.1 KeV), 135xe(249.6
KeV), 8?Kr(402.? KeV), 138xe(l~34.5 KeV), 88ab(18.36.1 KeV) ,
135mxe(52? KeV) and 41Ar(1293.6 KeV).
F1g.2 presents the example of the fission-product gamma-
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spectra in sodium. The activity levels tor 1340s, 1360s,13?Os,
1380s isotopes are, respectively, 8.4, 2.2, 183, 140 KBc/g.
The example tor fission gas gamma-spectra in cover gas is
given in Fig.3. At a fixed moment there are several fuel pins
with failed clads in the core remained from previous reactor
campaign.
The main features of the BOR-60 failed fuel detection
system are as follows:
• effective measurements of fission product gamma-activity
levels simultaneously in primary sodium and in cover gas
just under the r~actor operation,
• the controlled nuclide activity changes with time are
described by the mathematlcal model to ahorten the data
for storage, with these data one can restore with suffi-
cient accuracy any nuclide behaviour at any time interval,
• during each reactor campaign the measured data bank with
a convenient access is built...up.
The described control system operates at BOR-GO research
fast reactor during a year and a half. Over this period the aC-
tual problems for safe and economic reactor operation have been
solved using this system. On this basis the development of sim-
ple, effective and low cost failed tuel detection systems for
large sodium cooled fast reactors has beeu continued.
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Discussion
C. Ber1in, CEA:
1) What is the activity of the Na-24 in BOR-60 when the reactor is at fu11
power?
2) Considering that the activity of the Na-24 is 104 to 105 higher than the
activity of Cs-137, cou1d you exp1ain us how you do to measure on 1ine
reactor BOR-60 at fu11 power the activity of Cs-137 (and 1-131).
V.I. Schipi1ov, SRIAR:
1) When the BOR-60 reactor operate on fu11 power the activity of the Na-24
~s about 20 mCi/g .
2) We have the special method and faci1ity to measurethe re1ative1y low
gamma-activities from fission products in sodium f10w under the reactor
operation. We want to study this method more detail. This experiments are
we11 under way.
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INTEGRATED DND SYSTEM
--by C. Berlin
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HIGH TI}'II)ERATURE FISSlON CflMJB[!{S ])EVELOPI~lENT
by C. Berlin
INTEGrlATETJ lJl10 SYSTEI-I
TEI1PERATURE : !iSO - coo· C
GAM/lII DOSE RATE: 105 RAD H-1
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Discussion
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
What 1S sensitivity of the high temperature neutron counter you described?
C. Berlin, CEA:
-2 -1The measured sensitivity of the first prototype 1S leis for 1 n cm s
This is the expected sensitivity.
J. Dauk, IA:
How do you intend to measure delayed neutrons in the high background
(~ 105 cm- 2s- 1 ) with your high temperature fission counter?
C. Berlin, CEA:
Aecording to integrated DND purpose we need to know the actual neutron flux
coming directly from the core of the reactor. We intend to measure it on
Super-Phenix at the start up.
W. Glauner, KfK:
New fission counters:
At the future detector position: you~l have more fast or intermediate flux?
C. Berlin, CEA:
The new fission counters will be placed in the IHX. At this plaee the flux is
not a fast one because the long distance from the core. It 1S an intermediate
flux I suppose.
·P. Michaille, CEA:
Coul<;! you p.lease give the dimensions of the high temperature fission chamber?
C. Berlin, CEA:
The demensions of the first prototype are about diameter ~ 45 mm, active length
~ 150 mm.
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IN-PILE EXPERIMENTS WITH FAILED FUEL ELEMENTS
S. Jacobi, G. Schmitz
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
Institut für Reaktorentwicklung
H. Relic
INTERATOM, Bergisch Gladbach
Federal Republic of Germany
A. EXPERIMENTS AT THE SILOE REACTOR I~ GRENOBLE,.FRANCE
Considering the poor experience with failed fuel elements
an in-pile experimental program was started by Kernforschungs-
zentrum Karlsruhe GmbH (KfK) in collaboration with Centre
d'Etude Nucleaire Grenoble. The tasks of this program can be
summarized as follows:
- Study of the behaviour of failed LMFBR fuel pins under normal
reactor conditions.
- Characterization of defect type and its further development
by nuclear instrumentation.
- To assess consequences of failed fuel operations (maintenance,
shielding, cleaning, etc.) and
- to specify a core and plant instrumentation as a surveillance
system to prevent undesired reactor conditions.
- To provide specific data and approve models and codes.
- To develop a basis for economical plant operation with de-
fined classes of defective fuel pins.
The test program includes measurements with fresh and high
burn-up pins.
The irradiations are performed in SILOE reactor in Grenoble
(France). This reactor is a water swimming pool reactor in
which several different experimental rigs can be inserted. The
experimental devices used for this experimental program are
called "thermopump" sodium loops. The 11 thermopump 11 sodium loops
are designed for experimental irradiations of one fuel pin. The
essential features of this rig are
- pin power levels of up to 60-70 kW
- thermal or epithermal neutron flux
- sodium flow from 2 to 6 meters/second
- sodium temperature regulation
(total sodium quantity in the loop about 1,5 1)
- good accessibility for experimental instrumentation.
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The experimental instrumentation includes the following
measurement system:
- Continuous gas ionization chambers
Gamma spectrometry of gas sampIes by GeLi
Delayed neutron detection (DND)
On-line gamma spectrometry of sodium by GeLi
Off-line gamma spectrometry at selected parts of the loop
or of the fuel pin by GeLi
:Jeu trography.
Three experiments have been done and evaluated until now.
Table I shows the most important data about the fuel pins before
irradiation.
Table I: Data of the test pins for the experiments
82, 83 and 84 of the defect fuel program
82 83 84
Pu(fiss.)
Pu(tot.)+u(tot) .
U isotopic composition
~elative density
8toechiometry
Outside diameter
Material
Pellets length
Pellets outside
diameter
Fissile length
Clad thickness
Burn-up (max.)
Material dosis
Kind of artificially
machined defect
o
o
8lit,
open
35 mm x
1 nun
Hixed oxyde (U,Pu)02
27,6 %
83% U5 (weight)
86,8% TD
1 ,98
6 mm
1.4970 cold worked
10 mm
5,09 mm
320 mm
0,38 mm
10,4 % 9,7 %
45 dps 45 dps
8lit, Zn Slit,
plugged open
5 nun x 35 nun x
0,05 nun 1 mm
Defect position upper fissile column
184
The 8ILOE-irradiation data and the failure development are
summarized in Table 11.
Table 11: Data of the irradiation experiments 82, 83
and 84 of the defect fuel program
Max. linear power
Max. clad midwall
temperature
Irradiation time
Irradiation time
at max. linear
power
Diameter increase
at the irradiation
end
8econdary cracks
82
420 W/cm
47 d
25 d
27 %
no
(only
enlargem. )
83
350 W/cm
23 d
18 d
12,5 %
yes
(several)
84
350 ~\T/cm
21 d
9 d
12 %
yes
(prolongation
till 11 ° mm)
Geometrical defect 2 2
area ,,0,9 cm ~2 cm
Release of fissile
material <<4 mg -125 mg
Release of es 137 40 % <85 %
Release of I 131 10.;.-20% ~12 %
< 1 ,4 g
,.~80 %
-30 %
The evolution of the failures during the irradiation could
be followed by means of the continuous measurements of the re-
leased fission products and by means of neutrographies and of
gamma scans during irradiation stops. The measured data give
some good information concerning the failure development during
the first days and the following steady state conditions.
Regarding the information got from the applied instrumen-
tation and the utility of this instrumentation for reactor
application following statements can be made.
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On-line measurements of fission gases by a gamma ionization
chamber
The signals during the irradiation show a continuous fission
gas release superposed by fission gas bursts or bubbles. The fre-
quency and the amplitude of these bursts increase normally du-
ring the failure evolution time and can reach a number of ten or
more bursts per hour. After the failure stabilization the burst
frequency is again low. This behaviour of the fission gas release
allows to distinguish the evolution from the steady state condi-
tion of a failure.
Fission gas measurements by GeLi in the cover gas
The composition of the released fission gas isotopes gives
more information about the clad failure than the bulk gamma de-
tection. Especially an emission changement will be seen clearly.
During the failure evolution the short-lived isotopes increase
more rapidly than the long-lived isotopes and afterwards at the
equilibrium conditions the isotope emission is between the ini-
tial type and the evolution type. The augmentation of the short-
lived isotopes during the failure enlargement points to agas
emission from deeper fuel layers (e.g. from the central hole)
through new fuel cracks. Afterwards the formation of sodium/fuel
reaction products stops partly this rapid gas release.
Delayed neutron detection (DND)
The signals of delayed neutrons show well the evolution of
the pin failure.The defect area calculated with recoil model
differs about factor 10 to 100 from the geometrical failure sur-
face. This factor depends on the reactor power and/or on the
fuel temperature, Fig. 1.
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Fig.l: 52,54 and 53 calculated k-Factors
versus the 50dium Temperature
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Therefore for the characterization of the failure evolution the
DND signals must always be taken at the same pin power and tem-
perature. Although an improvement of the calculation method is
necessary, the DND system is able to give the information con-
cerning the degree of the clad failure. The threshold of a specific
recoil area which could lead to an adverse operation (e.g. loss
of fuel, etc.) was not found, as such conditions have not
occurred.
B. EXPERIMENTS AT THE BR 2 REACTOR IN MOL, BELGIUM
The fuel element behaviour due to local off-normal cooling
conditions and the possible pin-to-pin failure propagation are
of special interest in the safety analysis of LMFBR's. In a
joint program called "Mol 7C" the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
GmbH (KfK) and the Centre d'Etude de l'Energie Nucleaire/
Studiecentrum voor Kernenergie, Hol, Belgium, are performing re-
lated experiments in a sodium loop of the BR 2 reactor. The test
section contains a 37-pin bundle of fresh UO -fuel with an ar-
tificial local blockage of steel or fuel inv61ving about 11 pins.
After some days of preirradiation the transient test phase was
initiated by interruption of cooling in the zone of local
blockage l~ 1 ,2_7. Thi s program will be continued with preirra-
diated mixed oxide fuel from KNK 11.
The photographs and autoradiographies taken during the post
irradiation examinations of Hol 7C have shown fuel fragment
blockages, Fig. 2. The observed residual sodium flow through the
blockage is of importance for the cooling of the fuel inside
the blockage as weIl as for transportation of DN precursors to
the DND monitor outside the reactor.
The DND signals from the experiments reveal typical pattern
during the formation of the defects as weIl as subsequently at
constant reactor power, Fig. 3. During the first one to two se-
conds the DND signals increased rapidly by some orders of mag-
nitudes. This is contributed to the failure and subsequent mel-
ting of the claddings.
Then after a rest of a few seconds the next rise of the
signals by a factor 5 to 20 indicated the partial disintegration
of the pins. After this the signals were about constant which
means that the generated fuel fragment blockages were stable du-
ring the following reactor power operation of 48 min (Mol 7C/1),
6 min (Mol 7C/2) and 5 days (Mol 7C/3) .
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Fig.3: DND Signals of Mol 7C. Log. Chamber ChannelFig. 2: Mol 7C
Fuel Fragment Blockage
The experiments demonstrated that the cooling of the whole
fuel bundle was not interrupted, though several pins had failed.
The main results regarding DND signals are:
- Depending only on the sodium transit time from the core to the
DND monitor, the DND system gives a prompt response about the
events inside the core.
- The DND system is qualified to generate a scram signal.
- The counter equipment with a wide measuring range avoided over-
flow by passing over to large failures.
- In a reactor a short-time memory storing with high sveed the
DND signals, the covergas signals and the main opera~ional signals
about 5 min before and 5 min after the scram would be helpful
in signal interpretation.
C. EXPERI~lliNTS AT THE TOSHIBA-FISSION-PRODUCT-LOOP FPL
Instrumentation tests were performed at the Toshiba-Fission-
Product-Loop FPL. It was interesting to look for the sensiti-
vity of the KfK's (Kernforschungs zentrum Karlsruhe) precipitator
and its feasibility under sodium loop conditions. The KfK pre-
cipitator has the advantage that it has no moving parts and its
handling is easy, Fig. 4 /- 3,4 7.
The main interest of the test was:
- Measurement of the precipitator's sensitivity for fission
gases degasing out of the sodium.
- Influence of sodium vapour.
- Study of parameters as transit time, gas pressure, gas flow-
rate and temperature.
- Reliability.
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Reoetor Power 81 kW I
Ho Temperoture 300'e I
No Flow Rote 3 I/min I
Gas Flow Rote 151Imin
Gas Pressure 1.1 bor i
I
I
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Fig. 4: The KfK-Precipitator.
At the Outlet of the Ar-Volume the
Miniature-GM-Counter
-600 -400 -200 0 +200 +400 +600
------ Up
Fig.5: Detection Efficiency 1) versus
Precipitation Voltage Up
The experimental program was defined together with the
Toshiba company, the tests were performed by the Toshiba com-
pany. In Table 111 the data which were measured under water con-
ditions and the FPL results are compared. Taking into account
the uncertainty of the gamma spectrometry technique with NaJ(Tl)-
crystal which was used for the measurements under water condi-
tions, the collected activity on the Geiger-Müller-surface is
substantially identical in both cases.
Table 111: Analysis of the precipitate on the Geiger-
Müller-surface C4,5J
H20 loop,1967 [4.] FPL, 1979 [$J
NaJ(Tl)-measurements GeLi measurements
Nuclide Cs- ":<.b- not Cs- Rb- Rb-
138 89 analysed 138 89 88
Half-life (min) 32,3 15,4 32,2 15,4 17 ,8
Percentage of
isotope in the pre-
cipitate activity
in the time of
precipitation
54,2% 29,4% 16,4% 46% 16,5% 37%
The detection sensitivity for the fission products is also
comparable:
. 311 cps/decay/s.cm for H20 L-4~
4 cps/decay/s.cm3 for Na.
Fig. 5 shows the relation between the precipitation voltage
and the detection efficiency. Already at low voltages the de-
tection efficiency reaches its saturation value.
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The good detection efficiency and the troubleless preci-
pitator operation though the sodium vapour rests at FPL led to
the decision to install the KfK precipitator in the experimental
by-pass of the KNK-II cover gas system.
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STUDIES ON MODELING TO FAILED FUEL
DETECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE IN L'!FBR
T. M1yazawa
TOSHIBA corporat10n
G. Sajl
MITSUBISHI Atomic Power Industry
H. Rindo, N. Mitsuzuka, T. Hikichl
and T. Odo
Power Reactor and Nuclear
Fuel Oevelopment corporation.
MSTRACT
Fail€d Fuel Oetection (FFO) system with Fission Pro-
ducts (FP) detection is considered to be the most promissing
nethod, since FP provides direct information against fuel
element failure.
For.designing FFO system and for evaluating FFO signals,
scme'adequate FFO signal response to fuel failure have been
required. But few models are available in nowadays.
Thus Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Oevelop~ent Corp-
,ation (PNC) had developed FFO response model with computer
ccdes, based on several fundamental investigations on FP re-
lease and FP behavior, and referred to foreign country ex-
Jeriences on fuel failure.
In developing the model, noble gas and halogen FP re-
lease and behavior were considered, since FFO system would
Je composed of both cover gas monltoring and delayed neutron
:onitoring.
The developed model can provide typical fuel failure
'~sponse and detection limit which depends on various back-
rround signals at cover gas monitoring and delayed neutron
;onitoring.
According to the FFD response ~odel, we tri~d to assu~e
uel failure response and detection limit at Japan experi-
~ntal fast reactor "JOYO".
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The detection li~it of JOYO FFD system was estimated
y measuring the background signals.
Followed on the studies, a complete computer code has
ecn now made with some improvement.
On the paper, the details of the model, out line of
Jeveloped computer code, status of JOYO FFD system, and
trial ass~~ption of JOYO FFD response and d~tection limit.
CITRODUCTIOM.
Failed fuel detection (EFD) system has important role
Eor LMFBR safety and availability aspect. Among various
letection system, most promising method is the detection
00 radiation from fission produets (FP) whieh escape from
[ailed fuel pin into coolant or diffuse into gas space
:hrough coolant. The most eonventional FFD syst~~ for
loop type L~BR is composed with delayed neutron detection
([)~lD) subsys tern and cover-gas monitoring (CGM) subsys tem,'
13 sho'nn Fig.l. To FFO system, some fuel failure signal
:esponce estimations have been required for setting
lutomatic warni~g or reactor trip level, or operator
!ecision ~~king to the plannings continious plant operation
Je/ond fuel failure. For this purpose, PIlC (Po'..er Reactor
Ir,d Nuclear. Fuel Corp.-) has planed to make theoretical models
/~tch can descrived the FFD signal responee at loop type
~~!_i'BR.
For making adequate model, PHC has reffered several 1n-
,lle loop experiments(l) 'and other countries experiences on
'p release and behavior in LMFBR coolant system at fuel
ailure. Making models on FP release from failed pins and
'p behaviror in reactor eoolant system, rial calculation
,n DHD and CGM responces have been carried out in'assuming
uel failure at Japan experimental fast breeder reactor
0'(0(2). And also the minimum detection limits of each
ubsyst~'l\ were estimated with using measured back ground
['lnals (~).
MODELI~IG TO FP RELEASE 1\~ID BEHA'lliJ1l..
(1) Modeling concept
Because FP release from failed fu~l pins ar.d FP
behavior in reactor coolant system were ~ost i~portant
subjects on ",odeling FFD system responce, FP transpor-
tation process Were divided into following 5 steps.
i) FP release from fuel pellets into fuel pin gap or
pleny..',
FP reles~_from failure pin into eeolant.
FP behavior in reactor coolant plen~"
FP transportation in primary coolant pipe.
FP transportation from coolant into reactor cover
gas plen~,.
On the other hand, fuel fallure modes were
classlfied into two codes. The one is constant FP
release wlth time and the other is time dependent FP
release. The eonstant release can be used for gas
leaker, and time dependent release ean,be used for
burst failure such llke cracking growth at fuel pin
surface.
(2) FP release model at fuel failure
FP inventry balance in fuel pin with failure was
defined as Eq. (1).
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For a failure at pin plenu.~~ region\ the escape
rate WL is given by Eq. (5). and (6). (3
P l/y P y-l/y
W D C S p (..E.) [~(l- (..E.) }RTg )
L d d Pi y-l Pie
kth FP inventry in fue1 pin gap and plenum
(atoms)
I kth FP release rate from fue1 pellets into
pin gap or p1en~~ (atoms/sec.)
kth FP eseape rate from fuei pin at fuel
fai1ure on1y for ~T (atoms/sec.)
kth FP deeay eonstant (l/see,)
FP identifieation suffix
identifieation suffix for ~he preeurser
of kth FP
For solving Eq.(l), Rk and Lk shou1d be given.
a) FP escape from fai1ur~ pin
Regarding to eseape rate Lk(t), three ana1ytiea1
mede1s have been made, To the eonstant release model,
Lk(t) ean be written as Eq.(2). "
for
Po (_2_)y/(y-1)
Pi ~ y+l
and
es p( 2 ly/(y-l)(~?.Tg )1/2
d d y+I y+l e
(5)
•••••••••••• (6)
FP gas pressure inside tuel clad (a~~)
Coolant pressure (atm)
Ratio of speeifie heat (Cp/Cv )
Speeifie heat of gas at constant pressure
(ea1/ern3)
Speeilie heat of gas at constant vol~~e
(ea1/ern3)
Coeffieient of discharge (-)
Breaeh area at pin plenum (cm2)
Gas eonstant (atm'cm3/ccl)
FP and"He mixture gas density (atom/ern3)
Gas temperature (OK)
dimentional eonversion faetor (dyne/cm2'a~~)
Where, Pi:
Po:
y ;
Cp :
For a failure at fuel eolumn,(4)fo110wing equation can
be used for laminar f1ow.
.......................... (3)
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• (2)
The second model was defined as Eq.(4) with
using equiva1ent gas eseaping flow rate.
FP eseape eonstant for all gascous FP
(l/sec.)
kth FP inventry in fue1 pin gap and
plenum (atoms)
To time dependence FP release, two different proeess
were considered. The first model was thdt FP escape
rate was equa1 to FP release rate from fue1 pellets as
shown in Eq. (3)
Vp(t):
3221I00 0h (Pt -Po)
128\lRTt
= 2rO
flow annulus length (ern)
gas viseosity (a~~'see/em2)
pressure at outlet frem annulus (a~";\)
pressure at inlet to annulus (a~";\)
gap (ern)
(COol)
(ern)
Where, 0h: 2(rO-rl), dia.":\etrical
rO: annulus outer radius
rl' annulus inner radius
00 :
1
Equiva1ent gas eseaping f10w rate
(atoIRs3/see. )
Total gas volume in fuel pin gap and
p1enu.~ (atoms 3)
Moreover, the equiva1ent gas escaping flow rate'
WLean be given by theoritical models whieh were ()
introduced by T.C. Chawle et a1$3).and R.E. Murata. 4
aeording to the fai1ure loeation a10ng fuel pin.
The f!lilul"e locations Were c;onsidered to be at pin
plenum region and fuel eo1umn region as sho~~ in
Fig.2.
Far turbulent flo~ region, th~ equivalent ~lGW rate
ean be given with using running frietion fae~or of C.
:TO ° 3/2_-,o~h-,r-,·'.-(P 2 _ P 2) 1/24(1CRTI17~ t 0 (8)
•••••••••••••••••••••••• ; ••••• (9)rUD I CIJ1U7üIl
I
•
r~llur'''
In ease of Lvlt)=Rk(t), theoretieal model will be
handled in the next paragraph. (5)
(b) FP release from fue1 pellet into pin gap
Formaking FP release model, reeoil prccess
and diffusion proeess have been eonsidered.
To the recoil proeess, Rkr ean be given as Eq. (9).
Rrlllitr D -4-Kf
flg.2 Sche:ntlc VIe:J or rallura locatlon
'dhere, Rr , kth FP reeoil range (ern)
ß I kth FP generation rate per unit volume
(a tIns/em3 sec)
Kf' Rcughness faetor
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On the other hand, stable FP release rate can be given
in Eq. (11).
To the diffusion process, Booth diffusion modellS)
was used for both stable and radioactive FP release
from fue1 pellets.
For radioactive FP,
,
~ CckdV • (WsCsk + ~~k-l)CC(k-l)~CCk
+ AkCck (t-t ~dV - div (CekV) - lCckC~k (14)
Where, cck: FP concentration in primary coolant
(atoms/ernJ )
Ws : Sodium flow rate in on fuel a~s~~ly
(ernJ/see)
k-l, klh FP precursor identification
Coolant circulating time '(see)
Coolant flow velocity with vector form
(ern/sec)
!Cck' kth FP transport coefficient from sodi~~
into covergas (ern/sec)
C~k: FP eoncentration at contact surface
between coolant and cover gas
(10)
Dk/a 2 (l/see.)
Equivalent sphere radius (ern)
FP diffusion eonstant (cm2/sec)
D' 1/2 A. 1/2l\d 2 J(,) (colh(u:~
"k k
H'here,
Where, Tt: Fuel irradiated time
Thus Rk(t) can be given as
~(t) 2 ~r(t} + '1cd(t) (12)
. For.solving this equation, flow velosity distribution
sho~ld be given. '
The flow velocity distribution was solved by solving
the combination equation of the mass continuity equation
and the motion equation tNavier-Stokes Equation) under
adequate boundary conditions. For this purpose, .
modified SOLA code(6)was used. For Obtaining DND signal
responSe of conventional system as shown in Fig.1,the FP
coneentration in the primary eoolant pipe was required.
The FP coneentrations in the primary pipe was eonsidered
to be ehanged only by deeay butnot by p1ate-out.
(J) FP behavior model in the coolant
FP behavior in coolant system was considered with
three steps. The first step was the behavior in a
fuel subassembly with fuel failure, the second step
was the behavior at coolant plenum, and the Jrd step
was the transportation from coolant system into cover
gas plenum. The FP transportation coneept is shown
in Fig. (3).
On the other hand, FP eoncentration in cover gas space
ean be led as Eq. (15) by using transport coefficient of
Kek in Eq.(14), and (16).
(15)
(16)
Where, Hk: FP atoms n~~~er in cover, gas (atoms)
Sp: Contact area between sodium and cover gas (em2)
ks : FP p1ate öut coeffieient at cover gas system
wall (ern/sec)
SG' Total cover gas system wa1l(c,n2)
VG: Cover gas volume (c.nJ )
WG' Cover gas sampling flow rate (c=J 3/sec )
Sy' Sampling nozzle area (cm2)
(4) Response on failed fuel signal
a) CG~ response
Assuming the CGM to be eomposed .of moving wire
type precipitator, the res?onse model was led as
sho'on in Eq. (17).
M ,;. E t l:~-JtsC P c k....k+1-Ak 0 CGkWGdt
( -)'ktp -)'k+1
t p -:\k+1t w ••••••••••• (17)
x e -e ) e
rlg.3 FP Transport
The released FP eoncentration in fuel subassembly
can be written as Eq.(lJ) with an as~umption that
entire volume is divided into small cells.
Where, Me:
E p :
ce:
)'k+1'
Count rate by a preeipitator (eps)
Preeipitation effieieney
Counting effieieney
Daughter nuelide deeay eonstant of kth FP
(l/see)
Soaking time (sec)
Gas transit time of eha~ber (sec)
Required time of wire rnoving (sec)
(lJ)
b) D~IO respon~e
The DND response was led as shc~~ in Eq.(18)
........... (la)
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Using the developed ~odel, FFD signal response was
estimated with asslli~ng fuel failure at JOYO.
Major para~eters which were used for calcu;~~~~~ ~te
listed in Table(l), (2), (3), (4). And typical flow
pattern which was used the FP concentration calculation
i5 shown in Fig.(4). The trial calculations provided
typica1 response to leaker failure and burst failure as
shown in Fig.(5), (6), and (7).
I!UM. CALCULl'.TtQli
Deposition Ra~e and Transoort Coefrl~lent4
')k = k e -Ew/R.
'" wo
E", = Actlvatlon Ener3/( K~al/mo1
R aas Constan~ ( K:sl/~ol K )
T Tempnrature ( K )
TABLE
Ha1o«en ;10~ ~r- 235 Alkall
K·..k • 2.449 x 10-
6
---- 2.763 x 10- 5
E", . 11. 187 ---- 8.359
.. 2.763 x 10-4 12. 763-;~ 10- 2 2.763 x 10-2
k"
-
coolant
DND count-rate (cps)
DND efficiency (cps/atoms/cm3)
Transit time from inlet of primary
pipe to DND location (sec)
Measuring sodium vo1~e (ern3)
kth FP branching ratio
Where, MOl
"01
td l
In these figureS,the back ground levels are shown for
obtaining the detection limit of each subsyste~.
Transport Co~fri~ien~ ( lern )
TABLE 1 Fue1 Oata
Fuel Compotion rission rate
235U 22.29
"238U 7.21
"239Pu 59.11
"241Pu 11.39
"Fuel Di:nention
Pellet radius 0.2315 cm
Clad inner radius 0.24 cm
Clad outer radius 0.275 cm
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Fission Rate
3 x 1010 fission/·..att
f1g.~ Calculated f1o~ DIstributIon
TABLE 2 Par~~eters to F? release
COil5TA:rr V.~:,:;?
E'l'Jivalent spere radius 5 x 1'J- 4 r.:m
-
FP range 10-3e...
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CO:-/CLUSION
Based on the theoretical model, PNC has a plan to make
a computer code for FFD response with some L~prove~ent.
For irnproving the mo~el, more detail data on FP release
fron failed fuel pins, and FP behavior in reactor coolant
system.
In order to solve this problem, a lot of experi~ental
investigations have been planed in Japan.
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Discussion
F.E. Holt t HEDL:
Question to Fig. 5: What is the significance of 24 h t 240 h t etc. ?
T. Miyazawa t Toshiba:
The term AP is the escape rate of gas from the fuel pin.
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
Do you have plans to check in-pile for the parameters to be used in
your code?
T. Miyazawa, Toshiba:
Yes. One is for FPL, the other is for JOYO with stable isotope.
F.E. Holt t HEDL:
Your model is theoretical and will be modified as you obtain data?
T. Miyazawa t Toshiba:
Yes.
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MODELS AND CODES FOR THE RELEASE
OF FISSION PRODUCTS USED IN
FAILED FUEL DETECTION STUDIES IN
THE UK
MODELS AND CODES FOR THE RELEASE
OF FISSION PRODUCTS USED IN
pi;"iLBD-J;i'UBL-DETEcTIo"N-STlJDIESIN
THE UK
The mechanisms guiding the
release of fission products from
fuel are being studied at a
number of establishments in the
UK. Detailed codes describing
the release are being constructed
from controlled experiments on
small fuel sampIes . This note
reviews this work.
From experience with
defected pins it is evident that
the fission· product emission is
greater than that expected solely
from recoil fission products over
the area of the defect. Long
lived fission gases obviously
accumulate in the plenum of the
pin, some if not mos t of these
escape at pin failure followed by
a subsequent steady release. The
initial release could carry with
it some fission products but
normally the escape is expected
to be too slow to carry the short
lived DN precursors, for example,
to the coolant. The 3ubsequent
release of about 1 cm per day
also probably has li ttle effect
on release of short lived
species, but significant activity
from long lived species such as
Xe133 and Xe135 will probably
escape and remain in equilibrium
in the cover gas.
Release from Fuel
The rate of release of both
long and short-lived species from
polycrystalline fuel is a
function of the effective surface
area of the fuel, which depends
on bur n-up, as weIl as the fue I
rating and fuel temperature
(itself a function of rating).
Most of the primary fission
product atoms come to rest within
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the fuel crystallites and diffuse
towards the grain boundaries by a
mechanism which depends on
thermal activation, with
enhancement from irradiation
effects and delays arising from
temporary trapping in
precipitated fission gas bubbles.
During the time taken to reach
the grain boundaries, the primary
fission products may decay
radioactively and the resulting
members of the fission chain
continue to diffuse towards th,e
surface. The resultant emission
of a gi ven isotope may thus be
cons ide red as a summa t ion of a
number of distinct but related
processes involving its
precursors as weIl as itself.
The mechanism of release
from the grain boundaries of the
fuel to .the free volume of the
pin can be shown to involve the
passage of vola t i le atoms along
narrow tunnels, between the
grains, which are formed during
irradiation by the interlinkage
of fission gas bubbles on grain
boundaries and along grain edges.
The process is aided by the
formation of large voids and
cracks within the fuel.
The release of short-lived
fission gases from thermal and
fast rector fuels has been
studied in the UK by the UKAEA
and CEGB. At DNE, experiments
have been conducted with a vented
pin in the DFR (1). The results
were compared with experiments
carried out in the thermal
reactor DIDO at AERE (2).
More detailed experiments
have been made by BNL and AERE
(3, 4) on small fuel sampIes to
obtain the temper~ture and rating
dependancies of the· release (5)
and to study the effects of fuel
structure and burn-up.
For short-lived isotopes of
a given chemical species (t~ <20
h), unoer s?ecified conditions of
temperature, fuel rating and
burn-up, the release rate, R, can
be represented as a fraction of
the rate of production, B, by the
expression
(R/B)
where D is the effective
diffusion coefficient for the
chemical species and 'f.. is the
decay constant of the isotope.
The total rate of emmision,
including the diffusion and
emission of precursors of
different chemical form, can be
calculated using the method of
Friskney and Speight (6). In
comparing the measured and
derived values of the total
emission rates for a range of
isotopes with different decay
cons tan ts, i t has become ev iden t
that the effective diffusion
rates of different chemical
species are different: in
particular, the value for Br is
likely to be about 300 times
greater than that for Kr and the
value for I about 10 times
greater than that for Xe. These
larger values should be used in
calculating the emission of the
DN precursors Br89 and 1137.
The rate of release of a
given isotope from the fue1 in a
who1e pin under specified
cond i t ions has been compu ted by
di v id ing the fuel vol urne into a
series ofaxial and radial zones,
assigning the appropriate values
of temperature, rating and
burn-up to each section and
calculating the release from that
section on the basis of measured
release rates. The contributions
f rom each section can be summed
for the whole pin, or
alternatively axial zones may be
treated separately. A x i a 1
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diffusion to the defect in a pin
may be calcu1ated using a simple
model. It is calculated that the
quantity of an isotope with
disintegration constant 'f.. which
reaches the defect is that which
is born within a diffusive
distance (DI 'f..)h of the defect.
(D is the diffusion coefficient).
If coolant has not entered the
pin then D is the diffusion
coefficient of the gas in the
voids, although this should be
modified if significant diffusion
is through cracks in the fuel.
The picture is further
complicated by pressure
fluctuations at the defect, and
by the ingress of sodium which is
aided by these fluctuations, and
in the case of de layed neu tr on
precursor bromines and iodines by
their affinity for other fission
products, particularly caesium.
The chemistry is such that
caesium which accumulates near to
the cool cladding would be
expected to be washed out taking
any halogens chemically bonded to
it. Subsequently the sodium,
depending on the oxygen
potential, can react with the
fuel forming complex uranates or
p1utanates depending on the fuel,
(7) . Being less dense than the
fuel these compounds cause
swe11ing of the can and unless
they are washed away release of
fission products will be affected
by diffusion through these
complexes.
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Discussion
S. Jacobi, KfK:
What is the main part of the diffusion release:
Diffusion through the solid state lattice?
Diffusion along the grain boundaries?
Diffusion through open porosity?
Others?
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
I think that diffus ion through the solid lattice is a main part of the
release, but this must depend on the details of the failure.
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
Are there stable (R/B) for all isotopes in irradiated fuel after
1-2 % burn up?
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
Yes for rare gases, for other conditions constant.
P. Michaille, CEA:
When you interpret the DND signals in terms of diffusion, do you take
into account all the fuel of the pin or only a partof it at the vicinity
of the defect?
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
We calculate the release from that part of the pin wi thin a diffusion
distance from the defect.
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P. Michaille, CEA,
Have you an explanation for the fact the bromides and iodides have such
a greater diffusion coefficient than noble gases?
Comment from D.E. Mahagin, HEDL
The insolubility of noble gases ~n solids inhibits their diffusion through
the solid relative to other gases than can be dissolved in the solid.
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Delayed-Neutron Signal Analysis Techniques
K.C. Gross and R.V. Strain
Argonne National Laboratory
Argonne, Illinois
ABSTRACT*
The experimental and analytical techniques devel-
oped at EBR-II to characterize delayed-neutron signals
are described. These techniques include raw data aver-
aging, special flow-reduction tests on the delayed-
neutron detector loop, and the development of a special
code (GIRAFFE) to unfold the character of the signals.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the first failure of an experimental
fuel pin in 1967 it has been hoped that the character
of fission-gas releases from failures--their fine struc-
ture as it were--could be used to inf~r information
about the failures themselves. However, apart from some
very qualitative statements about the type of fuel in-
volved--oxide or metal, and its. burnup--high or low (1),
attempts to extract further information about failures
from their gas release met with surprisingly little
success. Attent ion then,' was focused on delayed-neutron
(DN) monitoring as a means to garner additional infor-
mation during reactor operation. It was argued that
fuel directly exposed to primary sodium would release
the very short-lived ON precursors to it by recoil; the
magnitude of the signal then could be directly correl-
ated with the size (or the severity) of defect, pro-
vided allowance were made for fission rate, counter
efficiency, and a few other parameters. In truth, little
happened in the first 12 years of EBR-II operation to
change this belief, as described in a parallel paper
(2). The small number of ON signals from 'natural fail-
ures during that per iod were curtailed by scram of the
reactor, when the signals would rapidly die away.
When the ON detector FERD was removed from the
EBR-II trip circuit in 1977, in order to allow breached-
pin tests to start, a number of new and revealing as-
pects of ON monitoring became apparent. OUring tests
to calibrate FERD, "systems" effects-such as the mix-
ing of sodium in the upper plenum, and the transit time
from core to detector-were first observed and appreci-
ated. Soon afterwards, the ON signals from initial
breached-pin tests made it abundantly clear that re-
lease from breached pins could not be by recoil only.
Signals were many times the value to be expected by
such release fram the geometrical area of exposed fuel.
The "enhancement factor" was born in the U.S.; workers
abroad had observed the same phenomenon (3,4). This
paper describes a his tory of the techniques developed
to date at EBR-II to extract as much information
as possible from DN signals regarding the nature of
cladding breaches.
INSIGHT GAINED BY SPECIAL TESTS
The ON detector FERD and the cover-gas activity
monitor GLASS were calibrated in 1977 (5), and again
in 1978, by using a fission-product source (FPS) which
gave release by recoil only. In 1977 the FPS was irradi-
*Work sUPP,orted by the U. S. Department of Energy.
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Fig. 1. Flow in Upper Plenum of EBR-II
ated in two core locations: 5B2 and 5E4; 5B2 is closer
to the primary out let pipe than 5E4 (Fig. 1). Response
of the FERD was sensitive and linear to reactor power
change, or fission rate, as described elsewhere (2).
The FERD signals under all constant-power conditions,
however, exhibited short-term cyclic fluctuations of
±15% about the mean count rate on all three (independ-
ent) channels. The fluctuations appeared to be in phase
(Fig. 2), although their magnitude and (common) fre-
quency var iOO.
Similar fluctuations had been always observed in
the background O~ signals, but were ascribed to normal
variation due to the'low count rates; the fluctuations
in signal from the FPS were much more than could be
explained by counting statistics. Attempts were made to
correlate the fluctuations with variation in a number
of reactor parameters, such as primary flowrate, flow
in the FERD loop, fine-scale power variations, even
beats between the two primary pumps; none was success-
ful. It was found later that part of the fluctuations
resulted from the coupling between the FERD loop and
the IHX discharge. When the FERD-loop flow was reduced
slightly, the DN signal count rate went up and the
fluctuations decreased; bulk sodium from the tank was
clearly diluting the signal' strength at full-rated
flow in the FERD loop. This effect was peculiar to
EBR-II; clearly it could be, and was minimizoo.
The remaining fluctuations could only be ascribed
to varying mixing of sodium in the upper plenum, and
therefore to varying transit paths for 'DN precursors to
follow. Although the movement of sodium is radially
outward through the circumferential flow baffle (Fig. 1)
and around the periphery to the out let pipe, this
whole region has much turbulence. A similar, but perhaps
less marked effect will occur for reactors with more
than one out let pipe. The phenomenon was ineradicable,
206
TIME, min
6543
FERD FLOW, Lls
2
FFR Tests in EEI'.-Ij:
a: Transit time in FERD loop
b: Oata from first test
7
6 ~
-'
5 ~
4 ~3
2
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
TIME, min
ci 60
Cl::
.....
....
0 50I-
/:j
-' 40B
><
:l: 30H
~
.... 20
.....
Oll
I- 10l::
'"zCi 0I-
'"
1100
....
'" 1000;:ä 900~ 800
~ 700
z 6000
Cl::
~ 500
.....
z
.; 400
.....
~ 300
-'l,lj 200
0
Fig. 3.
~ CHANNEL A
2
..
.....
~
s
,.."
...;;
~ 950u
CI
z
0 900a:
...
::>
....
850 ,z.
Q
800 L....~
..J
....
Q
750
0
Fig. 2. Fluctuations in ON Signals
from the FPS
but since it equally affected all signals we hoped it
could be ignored. In practice, all DN signals and related
parameters (flow. reactor power ... ) during FERO tests
were coliected on fast magnetic tape at two readings
per second, and data averaging later used to produce
mean count rates corrected for small variations in re-
actor power. Very stable ON signals were then apparent.
There is now an historic file of DN tapes which can be
used and re-used as analytical techniques improve.
FERO-Loop Flow Reduction Reduction (FFR) Tests
This equation was used to determine the in-core transit
time. Ri values were obtained from recoil ranges deter-
mined iii CP-S; Yi values were obtained from Meek and
Rider (6), with probabilities of DN emission from the
data of Izak-Biran and Amiel (7).
Further insight was gained while the FPS was oper-
ated at full power by reducing the FERD-loop flow in
steps and re~ording the ON signals. Reducing the flow
artificially increases the transit time to the detectors
(Fig. 3a); the corresponding ON signals are shown in
Fig. 3b. The activities (Al,A2) recorded at two flow
rates (transit times in the FERn loop of tl and tz) may
then be related to the unknown,transit in-core, Ttr , by
the relationship:
where
Equation (1) was used to determine the in-core
transit ttmes for ON precursors for the two core loca-
tions that were used for the FPS irradiation. Transit
ttmes of 13.1 and 14.7 sec. were obtained for locations
SB2 and SE4, respectively. A stmilar determination had
been made by Fryer (8) somewhat earlier, using tramp
uranium in-core' as the source of ON precursors; that
value was 15.3 sec. (a value with a lower precision
because of the ~ow signal count rates involved). Thus,
it appeared that 'despite sodium mixing in the upper
plenum the in-core transit time varied in a plausible
manner with reactor core location. An interesting and
possibly useful phenomenon in failure location.
CALCULATlONAL MODEL FOR NON-RECOlL SOURCES
When the first breached-pin tests were performed in
EBR-II, the magnitude of the ON signals from them clearly
indicated that release of DN precursors was not predom-
inantly by recoil. Equation (1) could not, therefore, be
used because it assumes instantaneous, or recoil release
to prtmary sodium, with decline in DN activity occurring
in the sodium in transit, not in the fuel itself. Never-
theless, FFR tests were performed and data gathered dur-
ing the predefected U02 test and the first test of a
naturally breached mixed-oxide fuel pin (2,9). In fact,
using the estimates of transit time for ON's in-core
obtained from the FPS tests, application of equation (1)
revealed an "ag ing" or apparent holdup of DN precursors
of 10-20 sec.
In view of this result, we went back to first prin-
ciples to arrive at a model for non-recoil sources which
treats parent and daughter species separately and assumes
that the release of both is controlled by an Arrhenius
, ••.• (1) ,
Ri = release rate for nuclide i,
Y1 • delayed-neutron yield for nuclide,
Al = decay constant for nuclide i,
n = number of isotopes included in model
(currently nine).
f RiYiA i exp[-\i(Ttr + tl)]
.!ll = ..=1'--=::..1 _
A2 t RiYiA i exp[-Ai(Ttr + t2)]
i=l
and
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rate equation with an effective escape coefficient
The units of \ are sec-I, and its value is inferred e
from FFR tests~ Incorporation of the Arrhenius model
enabled us to predict ~N activity in the FERD loop by
the following equation:
rates. The Y intercept ('() is equal to the flow-inde-
pendent contribution to the measured DN signal from
(y,n) reaction in the moderator. Earlier methods (8)
required this contribution to be measured directly.
PREOICTEO ON ACTIVITY, count/s
o
I ' &ST' qr REGRESSION LINE
C' SLOPE OF LINE r
o , IAmk. Apkl. k • 1.2..... 5
'- r' Y INTERCEPT
bulk sodium flow rate, m3/s
decay constants for parent and daughter
isotopes of species i, s-1
fission production rates for parent and
daughter isotopes of species i, atoms/s
transit time from core to inlet of FERD
loop, s
decay time within FERD loop ,s
number of isotope groups treated (N = 9)
t
N
T tr
where
The decay time in the FERD loop is of course varied
by the FFR technique. The values of the unknown model
parameters are then determined with a systematic numer-
ical algorithm that minimizes a non-linear error func-
tion of the form:
Fig. 4. Plot of five pairs of measured and
predicted DN activities and best-
fit line from GIRAFFE regression
algorithm.
where W
and S
for tK~
E (Ttr' Ae)
where
~k experimentally measured DN activity at
flow step k
A
mk model-predicted activity [1.e., Eq. (2)
at flow step k with parameter set
(T tr' Ae)
Wk weighting function
J = total number of FERD flow steps.
Unfortunately , data that can be obtained from a
given FFR test are not sufficient to permit solution of
Eq. (3) for Ttr and \e simultaneously. T~e procedure,
therefore, is to perform a test first with a source
having a known value of \e' (For these t.ests, a recoil
fission source was used, for which \e = 00). Data from
these tests define, through minimization of Eq. (3) the
value of Ttr • This value is then used as an input param-
eter for subsequent tests in which \e is unknown. The
reciprocal of \e is a physically useful parameter rep-
resenting the holdup time for DN precursors in the fuel
(Th)' Typical values of Th have been 10-23 sec. for oxide
fuel, and less than 3 sec. for carbide fuel.
The above model has been incorporated into a com-
puter code GIRAFFE (10) which may be used to calculate
Ttr , Th' and other potentially useful diagnostic param-
eters. Figure 4 illustrates how the new model is used
to obtain information from an FFR test involving five
flow steps. The Y axis represents the measured count
rates corrected for tramp background. The X axis repre-
sents the corresponding count rates predicted from the
analytical model formulated above. Line I is the least-
squares best fit between measured and predicted DN count
The residuals, or deviations of the measured data
from the best-fit line, will indicate deficiencies in
the model or anomalous data due to a drift in the
counting system characteristics. The correlation coef-
ficient, XFIT, provides a quantitative measure of the
effectiveness of the model in predlc·ting the outcome
of actual FFR tests.
The slope C of the best-fit Line I contains poten-
tially useful physical information. Theoretical consid-
erations reveal that C is equal to VNaagpV/F, where VNa
is the sodium volume "seen" by the detectors, a is the
fission rate in the source, E is the efficiency of the
detector arrangement (a dimensionless quantity), p is
the fuel density, V is the fuel volume from which the
DN precursors are ernitted, and F is the primary-sodium
flow rate.
The slope C can be used to define the equivalent
recoil area of a non-recoil source in terms of the
strength of the fission-product source (FPS) irradiated
several times in EBR-II (5). We note first that three
of the parameters in an FFR test do not change, namely,
F, g, and VNa' Thus, for a given RBCB experiment we
can write
(S) = C x aFPS x PFPS x WFPSRBCB P x (Src)FPS '" (4)rc aRBCB x PRBCB x 'RBCB
is the recoil distance in the source material,
is defined to be the "equivalent recoil area"
fuel. For non-recoil sourees, Src provides a
measure of the square centimeters of the soutce mater-
ial that would produce a given detector response if
direct recoil were the only mechanism for release.
Defined in this manner, the equivalent recoil
area orovides an absolute basis for comparison of
different breaehed-pin tests, and toestablish meaning-
ful limits for assuring reaetor safety and maintainabil-
ity. Present praetiee for fast reaetors that have DN
monitoring systems is to set reaetor-seram limits in
terms of the magnitude of the DN signal. The signal mag-
nitude, however, is a sensitive funetion of the isotopie
holdup time for the souree and the transit time to the
detector. Thus, more meaningful information is conveyed,
in terms of how severe or benign an exposed-fuel test
may be, by a statement of its equivalent reeoil area,
since that value automatically aceommodates differences
in the release rate and transit time for the DN emitters.
Typieal values of S c have ranged from 7 to 91 cm 2 .
The enhancemenE faetor Il, defined as the ratio of
Src to actual area S of fuel b~neath adefeet, requires
a knowledge of the defect area on a breaehed pin. Only
once has this been determined accurately: for the case
of the first naturally hreached mixed-oxide fuel pins
irradiated in EBR-fI. Its enhancement factor was found
to be approximately 235.
Direction of Future Research
The Arrhenius model ineorporated into GIRAFFE to
ac count for isotopic removal terms in the transport
equations was not derived from physical principles. It
is, rather, an empirically based model that "adjusts"
the effective removal rate in a manner that best agrees
with the ohserved flow-dependent signal behavior. Use
of the resulting escape-rate coeffieient in the general
transport-and deeay model provides a particularly trae-
table technique for aceommodating differences in the
relative composition of parent and daughter species
which resultfrom gross differences in the overall
holdup time, no matter how that holdup time aris~s phys-
leally. In this regard, use of the Arrhenius equation
represents a considerable improvement over the earlier
recoil model.
However, furt her research-is needed to better un-
derstand the interplay of the comp1ex physical meehanisms
which are responsible for transport of fission products
and their progeny from the fuel matrix to the sodium
under the various conditions that attend sustained oper-
ation with exposed fuel in a fast reactor. Ongoins re-
search at EBR-II is focused on reducing the considerable
uncertainty that currently exists in this area (11).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Significant progress has been made at EBR-II in both
DN monitoring and in DN signal analysis since 1977, when
the DN detector FERD was removed from the trip circuit
of the reaetor. Irradiation of a recoil source in two
core 1ocations gave indication of a different transit
time for DN precursors for different core locations.
Similarly, sodium mixing in the upper plenum of the re-
aetor was found to always produee cyclic fluctuations in
DN signals which cannot be eradicated: their effect, how-
ever, appears not to be serious.
The technique of artificially altering the transit
time for DN precursors_to reach the detectors has proved
a useful technique, in enabling the aging or holdup of
DN precursors in exposed ceramic fuel to be determined.
The formalism for doing this is based on an (assumed)
Arrhenius release rate for the precursors, whose recip-
rocal is the effective holdup time in the fuel. The
release rate is determined empirically by matching the
activities measured at different total transit times
with those calculated by means of a computer code
GIRAFFE; correlation between measured and predicted
activlties has been good to date.
Further development of present techniques might
involve allowing for different release rates for the
various DN precursors considered, in line with their
different measured diffusion rates in fuel and likely
208
different volatilities. The acid test for such a future
model would be comparison between measured and predicted
DN signals in tests of stable defeets where the tempera-
ture and/or fission rate is varied.
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Discussion
D.B. Sangodkar, RRCK:
You have said that by changing the flow in the FERD loop you can deduce
the transit time from the defected fuel to the outlet of 1HX. Could
you use this information for localisation of failed fuel?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
To a small extent, but this is not its major purpose.
P. Michaille, CEA:
I. Did you investigate all the transit times shown in the fig. 3 of your
paper?
2. Which is the Reynolds number for the longest transit times (60 s on the
curve)?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
I. To zero flow; but mostly at 4-5 steps.
2. I don't know, but flow is turbulent.
W. Glauner, KfK:
The gap in the curve f.p. recoil range vs. nuclide number: what are
the isotopes there? Is itjust Bromiüe or lodine?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
The gap is for the low yield f.p.'s, I hope land Br are not amongst
them.
V.F. Efimenko, 1AEA:
Do you have any experimental information on the change of flow rates
distribution in the core subassemblies while changing the flow rate in
the main piping? What is the accuracy of measuring flow rate in a sub-
assembly?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
Sorry, no. We always operate at full primary flow.
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W. Glauner, KfK:
Do you think that th~ DND-fluetuation is also an indieation for temper-
ature fluetuations in the upper Na-plenum, whieh are undesirable for
thermal stress reasons?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
At EBR-II are limit the differenees between the mi xe d-me an outlet
temperatures of subassemblies to less than 40-50 °c. But these small
differenees will have an effeet on upper-plenum mixing.
Comment from S. Jaeobi, KfK to J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
A eomment about the fluctuations of the DND signals.measured in the EBR 11:
Operating the KNK 11 r980 with a natural defeeted pin fluetuations of
the DND signals were observed in the following manner: Although the defeet
was in the eastern part of the eore sometimes the DND signal east was
deereasing during the DND signal west inereased and inversely. Our only ex-
planation for this are fluetuations of the hydraulie eonditions 1n the
upper sodium plenum.
M. Relie, IA:
I find that the linearity between measured and predieted DN aetivity in
your fig. 4 is exeellent. Can you give us some eomments about this plot?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
It is an illustration not aetually real data.
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
What fission produet range do you use to prediet reeoil areas from defeets?
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
For mixed-oxide fuel 10 vm.
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by P. Michail1e
PROGRESSIVE EtHl/\HeUiENT OF TIIE r.ornlNlIOUS DM!) I.EVELS
1 _. , ... --
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W1PARISON OF·THE EVOLUTION OF THE!!LID & GAS SIGNALS.,
I IN-LOOP~~VOLGA ';DGR;;-[
INSTRU-
MENTATION
INITIAL
DEFECT
TYPEB,U.PARTl-
CIPAtlTS
IV F-D HIGH SNR 30 x 1 MM SIMPLELOOP lN-lOOP EXPERIIIEIiT Will - EVOLUTION OF TIIE OHO SIG~I,lS UP TO 25 C~:2lR[C";L) \
01 F-D HIGH SNR 2.5 x 1 MM SIMeLELOOP
1 F-D HIGH SPX NOT THRU SIMPLELOOP
VI F HIGH SPX NOT·THRU DOUBLELOOP
V F-D LOW SPX o1 /IM DOUBLELOOP
0 F-I FERTILE PX
DOUBLE
LOOP
1,1 dc--v ~
{IN-LOO? ·hP[Rn~H0'1l1 - [VOlUT 10:1 OF TIlE OHO SIGH~LS L'P 10 200 (h2~~
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by P. Michail1e
<lTUDY OF TI1E N1PLI TUDE & (Of1POS nION OF THE DND SI.GN,~L
~~
-r------
COLD METALLIC TUBE
COLD CERAMIC SAMPLE
SODIUM BOND
GAS BOND
CALIBRATION SOURCE
EFFECT OF SURFACE
TEMPERATURE-ACTIVATED
MECHANISMS
INTERPR~TATION OF THE
DND PEAKS
Instrumentation: Double Circuit loop
1--_---.:J~_-_--lI---eXpansion tank (gas sampling)
cold trap-
1.6m
flow rate: q=O to 40cc/s
V3 =100cc; 1cm 2R::800c/s;
noise :: 400c/s
V2 =330cc (delay time =10s)
V1 =100cc ;h1= 120mm; 1cm 2R:: 1800c/s
. noise :: 3000c/s
nominal power =13 -14 kW
TI6 = 620°C; THa = 570°C
If pin
Design 01 the Double Circui t loop
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Discussion
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
In experiment 111 ofyour Siloe work you stated that the increase in DN
recoil area was supported by gas measurements. Does this mean that the
gas release depends on the size of the slit?
P.A. Michaille, CEA:
Not of the size of the slit but of the conductance of the defect. We
observe a few hours after the DND increase a decrease of the lai slope
<I NI -- log R/B ) f 1 5 h .~ logA rom ~ .0 to O. t at was 1nterpreted to a good
access to the central hole of the pin.
J.D.B. Lambert, ANL:
When you quote R/B, B is calculated, yes?
P. Michaille, CEA:
Yes.
Comment from G. Schmitz, KfK to P. Michaille, CEA:
The radioactive fission products are measured in the sodium or in the
cover gas. Then the release rates are calculated. Also the birth rates
in the total fuel pin are calculated. At last the R/B-ratios aFe plotted
versus the appropriate decay constants.
N. Sekiguchi, PNC:
Have you developed any computer code which is able to interpret FP and
fuel material behavior not only within fuel pin but also in coolant and
loop in order to analyse the results from your in-pile loop?
P. Michaille, CEA:
We have a code for fission gas release from the fuel which is reviewed
from recent measurements at very high burn-up. For the fission products trans-
formation, we can't make efforts in the loop because we think it is different
from pool reactors. Therefore, we make measurements at Phenix.
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D.E. Mahagin, HEDL:
What exactly is the MARGO program?
C. Berlin, CEA:
It ~s not a program.
It ~s a plan to make concrete the will to go ahead with failures considering
the DND levels reached, as well from natural causes as from artificial defects.
J.D.B. Lambert, ili1L:
Are the counters easily replaceable?
C. Berlin, CEA:
Yes.
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ABSTRACT
In case of failures of fuel claddings different mechanisms of fission
product releases must be taken into account such as
- Releases into the coolant by recoil.
- Releases into the coolant by diffusion.
- Releases by recoi1 into open fuel pores and on into the coolant.
The physical models are described and mathematieal correlations bet-
ween release rates, birth rates and decay eonstants of different radioactive
nuclides are given. Then a graphical method to analyse a given case of
fission product release is described and different equations for the fis-
suring factor kare given depending on the predominant release mechanism.
Three inpile experiments with artificially defected fuel pins have been
analysed with the resu1t, that in two cases there was a diffusion eontro1led
release mechanism associated with J diffusion corefficients between
2 . 10- 7 cm2s- l and 6 . 10- 6 cm2s- l . In the third case the release mechanism
was control1ed by reeoil into open fuel pores and on into the coolant
associated with an open porosity surfaee of 864 cm2 in contrast to a geometrie
defect area of 2 cm2 . At last the code FICTION I (Fission Product Signal Cal-
culation) is described. This code calculates the expected count-rates of
the DN detectors in KNK 11, on the one hand, and in the SILOE loops, on
the other hand.
INTRODUCTION
If 1eaks occur in the claddings of individual fuel rods during operation
of LMFBR's fission produets and possibly, also fuel may be released into the
coo1ant. l - 1l When analyzing such phenomena, different mechanisms of fission
product releases must be taken into account. 3 , 10, 12, 13, 14, 15
- Releases into the coolant by recoil.
- Releases into the coolant by diffusion.
- Releases by recoil into open fuel pores and on into the coolant.
- Releases by diffusion into the plenum and on into the eoolant.
- Releases into the coo1ant by knock-out mechanisms.
- Releases by knock-out mechanims into open fuel pores and on into the coolant.
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RELEASES INTO THE COOLANT BY RECOIL
(1) Model Av .. S
~
A.
~
ö . F . L.
~
In releases of radioaetive fission produets eaused by reeoil meeha-
nisms it is assumed that fission produets formed in a layer of the thiek-
ness Li right underneath the defeet area F are spontaneously released into
the eoolant by reeoil in a fraetion ö. 12 After an equilibrium eondition
has beeome established, the following equation holds:
R.R
~
R.R !. - -2s / Aetivity release rate of nuclide i into~ the eoolant by reeoil.
/ - 7ö 1 Geometrie eseape eoeffieient.
- 2 IF !. em Geometrie defeet area.
- IL. !. em Reeoil length of nuelide ~ .~
- -1 IA • !. s Deeay eonstant of nuelide ~ .~
!. - 7v. 1 Cumulative fission yield of nuelide ~.~
!. - -1 -3 7S s em Specifie fission rate.
-
RELEASES INTO THE COOLANT BY DIFFUSION
If radioaetive fission produets are released by diffusion, the fission
produets generated are assumed to migrate through the fuel up to the fuel
rod defeet and on into the eoolant as a result of a eoneentration gradient.
Under the additional assumptions of a linear, one-dimensional geometry
and the absenee of any repereussions on diffusion proeesses in the fuel of
the eoneentration of fission produets in the l~olant, it foliows, after an
equilibrium eondition has beeome established.
F . V.• S . ~
~ ~
(2) Model B
Aetivity release rate of nuelide ~ into
the eoolant by diffusion.
Diffusion eoeffieient of nuelide i in the
fuel region.
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RELEASES BY RECOIL INTO OPEN FUEL PORES AND ON INTO THE COOLANT
For releases of radioactive fission products by recoil mechanisms
into open fuel pores and on into the coolant, the following model is
assumed to be valid: Fission products formed in a layer of the thickness
L. and an area FP, which surrounds the open porosity, are released
s~ontaneously into the free pores by recoil in a fraction O. Fission product
noble gases also released carry part of the fission products from the open
porosity through the rod defect into the coolant. An Arrhenius type re-
lease is assumed to prevail. lo After an equilibrium has been established,
it is found that
R.RP
l.
A .'A-l. e
. 0 . L. . FP . \!. • S
l. l. (3) Model C
RP
L
- -2 7R. sl. -
- -1 -
A- I s Ie -
FP l-cm2 7
Activity release rate of nuclide i by
recoil into the open porosity and on
into the coolant.
Escape coefficient.
Surface of open porosity l.n the region
of the fuel rod defect.
The other three releasemechanisms mentioned above are not at present
treated mathematical,ly and numerically.
PLOTTING INDIVIDUAL RELEASE MECHANISMS
When analyzing the measured results obtained in operation with defec-
tive fuel rods, or fuel rods artificially made defective, in reactors or
in-pile test loops, it is advisable to convert the measured fission product
activity concentrations to the ratio of radioactivity release rates to
radioactivity birth rates (R/B ratios) of the individual fission product
nuclides, taking into account the fuel rod and systems data. Since the
functional relationships between the R/B ratio and the decay constants of
different radioactive fission productnuclides vary as a function of re-
lease mechanisms, it is possible to determine the specific type of fission
product release by plotting these relationships. In an equilibrium case, it
applies to
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L- -2 7B. s Radioactivity birth rate of nuclide 11 ln the fuel rod.
/ - 3VB cm / Fuel volume of the defective rod.
-
Model B:
R. D F· v'D:' -1/2
1 1
= A.
B. VB
1
1
Model C: R.RP P1)'1. 'F A
1 1 e
B. VB A.+A1 1 e
Fig. 1 shows three typical plots:
(5 )
(6)
On the abscissa, the decay constant A. of the individual nuclides has
been plotted on a logarithmic scale. On th~ ordinate, also on a logarithmic
scale, the R./B. ratio of the respective nuclides has been plotted.
1 1
Curve A shows the expected behavior of the R/B ratio for case A: release
into thelcoolant by recoil. The following values were used for calculation:
I) = 0.25 2; 1. = 6xlO- 4cm (this value was assumed to be identical for all the
nuclides cons!dered); F = 2 cm2 and VB = 2 cm3 . This curve is a horizontal
straight line.
Curve B shows the expected behavior of the R/B ratio for case B:
release into the coolant by diffusion. For this case, the following values
were used for calculation: F = 2 cm2; D = lxlO-6 cm2s- l (this valu~ was assumed
to be identical for all the nuclides considered), and VB = 2 cm3 . This curve
is a straight line with the slope of -1/2.
Curve C shows the expected behavior of the'R/B ratio for case C:
release by recoil into open fuel pores and on into the coolant. For this case,
the following values were used for calculation: 0 = 0.25; 1. = 6xlO-4 cm;
FP = 400 cm2; VB = 2 cm3 ; Ae = lxlO- 3s- l . This curve shows Ehree typical
sections. Section I is characterized by Ae » Ai' As a consequence, Eq. (6) changes
into
R'RP
1
B'1
ln case of A »A .
e 1
(7)
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In this seetion, the eurve is a horizontal straight line. Seetion 11
is eharaeterized by Ae and A. being of eomparable orders of magnitude.
This is apart of the eurve ~ith deereasing slope, as A. inereases. Finally,
Seetion III is eharaeterized by Ae« A •• As a conseque~ee, Eq. (6) ehanges
. 11nto
R.RP P
1 O'Li' F
A. -1 of A « A. (8)= 1n case
B. VB
1 e 1
1
In this seetion, the eurve 1S a straight line with the slope of -1.
K-FACTOR
The fissuring faetor, k, has been defined in 7 as the ratio of the
effeetive reeoil area to the geometrie defeet area, in whieh ease fission
produet release by reeoil was assumed. For a speeifie nuelide it ean be
expressed as follows:
R. G
1
Measured radioaetivity release rate of
nuclide i.
Fissuring factor relative to nuelide i.
k.1
R.R
1
!. -k. 1 /1
G - -2R. !. s /1
R.R !. - -2 7s1 - Radioaetivity release rate of nuelide i
ealculated by means of a reeoil model.
If the real radioaetivity release is d~ffusion controlled, R. G ean be
expressed as follows in aeeordanee with Eq. (2): 1
G ID':""' . A. 1/2 SR. = F • V.1 1 1 1
with Eqs. (10) and (1), Eq. (9) 1S transformed into
1
.(~:r2k.1 o·L.1
Eq. (11) can be eonverted into
L. 2 02 A. k. 2D.1 1 1 1
(0)
(11 )
(12)
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In deriving Eq. (11) it has been assumed that the fuel will not change
chemically after the occurrence of the defect. However, this condition does
not always exist if sodium is used as a coolant because, when certain oxygen
concentrations in the fuel and the so~ium are exceeded, part of the fuel will
be converted into Na3M04 or similar compounds. The letter M in this case
stands for metal, i.e., U or Pu. Since also the density of the fissile
material taken into account changes in this transformation. also different
specific fission ratios must be substituted in Eq. (10) and (1). For this general
case one obtains:
ki Ö~:i,SBtJl/2 (13)
SR /- -1 -3-/s cm _
S
B - -1 - 3 -t. s cm /
Specific fission rate in the
Na3M04 reaction layer.
Specific fission rate 1n M0 2 fuel.
Diffusion coefficient of nuclide i
in the reaction layer.
Eq. (13) can be changed into:
D. = L. 2
1 1 (
B)22 S 2
0';\.- - -k.
. 1 1
sR
(14)
(15)
by recoil
V.
1
P
. 0 . L .. F . \.
1 1
;\ .+;\
1 e
R. G =
1
However, if the actual radioactivity release is controlled
open pores, it holds for Ri
G according to Eq. (3):
;\
e
into
With Eq. (15 ) and (1) , Eq. (9) changes into
;\ Fl:'e (16)k. --- .1 ;\ .+;\ F1 e
If this type of release prevails, it is assumed that there has been no
chemical conversion of the fuel or that such (Na3M04 ) reaction layer has beenreduced again.
RESULTS OF THE FIRST SILOE EXPERIMENTS
Fig. 2 to 4 show R/B values of the radioactive I isotopes calculated from
measured values and experimental data. 14 When calculating the R/B value of
1-137 from the count rate of the DND detectors, a recoil type release mechanism
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was assumed. For this reason, this R/B value is underestimated in
other types of releases. More precise calculations are planned for the
future. Fig. 3, in addition, shows R/B values of radioactive Kr and Xe
isotopes.
As in Fig. 1, the abscissa is a.logarithmic plot of the decay constant,
Ai' of the different nuclides, whereas the ordinate is a logarithmic plot
of the Ri/Bi ratio of the corresponding nuclides.
The relative positions of the different Ri/Bi values in Fig. 2 and 3
indicate a diffusion controlled release mechanism. The excessively high
Ri/Bi value of 1-132 can be explained by the fact that the Te-132 precursor
nucllde has a much longer half-life and is probably also released by
diffusion. Table 1 indicates k(I-137) factors and I diffusion coefficients
calculated at specific points in time. Table 1 replaces Table 4 in 14 bpcause,
in that older Table, Eq. (12) had been used ~nstead of Eq. (14) in calculating the
diffusion coefficients. Moreover, the k(I-137) factors had to be recalculated
for the S4 experiment.
The positions of the different Ri/Bi values in Fig. 4 indicate a
release mechanism by recoil into open pores and on into the coolant.
For A »A., i.e., A. < 3 x 1O- 3 s-J a Ri/B~ value of 1.56 x 10- 2 is found.
e 1 ~ ' . .L •With the data of 8 = (J.25. L(I) = 4.7xlO-4 cm ana VB = 6.51 cmJ , it fdl~ows
from Eq. (7):FP = 864 cm2 as aga1nst a defect area of F = (2.0+ 0.4) cm
as determined optically after irradiation. From the R/ß(I-137)-value it is
possible to estimateA e fromEq.(6) and (7) aSA > 7xlO- 3s- 1 .e
CODES ESTABLISHED TO.DATE
To calculate the expected count rates of the DN detectors in KNK 11,
on the one hand, and in the SILOE loops, on the other hand, the FICTION I
'(Fission Produ;:.!: Signal Calculati~) code was written in the FOCAL-8
programming language tor a PDP-8 computer made by the Digital Equipment
Corporation. 16 Recoil of the fission products into the coolant was assumed
as the release mechanism. In addition, the k-factor was programmed. The
following formulaewere used:
N. = 8 . L. . F . k . A .• \).
1 1 ~ ~
fl. . S
1
on
fl. !. 1 7
1
Neutron activity release rate of nuclide i
into the coolant.
Emitted neutrons per nuclide disintegration.
N ;VP 10 (N. -A.. t l ) (8)C n p l. ...2:. , e ~
i=l Q
!. - -1 7 rate of DN-detectorC s Count
-
!. - 7 Neutron sensitivityn 1 of DN-detector
vP !. - 3 7 of Na sample vesse1cm Vo1ume
!. - g/s_ 7 Sodium flow.Q
Np
- 3-!. g/cm /
!. s 7
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Sodium density.
Transit time of sodium from the defect
point to the DN detector.
For short sodium recirculation times it holds that
R pN. Vp. m 10(Ni ->...(tl+J.. t U»)C=n L:'l: -'e~
j=O i=l Q
CR / - -1s /
-
tU !. s 7
with
5'ln2
m =
tU.>" (Br-87)
Count rate of DN detector taking account
of sodium recirculation
recirculation time of sodium
h . bl . ... 1 d N P 1 d uT e var~a e ~nput quant~t~es ~nc u e F, K, S, n, p , V , Q, t an t .
The following nuclides are taken into account: Br-87, Br-88, 1-137, Br-89,
Rb-93, 1-138, As-85, Br-90, Rb-94 and 1-139. The fixed parameters are taken
from: 8 = 0.25 and L. from 12, v. and ~. from17 .
~ ~ ~
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Date Exp Power per !a-temp I-dill "eil k-foctor F Daysln
rod 1"9th I'CI lem2 s-l] for 1-137 lem21 operation[W/em) [I]
17376 S2 213 m 2.910- 6'0.5 51 0,7 20
193.76 S2 413 570 \.110- 7'0.5 19 0,7 22
a577 S4 381 560 1.2 )0"6'0.5 33 1.8 2
16 77 S4 \31 560 5.910- 6'0.5 72 2.5 4
9677 S\ 394 560 5.\10- 6'0.5 69 2.5 6
27677 SI 163 180 2.5 10" 7' 0.5 15 2.5 11
3777 S\ 309 m 1.110- 6'0.5 31 2.5 19
7777 S4 397 560 3.510- 6'0.5 56 2.5 21
Toble 1: Diffusion Coefficients ond Colculoted k-Foclors in the SILDE S2 ond S4 Experiments
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Discussion
P. Michaille, CEA:
Is it possible to take into account for the model as weIl fission gas
as volatile (iodines) since M. Mahagin said that diffusion mechanisms
are different?
G. Schmitz, KfK:
I think that thepresented models are applicable for releases of fission
gases as weIl as for volatile fission products. But the controlling
parameters may be different.
J. Dauk, IA:
I. Do you think that your model is applicable to reactors, considering that
the isotopes you measured are important as precursers in reactor?
2. Did you measure theisotopes by on line y-spectrometry in sodium?
G. Schmitz, KfK:
I. Yes.
2. During our SILOE-experiments we measured the activity-concentrations of
J-131, J-132, J-133, J-134 and J-135 in the sodium by a gamma-telescope.
This telescope did not work continuously.
M. Relic, IA:
You have in your model two unkown parameters FP and A • How can you
e
calculated them separately?
G. Schmitz, KfK:
The two parameters FP .and A
e
have to be calculated simultaneously.
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P. Michaille, CEA:
Is it possible to use your code to predict the DND signal for a given
defect?
G. Schmitz, KfK:
In principle yes. In case of a defect with a Na3(U, Pu)04 layer I would
prefer the model "releases into the coolant by diffusion". In case of a
defect wi thout such a layer I would prefer the model "release by recoil
into open fuel pores and one into the coolant".
M. ReHc, IA:
How do you calculate FP and A from your experimental curves?
e
G. Schmitz, KfK:
Regarding to fig. 4 in case of A. < 10-5 s-1 the R/B-ratio is about
-2 1
1.5 . 10 and constant. Taking equation (7) you can calculate FP .
Then you can calculate A by equation (6), taking the values of R/B
e
and A for J-137 out of fig. 4.
Comment from H. Feuerstein, KfK to G. Schmitz, KfK:
I wish to point the fact that all gas measurements in
the covergas must also consider the fact of the degassing delay from
the loop sodium to the covergas.
D.K. Cartwright, UKAEA:
Is the escape coefficient empirical or 1S it derived from physical parameters?
G. Schmitz, KfK:
The escape coefficient 1S empirical.
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OvERVIEW OF JAPANESE STATUS AHD FUTURE PROGRAM
FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FFDL SYSTEM
N. Sekiguehi, B. Rindo, I. Sato
Power Reactor and Nuclear
Fue1 Deve10pment Co~ration
T. Takagi
Mitsubishi E1eetrie Corporation
H. Fujisawa
Fuji E1eetric Corporation
ABS':'?.ACT
The future program of FFDL system de:e10pment in.J~p~n is
outlined with the aehievements resu1ted Lrom the aet1v1t1es on
~~e subjeet over these 12 years. ~Ajor eoneerns are direeted
to evaluation of FFD response in relation to ~~e behavior of
failed pin, and development of reliable loeati~g system from
~~e viewpoint of eocpatibility of plant operat10~a1 safety and
availability. Another interest is taken in sipP1ng me~~od,
as one of means of loeation of failed subass~Tbly. The pro-
gran of its developcent is deseribed for a ~arti~ular atten-
tion for an important future work in this f1eld 1n Japan.
INTRODCCTION
The Japanese experimental fast reaetor, JOYO, reaehed its
first eritieality on April 1977. The 50 :~it norwal
operation began in October 1978 and successfully eompleted
in February 1979. Normal operation of 75 w~t is at present
underNaywithout any fuel failure as weIl as major eomponents
trouble, and will be eontinued until the end of 1981. The
HK-II prograrn of a eore of 100 HWt power will be started in
the beginning of 1982.
Meanwhile, the projeet of the proto-type fast breeder
reaetor MONJU 280 ~e of power, is going on with great effort
in psc in cooForation with the utilities and the manufaeturE~rs.
The licensing proeedure for start of eonstruetion is now be1ng
intensively conducted. The final principal design speeifica-
tion is also currently under consideration, on the basis of
~~e supporting research and developoent works. The major part
cf L~e works will be achieved within a couple of years.
Th~ development progr~~ of FFDL system (1) with other corn-
ponents and system in the area of instrumentation and control
in L~SR has been planned, inplemented, and succeeded in line
and aecordence with the ooeration and the design of the
Japanese L~BRs in these io years.
Several future under takings are projected in the
scope of FFDL syst~m, as oresented in Table land 2. It is
a ~attcr of practieal impörtanee to set up a distinet guice
line for continuation of operation of a reaetor with f~iled
fuels. By aecumulating many experienees of fuel fai1ure in
~~e reactor, a proper guide line for plant operation will be
obtained. On the other hand, however, a study of FP release
frec failed pin and transport in pr~arx eooling systea is
considered to support quantitative analysis of the relation
be=-Neen FFO response and fuel failure. In this meaning,
Japanese approach to the subject at present is directed to
cc~put~r code and rnodelling of FP behavior. In-pile loop
tes~ing program in JOYO Mk-II is expected to verify these
analyses based on theoretical investigation and the other
in-pile experiments. As another future program of FFDL
system de~elopmentt major interest is paid for sipping me~,cd
~s ~ell as for gas tagginq. Developcent of in- and ex-vessel
1nspection systa~ based on sipping me~~od(2) is disccibed in
a little detail in this paper.
CODE A:-iD :10DELLING
Co~puter Codes for anal'lsis oE FP behavior and FFD reS~On5e
have been developed (3) and run to be tested in ~~e case öf
JOYO and MO~JU. As one examole of eoces, an outline of F?T-l
15 introduced as foliews. •
The code is used to analyze release a~d trans?ort process
of FP gas released from the fuel pellets into liquid metal
coolant and to cover gas region. This is based on the FP
gas diffusion model by aooth, evaluatir.g a relaas~ rate of FP
gas from fuel pellets. It is construc~ed by modelling FP
behaviors which greatly affeot the response charaeteristics.
These are shown as foliows:
Rate of FP released from pellet.
Rate of FP released from fuel pin
Rate of FP, released in the coolant, transported
to cover gas
Clean up or trapping rate of FP in cover gas
system.
This 1s able to be used for calculating response of FFO system
that detcets fuel failure by monitorinq cover g&S radioactivity.
Table. 1 P'anned Program of FFDL System Development in Japan.
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TabI•• 2 Planned Program of FFDL System Oevelopmant in Jllpan (Conl'd)
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Principle of Detection
Liquid Na flows on the Fuel Exch~~ge Mede, and the
pressure is given thereby keeping a balance with the
gas pressure within the fuel pin as sho'Wl\ in Fig. 1.
.......
1)The code is verified and ".'ell compared with the
experimental results of GETR in the 0.5., where fuel
failure is artificially produced in an in-pile sodium 100p.
It is expected and reco~ended that more experimental
results are obtained and ex~ned to improve reliability
of input parameters not only to the code but also to o.her
ones which are under qeveloped, while introducing more
detailed analytical models, since release and transport
phenc~ena of FP are still le=t much to be investigated.
Tr.e computer codes, being well :edified, will oe oE helpEul
to evaluate operation quide and syst~~ design concerni~g FFD
in JOYO and MONJU.
TAGGI~lG GAS IRRADIATION k'm SYST"':-I VERIFICATION TEST
It i5 necessary fram tec~~ical aspect to make intensive
study of feasibility and on t~e other hand, cost evaluation
oE tagging gas sy~tem. The:e are several uncertaintia~ on
the feasibility of tagging gas syst~ in UIFBR. It is,
~~e=~fcre, L~portant and ,ces~rabl~to verify SY5t~
?e~~o~ance and enduarance by overall system test and by
acc~~ulating experiences in actual fast reactor. ?rior to
and apart Erom veriEication of the systa~, uncertainties
which are particularly influencial to systa~ capability
must be fully investigated.
raU.....
Port - -Pb ~
Pb' (~P.) .. """
-pb
Isotopic change of Xe and Kr due to burn~up and behavior
of realeased gas from failed pin in primary systa~, which
are left to be studied will be analysed and evaluated, by
u~ing the irradiated test subassa~blies and the other special
device in JOYO Mk-II. Whet~er the future progr~~ will be
~pl~ented or not, however, are still under consideration.
-h
SIPPI~lG METHODS
Fig 1. The Pressure Applide on the Failed Fuel Pin
~JO types of inspection system based on slpping method'
and the like have been designed, and are being fabricated for
test in sodium one is in-vessel failed fuel de~ection and
location system(IV-FFDL) which is used to scan all the
subassembly with operation of rotating shield plug during
reactor shutdown.
(1) With the sipping port fixed on the top oE the
S/A, Ar gas pressurized and ~~en the flow
blocked, it will turn out as folIows; (following
to Fiq. 1)
Pa' = Pa, Pb' + Pa > Pb, Pe' 9 Pa > Pe
k~other type i9 named ex-vessel falled fuel detection
systan(EV-FFD), the purp0ge of which 1s expected to identiEy
the failed 9ubassembly out of reactor vessel after localizing
failed fuel in reactor vessel.
The volume öf the gas plen~~ 13 then red~ced to
1 - (Pb/Pb') with the subseq~ent en~1 of Sa to
the extent ~~at the gas plen'~ is reduced to
balance the pressure.
1. In-Vessel Failed Fuel Detection and Location Syst~
(IV-HDL)
The method of IV-FFDL is to suck up the coolant
90dium (Na) from the upper part of tae fuel subassembly
(S/A) and extract the gaseous fission products (FP)
contained therein by Argon gas in orde~ to measure 1ts
radioactivity and check ~hether there i9 any failed
fue1 element in the S/A.
(2) When the sipping port i9 liEted from the top of
the S/A, the pressure balance oE the fuel pin is
restored to the initial state. It is, therefore,
presumed that the same volume oE Na as is ente red
when the flow i9 blocked will be released. It is
also pres~~ed that the released Na inc1udes FP
gas which is mixed in the pin.
(3) By lifting the sipping port Erem S/A and, at the
sa~e time, sam~ling Na into the tank oE the
device, FP gas oi the Eailed pin can be induced
into the device.
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«() FP gas is to be extracted frcCl ~a by flowin" U\e
Carrier gas (Ar) into the s~~pled Na. A fairly
good percentage of the extraction is expected.
For ex~~ple, according to the ~~L experiment,
it is reoorted that 99\ o~ Xe can be extracted
in 55 se~onds when lt/min Argon is blown into
500 cc Na.
FP from Tramp Fue1s
Fission materials tr~~oed in the coolant
and contaminated on surface of the fuel
pins are roughly estimated t~ be less~han 10 mg corresponding to 35 U by t~e
1nfo~ation of the other experiments.
(5) The.fa~lure can be detected by measuring ß , Y
rad1at10n of carrier gas after inducing carrier
gas which includes FP gas into the gas sampling
chamber of the radiation detector.
Then this contribution is negligible small
compared to FP from the failure of a pin.
(2) The Effect of the B10ckage of S/A Flow.
The detection procedure is, first of all, to
measure the background level (B) of radioactivity
of rare gases in Na at the place. Where there
is no posibility of fai1ure, such as, at the
radial blank~t SIA. and then to mcasure the
radiation (C) of the centre S/A one by one.
Judgement regarding to the failure is made by a
camparisan of the above two with each ether.
The following is the fo~ula of the judgement
criterion.
C - B ) nrc + Eil
By contacting the sipping port on the top
of the S/A, flcw of Na is blocked ar.d.L~en
the pressure rise at the failure port is
resultec. It is estimated that the pressure
change is about 0.1 kg/c.n 2 which 1s effective
for releasing FP.gas from failed fuel pin.
On t~e other hand, the temoerature rise oE the
fuel pin accornpanied with the blockage of the
ccolant flow is estimated to be about 0.25·C.
This rise does not effect on the healthy of
fuel pin.
n ; The statistical ~eight and ~~e ca~e is
n ~ 1 but for the first tL~e being make
it n = 1, and find an appropriate va1ue
after som~ accumulat~d experie~ce.
c ; ~rrors in ~eas~~~ent, that is to say,
tQe uncertainty with regard to the ~a
sampling volune or the reproducibi1ity
of extraction of FP gas by Ar gas. The
tentative value used is € = 0.05
2. Ex-Yessel Failed Fuel Detection System
Ex-Yessel Failed Fuet Detection System (EV-FFD) is
out-of-eore sipping syst~~ which is adopted in 'Japanese
prototype L~BR HONJU design.
Main objective of EY-FFD is to identify a failed
fuel subassembly out of fuel sub~ssemblies which were
suspected as failed in core by tagging gas FFDL system.
1) System design
Flq.J Fal1ed Fuel Trans(er Root
and FP Release
""'"
eo-linq ,,..te.
~"'" •• l
Fig 4- Shematic Diagram of E;V-E"FD
Schematic diagram of this system is shown in Fig. 3
and 4.
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The quantitative calculation shows the
presense of FP gas in the coolant after
two days from shutdown. The background
is about 10 ci in total.
FP gas from the failure of a pin
On the condi~ion that 10\ each inventory of
Xe and I is transfered into the coolant, the
FP gas background is obtained as following.
In the case of rare gas FP, they are carried
into the coolant ~a by its flow to be spread
evenly and are decayed or transfered to the
COVer gas of r~actor. Of course they are
supplemented by the creation from the parent
nuclide.
IOO~-----------------.
Fig 2 shows variation of the background
in relation to the progressing days after
the shutdown.
2) Ouantitative Study of the Sipping Hethod.
(1) EstL~ation of the Background
The background includes FP from the failure
of One pin, and FP froCl natural Uraniums in
the coolant Na and contaminating to the
surface of the fuel pin.
.. ,..
I ...
QJ
QJ 14 ...,. 10-
rt" ~. D<lcay CuCV1l of x. In the Coolant
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EV-ffD mainly consists of failed fuel detection tank,
cooling system, argon gas supply system and monitoring
systel!l.
The fue~ subassembly maintaining within sodium filled
pot, w~~ch was detected as suspicious by tagging gas
FfDL, ~s transfer.ed from reactor core to EV-fFD port
10ca7ed in ex-containnent by Ex-vessel transfer machine
and ~nserted into detection tank.
By retaining cover gas of detection tank to negative
pressure and heating sodium filled pot it is exoected
to release gaseous fission product (133xe ) from gas
plenum of the fuel subass~~ly.
I~entification of failed fuel subassernbly is deter-
m~~ed by analyzing radioactivity from the sampled gas
us~ng NaI detector and nuclide spectrum analyzer.
2) Research and development
Simulating FP gas (S2) release experiments
The ~irnulating FP gas release experioents were
carried out to evaluate the effectiveness of rl-FFDT~e first series of experi@ents were perfc~eG ~i~~·
s~mulating fP gas release through a'srnall failure
hole (diameter: 0.2, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0 mm) in ...ater.
T~e se:ond series of experiments were perforrned
...~th sLmulating FP gas release through less small
~ailure hole (di~~eter: 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.2, 0.5mm)
~n water. Results obtained are as follows,
(1) Differential pr~ssure of 0.68 ~ 0.75 kg/cm2 was
necessary to release the sL~ulating FP ga~ of
model fuel pin gas plenum into water.
(2) TL~e of about 4 ~ 30 minutes ...as required to
release th~ simulating FP gas of model fuel
pin gas plen~~ into water as shown in Fig.5.
Experimenta~ results shown that aipping ~ethod
of EV-FfD w~ll be effective to identify failed
fuel subassembly out of suspicious fuel
subassemblies •
SUX.".AR'l "'ND CONCLUSION
In order to analyze FFO signal response to fuel failure
an intensive study in modelli~g of FP behavior will proceed
in ~~e future. The code, which reoresent FP behavior from
its birth in fuel and to transport·to pr~dry cooling ~ystem,
is expected to be verified by in-pile experiments ...ith
artificial FP source in JOYO Y~-II.
The experiences of fuel failure in the actual L~BR
plants will produce the most interestinq and neaningfu1
information on the study of F?DL. Accordingly, it is rouch
beneficial to.release and accureulate the detailed data
ooncerning ~~e experiences of fuel failure in L~BRs in every
country.
Location and inspection of failed subasse~bly is quite
important from the .view point of plant availability.
Sippinq method as well as gas tagging will be tested for
verification of lts feasibility in L~BR. The future
programs are now being considered and ex~ined.
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3) Investigation and future program.
EV-FFD will bc effective to identify failed fuel
subass~~ly from the result uf simulating FP gas
rele3se experiment in ~ater. But it is necessary
to estimate the following items.
(1) Influence of scdiuro surface tension and
viscosity.
(2) Vol~~e of FP gas which is trapped in the
fuel pin bundle after escaping failed fuel
pin.
SL~ulating FP gas release experL~ent in sodium
...ill be carried out to estimate above mentioned
itC!lls.
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Diseussion
D.B. Sangodkar, RRCK:
Why do you propose to develop individual sampling of sodium for DN monitoring
and gas-tagging at the same time?
N. Sekiguehi, PNC:
Seleetor value sampling sodium deviee for DN monitoring has been developed for
MONJU. But at the detailed design stage of the vessel, it was determined to
be impossible to be applied, beeause of very narrow spaee of the upper plate
for its installation.
This is the major reason that we have started to develop gas tagging system.
V.F. Efimenko, lAEA:
Are you g01ng to use ultrasonie under sodiumviewing for loeation of fuel
failures?
N. Sekiguehi, PNC:
No, we are not.
F.E. Holt, HEDL:
You feel gas tagging will not be reliable with many failures 1n eore?
N. Sekiguehi, PNC:
That is true. Some experi~nee will be required.
F.E. Holt, HEDL:
How long does it take to obtain Na sparge and eount in JOYO sipping system?
N. Sekiguehi, PNC:
The entire eore, 67 assemblies will take ~ 24 HRS.
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F. Gestermann, IA:
Can you precise your system of in-core inspection of fuel elements, especially
the sodium sampling and degazification?
N. Sekiguchi, PNC:
The principle of our sipping method is described in the paper "Sipping Methods
for Localization of Failed Fuel Element in Japanese LMFBR". That was distributed
yesterday.
P. Michaille, CEA:
Can you explain me what you expect more with a precipitator than with a german~um
for gases measurements?
N. Sekiguchi, PNC:
Although y-spectrometer ~s able to give more information concerning characterization
of failed fuel, precipitator is better with respect of reliability, maintenance
and cost.
J. Dauk,IA:
Will your tagging system be an on-line system?
N. Sekiguchi, PNC:
Yes.
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FUEL DETECTION STUDIES IN THE UK
THE FUTURE PROGRAMME FOR. FAILED
FUEL DETECTION STUDIES IN THE UK
The main object of future
work is to attempt to relate
fission product signals to fuel
behaviour so that by observing
these signals the state of the
core can~ as far as possible, be
known.
To this end the main UK
programme is mounted in PFR where
the behaviour of fuel and the
related fission product signals
will be studied from both
naturally occurring failures if
and when they occur and from
artificially defected pins. The
latter cover a range of defect
sizes and fuel types including
pelleted and vibro fuel and both
core and breeder designs are to
be studied. This programme in
part utilises the demountable
subassemblies (DMSA' s) which
enable up to 6 clusters of fuel
each containing 19 pins to be
irradiated in special core
lattice positions. These lattice
positions in addition to the
normal bulk monitoring facilities
have sampling pipes to the
location monitor which enables
the mixed mean sample of the DMSA
and two individual clusters to be
monitored.
This programme will thus
enable the fission products
released from fuel failures to be
correlated with fuel behaviour as
determined by post irradiation
examination. In addition the
fission gas and DN precursors
released will be correlated with
the release of fisson products
which can potentially contaminate
components and possibly restr ict
maintenance work.
In support of this work
models for the release of fission
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products are being developed
involving the use of in-pile
loops. This work includes the
study of fuel coolant
interactions.
Work related to the design
of CDFR is also being carried out
to ensure that the monitor design
is adequate and that the monitors
will receive representative
sampIes of coolant with
reasonable time delays.
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Diseussion
F. Gestermann, TA:
You intend to irradiate artifieially defeeted pins ~n the FFR up to long times.
How ~s this eomparable with your automatie SCRAM level of DND? Is the level
higher than expeeted for one breaehed fuel pin after long irradiation or ean the
level be adjusted?
T.A. Lennox, UKAEA:
The SCRAM level is adjusted aeeording to the operation proposed. 1t is expeeted
that prolonged operation with failures in the failed fuel rig will be aeeeptable
sinee e.g. this rig has a strenghtened wrapper and ean be monitored by the loeation
loop. The eore ean be seanned automatieally by the loeation loop during power
operation. These faetors and the relevant safety argument will be taken into
aeeount in deeiding the SCRAM level.
A. Merkei, 1A:
To whieh amount ~s the dissolving silverseal eontributing to the radioaetive
eontamination in the sodium?
T.A. Lennox, UKAEA:
Only a few milligrams of silver are used and the dilution by the bulk sodium
is large. The Ag-IIO produetion is negligible.
D.E. Mahagin, HEDL:
What is the enduranee goal to whieh failed fuel testing is direeted?
T.A. Lennox, UKAEA:
The UKAEA wishes to keep fuel ~n the reaetor until the next seheduled shutdown.
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ABSTRACT*
Experience gained at EBR-II by the late 1970's from
a significant number of failures in experimental fuel-
pin irradiation forms the basis of a program directed
towards the characterization of breached pins. The ques-
tions to be answered and the issues raised by further
testing are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The design and manufacture of LMFBR pins have
produced a remarkably reliable product in recent years,
both in the U.S.A. and abroad. There is, however, no
absolute means of guaranteeing that cladding breaches
will not occur during the expected service lifetime of
the fuel. In recognition of this fact, most countries
have instituted development programs to characterize
the performance of breached pins and to minimize the
effects of this type oE behavior on overall reactor
operations. This paper summarizes work in America in
this area.
breached pins in core together; and this with a residual
cover-gas 1eakage of ~.2 L/min. Figure 1 shows how the
CGCS reduces gas activity after a failure.
About 3-5 Ci of long-lived cesium activity have
also been released from each and every failure. Although
no immediate problems occurred because of this activity,
by 1977'primary sodium activity was at 0350 nCi/gm, and
future problems were envisioned with frosting of the
upper internal structures of the reactor. Tests were
therefore performed and a nuclide trap developed (6) to
limit this activity buildup. It was installed upstream
of the primary cold trap in 1978. The trap reduced the
cesium activity by two orders of magnitude, and has
maintained it at that level ever since (Fig. 2).
Over 1978-80 fifteen failures per year were encoun-
tered at EBR-II: more than one might reasonably expect
in a commercial plant. And yet the major sources of pri-
mary circuit contamination--fission gas and cesium (7)--
have been very adequately controlled, and experience that
suggests there should be no insurmountable problems in
controlling contamination from breached pins in a large
LMFBR.
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Contamination Control
Other papers to this meeting (1-4) relate the con-
siderable experience obtained to date in the US on the
detection, monitoring, and identification of fuel-pin
breaches. By the same token, equivalent experience has
also come from learning to accommodate the consequences
of failures in a power-producing LMFBR. Part of that
experience derived from retrofitting EBR-II to control
the fission-gas and cesium contamination from breached
pins; part came from having to justify the safety of
continued operation with them; and part came from' try-
ing to interpret their condition from the fission-
product signals that emanated from them--particularly
delayed-neutron (DN) signals. We brief1y relate this
experience, because it bears directly on how LMFBR's
may be operated with failures; and points to the ques-
tions that must be answered by further testing.
EBR-II l~as not built to accommodate fuel-pin fail-
ures, and a small but persistent leakage of cover gas
around seals in the reactor head required shutdown
whenever agas leaker occurred. A conserted effort was
made in the mid 1970's to reduce this leakage, and to
design and construct a cover-gas cleanup system, or CGCS
(5). The CGCS was rated to deal with the continuous (and
conservatively high) release from up to 12 breached
mixed-oxide pins in-core, and to cryogenically store
their fission gas. Two factors were found after the CGCS
was operational: gas leakers do not release all of their
fission gas at once; and primary sodium acts as an ex-
cellent holdup device to reduce activity of short-lived
gas isotopes, Consequently, no problems have been encoun-
tered with fission-gas contamination with up to five
*Work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy. Fig. 1. Reduction in Activity from aLeaker in EBR-II by the CGCS
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Failure Monitoring
When breached-pin tests were first contemplated in
EBR-II there was still a lingering fear that rapid fuel-
pin failure propagation might occur as a consequence of
continuing to operate breached pins. At that time also,
the DN detector FERD was in the scram circuit of the
reactor and set to trip at twice its normal background
level.
It was argued strongly and successfully from the
benign nature of the ~50 fuel-pin failures which had
already been encountered at EBR-II; from safety apprais-
als (8); and from foreign experience (9), that rapid
propagation of failure was extremely unlikely under
normal reactor conditions. Similarly, the FERD--which
receives signals 18-20 secs. after any event in-core--
would be slower to respond than other devices, such as
reactivity feedback (10). FERD was therefore taken out
of the trip circuit and an administrative limit placed
on DN signals. This limit was first set to be the full-
power signal plus 25%. Since that time this limit has
been raised in increments. At all times test results
have been fed back to the review groups so that they
are aware of progress achieved. This cautious 'bootstrap'
approach to operating EBR-II has worked weIl.
When testing started it was also thought that DN
signals from breached pins would be by recoil only,
and that exposed fuel, therefore, might be difficult
to monitor during operations. Results from initial
tests (2) showed this to be quite untrue for ceramic
fuels. Enhancement (or k factors) one or two orders of
magnitude above recoil release have been observed from
all tests of ceramic pins to date. (Metal fuels however
appear to have a genuine recoil release of DN's, at
least on the limited data obtained in EBR-II).
Although the cause of DN signal enhancement is not
known, and will be a phenomenon for further study, it
has made easier the monitoring of failures in-reactor.
It has, for example, given same reassurance that the
degradation of breached pins is slow, not rapid. Indeed
the shape of the ON signal with time for the first nat-
urally-breached pin test in EBR-II (see Fig. 5 in refer-
ence 2) was such as to indicate that breaehed mixed-
oxide pins may beeome stable under steady reactor condi-
tions.
Fig. 3. Fuel-Sodium Reaction in a Predefected
Mixed-Oxide Fuel Pin Tested in EBR-II
Fuel-Sodium Reactions and Contamination
/0,1 mm I
Results from early thermal-reactor tests (lI), lab-'
oratory studies (12), and thermochemieal modeling (13)
all indicated that the phenomenon of fuel-sodium reac-
tion swelling (FSRS) would be the primary driving force
in the deterioration of breached pins in oxide-fueled
LMFBR's. The problem in trying to predict the conse-
quences, however, was the inability to test under oxygen
potentials of fuel and sodiumj temperature gradients
and fission-product inventory; and cladding ductilities
which were in any way typical of an aetual operating pin .
The results from the initial predefected and nat-
urally failed mixed-oxide fuel-pin tests (14) indicated
that we were generally correet in our understanding of
what governs behavior of breaehed pins. For example,
Fig. 3 shows radial seetions of one of the predefected
pins. The interaction between primary sodium and mixed-
oxide fuel appears to stop at about the 1100·C isotherm
--in agreement with theory. On the other hand, it was
found that the simple act of shutdown and restart of
the 'reactor (for an extraneous reason) was sufficient
to cause a ratchetting of the DN signal from a pin.Was
this due to mechanical interaction on restart, addi-
tional ingress of sodium and reaction, or both? Cleatly,
the behavior of breached pins, and their modeling, are
complex, and must be systematieally studied.
During these initial tests there was no indication
of fuel loss from the breached pins, either by weight
loss (not accurate), visual examination (sensitive), or
by sampling of the primary sodium (very sensitive). How-
ever, such sampling was on the cold-leg only, and thus
would not indicate if minute amounts of fuel had come
adrift and caught in the IHX, or simply settled in the
cold tank and never been detected. At least, loss of
fuel was slight enough as to pose no serious consequence
to reactor operations; a reassuring fact.
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Fig. 4. The EBR-II Breaehed-Fuel Test Faeility
The seeond special facility--the fuels performance
test faeility, or FPTF--is somewhat similar to the BFTF.
It also mates with the top end of a test subassembly and
allows its discharge to be individually monitored by a
DN deteetor in the small rotuting plug. It differs from
the BFTF in having no deposition-sampler seetion. In-
stead, it has a variable flow-valve whieh allows. during
reaetor operation, for the flow in the subassembly be-
neath it to be altered. It is also equipped with fast-
response thermoeouples, aeoustie deteetors, and flow-
meters. With this faeility, therefore. it will be pos-
sible to perform eonstant power/variable temperature.
variable power/eonstant temperature tests, and eombina-
tions thereof. It will be used in eonjunetion with pre-
defeeted pins to study in detail the eharaeteristies
of DN release from defeets. It is hoped that by using
the FPTF the temperature and power sensitivity of DN
release from defeets may be finally elueidated.
ADDITIONAL WORK
It is elear from the proeeeding diseussion that
there are three basic areas involved in a thorough under-
standing and modeling of breaehed-pin' operation: (i) the
kineties of sodium-fuel reaetion swelling--these will
govern the deterioration of breached oxide pins; (ii) the
release, transport. and deposition of eontamination from
breaehed pins--these will govern the eonsequenees of such
operation on the reaetor plant; and (iii) the eharaeter-
isties of DN release from breaehed pins--these will be
ultimately used to monitor the progression of items (i)
and (ii). and to eontrol reaetor operations. All these
aetivities must have a eommon goa~: definition of the
limits whieh must be applied to breaehed fuel operation
in LMFBR I s.
The program should proceed on two fronts: laboratory
studies and modelirig. and in-reaetor tests of breached
pins. The ex-reaetor work is m?inly foeused on developlng
a detailed. physically realistie FSRS model which ean be
used to interpret the reaetor tests, und to extrapolate
to large-plant eonditions. Such a model is required to
evaluate the potential for slow pin-pin failure propaga-
tion and bloekage formation as a eonsequence of reaetion
produet buildup. In its present form (15) the FSRS model
will prediet the rate of eladding diametral serain and
opening at the initial breaeh site in a typieal mixed-
oxide pin at nominal power. Models for axial extension/
eraeking of the primary defect, sodium ingress, and sub-
sequent axial ,transport and metastatie reaction swelling,
and fuel release from an inereasing area of exposed fuel
are eurrently under development.
A eombination of experimental und analytieal evalua-
tion is being used to derive the source term for oxide
fuel release into sodium. This information is needed to
estimate primary sodium system eontamination. Measure-
ment of the limiting solubilities of urania and plutonia
in sodium at 550-800°C (16) have been made, and ,the aim
of current experiments is to eharaeterize fuel datticu-
late formation at the oxide-sodium interface. To aecom-
plish this, the separate influenees of fuel stoiehiometry.
temperature, oxygen impurity eoneentration. and sodium
flowrate will be examined in a small-seale experimental
loop.
Additional EBR-II tests should be of at least three
types: (i) tests to identify the primary fuel/blanket
variables whieh influenee breaehed-pin performance; (ii)
tests to study pin performance and fuel loss in order to
validate FSRS models; and (iii) tests specially designed
to study DN release phenomena in breaehed pins. The first
type of test cant in general, be earried out sequentially
in open-eore positions. The seeond two types of tests are
best performed in speeial-purpose faeilities whieh may
be instrumented.
The first of these special faeilities--the breaehed
fuel test faeility, or BFTF (17) is shown sehematieally
in Fig. 4. The faeility enables the diseharge from a
test subassembly to be taken through the reaetor cover,
past thermoeouples and flowmeters to a DN deteetor in
the small rotating plug of the reaetor. Here the flow of
sodium is reversed and brought back down to the upper
plenum of the reaetor. On its upward travel part of the
sodium flow is through the wall of a eylindrieal filter,
and part of the flow over the surfaee of rings of strue-
tural material. In this way, deposition of fuel and
fission produets on hot-leg sodium surfaees may be stud-
ied. Also DN signals from a breaehed pin may be monieored
with a minimum of delay (5-10 sees.). This faeility has
been installed in EBR-II and ealibrated with a reeoil
source. and sueeessfully used onee (18). It funetions
admirably. It permits very detailed study of pin behav-
ior, DN signals, and eontamination, all at the same
time.
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SUMMARY AND COMCLUSIONS
Sporadic fuel failures will likely occur in com-
mercial LMFBR's despite a very high quality control of
fuel pins. Extensive experience gained at EBR-II from
fuel-pin endurance testing suggests that simple "gas
leakers" may be easily tolerated if systems are avail-
able to control fission-gas contamination and the
buildup of cesium activity in primary sodium. An impor-
tant quest ion thatneeds to be answered by furt her de-
velopment work is whether oxide pins with fuel exposed
to primary sodium can be tolerated for limited per iods
of operation. What limits should be placed on this
potentially efficient mode of operation? What safety
concerns may be raised by such continued operation?
Results of preliminary testing in EBR-II suggest
that breached oxide pins may only slowly deteriorate
through fuel-sodium reaction under steady reactor con-
ditions. Similar1y, they seem easy to detect by delayed
neutron monitoring, due to an enhancement of DN release
whose cause is unknown; they also appear to lose insig-
nificant amounts of fuel or fission products (other
than gas and cesium). But our experience base is lim-
ited, and many factors remain uninvestigated.
To accomp1ish further deve10pment in this area,
we have imp1emented an integrated program involving
irradiation tests (several in special in-core facili-
ties); 1aboratory simulation; and computer mode1ing
of breached fuel-pin performance. As an adjunct, work
on detection systems and definition of the consequences
of fission-product contamination of the primary circuit
is also proceeding. We intend that the culmination of
this work will be guidelines for the operation of fu-
ture L}ITBR's in the presence of fue1 failures; and the
necessary support for 1icensing such p1ants.
REFERENCES
1. F. S. Kirn, et a'l., "Fue1 Failure Monitoring
Systems in US Breeder Reactors," this meeting.
2. F. S. Kirn, et a'l., "us Experience in Identifying
Fuel-Pin Failures," ibid.
3. J.D.B. Lambert, et aL, "us Experience in Delayed-
Neutron Monitoring," ibid.
4. K. C. Gross and R. V. Strain, "Delayed-Neutron
Signal Analysis Techniques," ibid.
5. L. R. Monson, et aI., "The EBR-II Cover-Gas
Cleanup System," IAEA Symp., Design, Construction
and Operating Experience of Demonstration Liquid-
Metal Fast Breeders (1978).
6. w. H. 01sen and W. E. Ruther, Nucl. Tech., 46,
p. 318-22 (1979).
7. V. D. Kizin, et aI., "Study of Accumulation and
Distribution of Radioactivity in BOR-60 Circuit,"
HRCBR Specialist Meeting, Dimitrovgrad (1975).
8. H. 'K. Fauske, Proc. Int. Conf., Fast Reactor
Safety and Related Physics, p. 316-24 (1976).
9. IWGFR/5, Meeting of Specialists on Fue1 Failure
Mechanisms, IAEA Summary Report (1975).
10. R. M. Fryer, et aI., AML-76-94 (1977).
11. E. A. Aitken, et aI., Proc. ANS Conf., Fast
Reactor Fuel Element Technology, p. 459-78
(1971) •
12. M. G. Adamson, GEAP-12519 (1974).
13. M. G. Adamson, et aI., lAEA Panel, Behavior and
Chemical State of Irradiated Ceramic Fuels,
p. 411 (1974).
241
14. D. F. Washburn, et aI., Proc. Conf., Fast Breeder
Reactor Fuel Performance, p. 100-111 (1979).
15. R. W. Caputi, et aI., ~~id, p. 214-231 (1979).
16. R. W. Caputi and M. G. Adamson, Proc. 2nd. Int.
Conf., Liquid-Metal Technology in Energy Production,
18-62/69 (1980).
17. W. K. Lehto, et aI., Proc. Conf., Fast Reactor
Safety Techno1ogy, p. 2374-82 (1979).
18. R. P. Colburn and H. P. Maffei, TANSAO, 35,
p. 225-6 (1980).
242
Discussion
P. Michaille, CEA:
The radial temperatures you showed on the figure of a defected pin cross
section are calculated by a code or measured by any experimental method?
D.E. Mahagin, HEDL:
Calculated by a code that considers pin operating history.
P. Weimar, KfK:
For new computer Code:
Is this code able to describe nonuniform swelling of Breached Pins up to
swelling rates of e.g. 40 %?
D.E. Mahagin, HEDL:
The code only describes p~n behaviour after a breach has occurred; it appears
to yield results that are consistent with experimental data.
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~.V.Krasnoyarov,V.D.Kizin,V.V.Konyashov,A.M.Sobolev,
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Part 5
PLANNED RESEARCH !ND FURTHER DEVELORmNT OF DETECTION
METHODS
Our knowledge about the main fission product release in
the moment of and following a fuel element failure are un _
adequate. The availabie possibilities of measuring the releas-
ed activity under reactor operation pose the task to study
quantitative and qualitative regularities of fission product
release and to relate them to fission gas and delayed neutron
measurement results. Quite a number of the studied volatile
fission products of different half-lives may indicate the ex-
tent of fuel element failure and burnup.
The improvement i8 required of failed subassembly detec -
tion and localization systems and the criteria for the iden-
tification of such subassemblles. On the other band, etforts
are made to standardize all the procedures in gas and aeroBol
sampling process. This must decrease the scatter in the results
of measurements associated with intact fuel subassemblies. On
the other hand the existing failed subassembly detection system
in the BOR-GO power plant is enhanced by other in- and out-of-
pile devices for measurements veritication. The sodium fission
product contamination background signal is lower for these de-
vices. The out-of-pile system may be vacuumed and its heating
temperature may be controlled. Combined with hot cel1 examina-
tion of a portion of tuel subassemb1ies the above checks
should improve the criteria of failed tuel assemblies identi-
fication and better its reliability.
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CONOLUSION
1. Used in LMFBR's methods, instrumentation and equipment
for failed fuel subassemblies detection and localization assu-
re safe fast reactor power plants operation even in situations
when a limited number of failed fuel subassemblies are present
in the core.
2. In the reactor under operation the delayed neutron and
fission gas detection systems provide information required to
gain knowledge about the oceurrence of fuel element failure,
the moment the failure oceurs, the number of failures and the
fuel-coolant eontact surface area. This information is suffi -
eient to make approximate estimate of the primary circuit
fission product eontaminat~on using the developed caleulation
methode and fission produet release fraetions. The effieieney
of both deteetion systems i8 adequate to signal from the oeeur-
renee of a single wide-open eladding failure or some fuel ele-
ment gaseous leaks in the situation when failed fuel elements
are present in the core.
3. The method of out-of-pile failed fuel subassemblies
deteetion assures all the·failed fuel element removal from.
the core. The in-pile failed fu~l deteetion allows to main-
tain in the core no more than 0.05% of fa11ed fuel elements
and provides adequate purity of the coolant and the circuito
4. Further improvements are necessary in the informativi-
ty of the methods end the efficiency of the primary eircuit
contamination deteetion to control the defeets development,
to predict more precisely the primary eircuit fission pro-
duet eontamination, to determine the number of failed fuel
elements end assure safe reactor operation radiation situation.
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by P. Michaille
DETERf-lINATION OF THE FIELD OF EFFICIENCY OF THE
DND SYSTEr" IN CASE OF SUBASSEf1BLY ACCIDENT
--'---.-------
~ RELEASE RATES BY FUEL ~ AT VERY HIGH TEMPERATURES
~ DISPERSED BY THE PRESSURE
OF THE OCCLUDED FISSION GASES
CiWli MECHANISf1S OF TRANSPORTATION BY A DIPHASIC COOLANT
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Introduction
Within the framework of R&D acitivities on the subject of
"Failed Fuel Element Detection and Location", DEBENE 1) plan a
major number of acitivities, which constitute the direct extension
of work performed so far and must be classified under the two
main headings of safety and availability of LMFBR~s. Of course,
it is not always possible to make separate direct assignments
either to aspects of safety or those of availability; in most
cases, close connections exist to both topics. The projects out-
lined below are partiy directly associated with the KNK 11 or
SNR-300 facilities, partly they are applicable to fast breeder
development in general.
Roughly half of the activities are being carried out jointiy
with foreign partners under various agreements for cooperation,
such cooperation is always mentioned specifically.
1. Reactor Instrumentation
Xe-t35 249,8keV
In Session I, the on-line gamma spectrometer installed 'in KNK 11
has been described. As mentioned on that occasion, the spectro-
meter furnishes both gamma spectra and calculated radioactiVity
concentrations of individual fission products, from which it
compiles daily and weekly plots, respectively; see Fig. 1a and b.
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Fig. 1a: Gamma spectrum
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Fig. 1b: Weekly plot of Xe-135
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Both plots, and also the computer printout referred to in the
above paper, are not yet regarded as the optimum of what is pos-
sible. For a?sessments of fault propagation it is not only the
daily and weekly plots of individual nuclides and the instantaneous
pictures of the fission product spectra, but especially their
variation as a function of time plotted in a three-dimensional
representation, which is deemed to be very helpful. The abscissa
in that representation is either the half-life, t 1/ 2 , or the
decay constant, A; the ordinate is either the radioactivity con-
centration, A, or the release-to-birth ratio, (R/B). A parameter
to be included is time, Fig. 2, for which random values are indi-
cated (Fictitious values). The plot of R/B as a function of A is
the most sophisticated, but also the most elegant solution and,
at the same time, would permit information to be obtained about
the mechanism of fission product escape, i.e., recoil, diffusion
and others.
Fig 2.: Plot of the variation as a function of time of the fission
product spectrum. For explanations, see text 1.
It is a weIl known fact that the localization of defective fuel
rods has not yet been solved satisfactorily. For this reason, a
novel detector for beta-radiation has been proposed. That detector
could be installed at the fuel element outlet and could detect in
particular the high energy beta-particles of the very shortlived
fission products. The working principle of the detector is based on
the passage of fission products beta-particles through the detector
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housing to the collector and measurement of the resultant
equalizing current, Fig. 3.
Estimates carried out so far have indicated a·sensitivity of
approx. 10-10A for 1 cm 2 of free fuel area (= recoil area) for
adetector of L = 10 cm length and D = 3 cm diameter. Spurious
effects caused by Na-24, gamma and neutron radiations could be
elimina ted.
The DN-monitors used so far have relatively large dimensions
because of the necessary shielding against gamma radiation,
thermal insulation and moderator. Although this kind of shielding
against core neutrons is indispensable, a study is intended to
show that detectors less sensitive to temperature and gamma radiation
allow smaller DN-monitors to be built. However, neutron sensitivity
is not to be reduced too much compared wi th the present type of
monitors.
2. Operation of LMFBR's
In Session 11, the flux tiltirtg measurements in KNK 11 were mentio-
ned in the DEBENE presentation,especially in Fig. 14 of the presen-
tation by H. Richard et al. In the course of those flux tilting
measurements, changed statistical variations of the DN count rate
were found when moving absorber rods at certain rod positions.
Additional studies are to indicate the way in which the height
of the lower absorber rod edge correlates with the axial position
of a fault in a fuel element. This may lead to a possibility of
three dimensional localization of the fault.
On the same subject, the current post-irradiation examinations of
the first defective KNK 11 fuel element and the post-irradiation-
examinations to be started in a few weeks of the second defective
KNK 11 fuel element should be mentioned ..These post irradiation
examinations serve the following main objectives with respect to
detection and localization of faulty fuel rods:
- geometrie position of fault
- size of fault
- typ e 0 f faul t
- presence or absence of secondary cracks
- correlation between size of fault and DND-signal.
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3. In-pile Experiments
Several experiments with open fuel sampIes are planned in KNK 11.
A first series of four experiments will begin with only one fuel
pellet and .an artificial fault of 1 mm 2 , terminating with 12 pel-
lets and several artificial faults of a total of 80 mm 2 .
The need to obtain official ·1.ieen"SBs for this series of experiments
was the reason for starting the tests at the very low fuel inven-
tory of only one pellet. As the inventory increases and the leakage
areas grow, it will be demonstrated that the risk to reactor opera-
tion brought about by those experiments is negligibly small.
Here are the real objectives of these experiments:
- Generalstudies of fuel rod behaviour
- Fission product releases
- Fuel 1055
- Formation of Na 3M0 4
- Fission product transport
Detection of fission products by means of DND and in the cover gas
- Measurements of sodium transit times and response times of
measuringchains
Correlation of leak size with the measured fission product signals
- Verification of computer codes.
According to the present timetable, the first experiment of this
type is to be.started in July 1981. After completion of the first
series of experiments, measurements are to be performed on uranium
metal to calibrate the DND monitors.
The first three Mol 7C-experiments. on studies of disturbances of
coolant flow in a 37-rod bundle have been conducted successfully
with SCK-CEN Mol, Belgium; see Session 111 and [-1, 2_7. As in
those earlier experiments, the Mol 7C/4 and Mol 7C/5 experiments
presently in preparation and planned for 1982 will use fuel with
medium burnup for extensive measurements of delayed neutrons. The
modification of the loop design due to burnup also requires a greatly
changed DND-monitor.
The successful cooperation carried out so far between the Toshiba
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Company of Tokyo and the Institute of Reactor Development of
the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center will be continued. In the
next few years, the FPL fission product loop of Toshiba in the
TTR (Toshiba Test Reactor) will be used for extensive DND parameter
studies about the behaviour of DN precursors in sodium. Moreover,
releases of DN precursors from a fuel pebble bed to be considered
as a blockage are to be studied.
The series of experiments on defective fuel rods conducted in the
SILOE reactor in Grenoble jointly by the CEA, France, and KfK,
Germany, is to be continued. Also in the future especially those
faults will be simulated which have been found to be not yet entirely
avoidable in practice, i.e., in reactor operation. In addition to
be continuous improvement of methods of detection of fuel rod
defects, it is especially the permissible length of reactor operation
with a defective fuel rod which is to be determined. Because of the
potential plutonium contamination of reactor systems, the loss of
fuel from a defective rod is in the foreground of studies.
4. Models and Codes
The quantitative interpretation of DND-signals is still highly
problematic. The following points will be given special attention
in the future:
- k-factors, their dependence on fuel structure, burnup and leak
size
- Temperature dependence of fission product emission
- Influence of open porosity
The Mol 7C experiments have shown that open porosity represents
a very important parameter influencing signal generation. The poro-
sities involved may be either open pores in the narrower sense of
the term (according to definition) or continuous inner surfaces
resulting from thermal overloading. Measurements of open porosities
are planned after the experiments within the framework of post-
irradiation examinations.
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For theoretical treatment of the DND-signals, the computer code
referred to in Session IV is to be expanded further. New theore-
tical and experimental findings are to be used for this purpose,
as is shown in Table 1. In a second step, the gas signals are to
treated.
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FI CT ION Code
Fission Produet Signal Caleulation
Bi rth rat"es Basis: ORIGEN
•I.:mpi rieal migration values of fission p rOlluc t s
--
in mixed oxide fuel
,
IOpen porosity I
•
I.:mpirieal release values of fission products
through the surfaee of the fuel
+
Free fuel surfaee in contaet wi th the sodium
as a funetion of time = f(t)
9 •
2.D::.gen eoncentration Fuel 1055
------
in the sodium and the
fue 1
•
lhickness of :ia 3M0 4 Concentration of fuel
f(t) in sodium = f(t)=
+ +
DI'D signal = f(t)
later: cover gas signals = f(t)
k- faetor = f(t)
Shutdown criteria )1
Reaetor instrumentation criteria)1
Reeommendations to reaetor operation) 1
)1 Not part of the code, but applicHtion
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Discussion
C. Berlin, CEA:
What 1S the size of the ß-detector?
S. Jacobi, KfK:
Proceeding from the design of the measurement equipments at the outlet of the
subassemblies of SNR 300 for the thermocouples and for the flow meter which
is now canceled I decided an outer diameter of 30 mm and a length of 100 mm.
But these dimensions are changeable according to the requirements of the
reactor observing that the sensitivity of the detector is proportional to
its surface.
L. Leenders, S.C.K./C.E.N.:
Concerns: parasitic ß-contributions in the ß-detector
Question: How do you take the ß-activation of the detector itself and of its
cladding tube into account?
S. Jacobi, KfK:
In contrast to the self powered neutron detectors I have the advantage that both
electrodes that means the collector and the cladding tube are composed of the
same material. So in case of the same size of surfaces of the collector and the
cladding tube aperfeet eompensation exists for the beta eurrent from the
eolleetor to the eladding tube and from the eladding tube to the eolleetor.
If the very small dirfrrenees of the sizes of these both eleetrodes must be
taken into aeeount it is possible to eompensate this by small grooves on the
surfaee of the eolleetor.
C. Berlin, CEA:
Have you any results about tests 1n the laboratory of the ß-deteetor?
S. Jaeobi, KfK:
Simulating the be~as of the fission produets by a souree of P-32 I used different
kinds of material and different sizes of the deteetor. Using the measured eurrent
of eleetrons to ealeulate the souree strength a suffieient eonformity was obtained
in eomparison to the souree strength ealeulated by the irradiation eonditions pro-
dueing the source.
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C. Berlin, CEA:
Where the ß-detector will be localized in the Mol 7C loop?
S. Jacobi, KfK:
Inside the test train downstream of the bundle with a transit time of the
sodium of about 1 to 1,5 s.
A. Merkel, IA:
Question due to the ß-detector situated at subassembly outlet: How do you
eliminate the Na24- and the Ne23- influence?
S. Jacobi, KfK:
- Na 24 is eliminated by wall thickness of the detector.
- Ne 23 is not eliminated. Ne 23-concentration in the sodium ~s expected to be
low enough to classify it as a background effect by which operation of the
detector can be tested.
In addition, the Ne 23-level may be used as a neutron flux monitoring signal
to measure the power of the subassembly, but this is in the future.
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ffiOGRAMME FOR DEVEWIMENT OF FAILED FUEL ELEMENT
DETECTlON AND IDCATION SYSTEMS FOR INDIAN FAST REACTORS
D.B. Sangodkar
REACTOR RESEARCH CENTRE
KALPAKKAM, INDIA.
1. Introduction
Indian fast reactor programme began with the start of
construction of Fast Breeder Test Reactor at Kalpakkam.
'Ibis reactor is in an advanced st88e of construction. 'Ibe
instrumentation for failed fuel element detection and loca-
lisation in FBTR has been described in an earlier preeentation
at this Meeting. It is recognised that the instrumentation
of FBTR, particularly that for localisation of failed fuel
will not be adequate for a large power generating IMFBR.
From considerations of resolution and speed, d.n. monitoring
of individual coolant channel samples appears promising and
hence this technique is chosen for developnent as a syst_
for localisation of failed fuel in future Indian fast
rea.ctors. 'Ibe programme planned to develop euch a system
for FBR-5OO, a 500 MW(e) IMFBR, to be set up in India in the
next decade ie described in this preeentation.
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2. Future Programme
2.1 Programme for FBTR.
2.1.1 OOmmiesioning of instrumentation grsteme
One of the taske to be pursued in the immediate future is
that of commissioning and calibration of FBTR systems. Pre-
commissioning tests are proposed to be restricted to souree-
checks on both the DND and GFPD systems. 1\1e mD system will
be checked both before and after filling of sodium by a
6
neutronsource of etrength 10 n/sec. 1\1e gas-flow ion
chamber of the GFPD system will be cheeked with a gamma
souree of 5 millicurie placed extern&! to the deteetor.
Its sensitivity for radioactive gas flowing through it will
be checked in the beginning of power operation of FBTR by
measurement of the 41 Ar + 23Ne background in the cover gas
by an independent laboratory measurement of the activity
of a cover gas sample.
2.1.2 Calibration
'lbe calibration of both these systems will be done by
introdueing a bare uranium rod in the core.
2.1.3 Exi!rimentation of additional gyetems
Gas-tagging which can be incorporated with relative ease in
emall as well ae large fast reactors was eonsidered for FBTR.
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n>.e void space in FBTR fuel pin was fotmd to be too emaIl
to permit about one cm~ of gastag without affecting its
linear rating. However, it i8 possible to tag the
experimental fuel assemblies which will have much larger
void space. It is difficult to justify the enormous
expenaiture on the gastags and related detection equipment
for this limited purpose. We are now considering the use
of solid radio-active tracers such as 226 Ra and 228'Ih in the
experimental fuel pins with a view to detecting their
gaseous daushter products, Radon and Thoron, in the
Cover gase Since the choice of the tracers is restricted,
this eystem is proposed to be ueed in combination with the
gamma-chromatograph so that the age of the failed fuel
element and the simultaneous detection of the tracer will
together permit localisation of a failed experimental
assembly with enhancedprecision.
2.2 Programme for FBR-SOO
In the,next phase of fast reactor programme in India,
construction of FBR-500, a 500 I>1W(e) IJ.W'BR, is planned...
While the design of the reactor is still in the conceptual
stage, emphasis is being laid on the research and development
needed to support the design and construction of the reactor.
Included in this R& D programme is the developnent of a
system for identification and localisation of failed fuel
elements. Based on published literature and our own
theoretical assessment, it has been decided to pursue
developnent of a system based on d.n. monitoring of sodium
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sarnpled from individual coolant channele. From considerations
of resolution and speed of localisation, this system appears
to be the most promising for this application. 'rhe
experience from Fhenix end PFR is also reported to be good.
The main disadvantages of the system are the need for
L.'1tervention into the reactor vessel and for continued
operation of the reactor albeit at lower power for identifying
the failed element.
Theoretical assessment of the sensitivity of such a
system indicates that it is adequate for FBR-500.
Development programme already planned in this field
includes development of a selector valve for sodium samplingo
}~draulic performance of a prototype valve will be tested
in water and in sodium at different temperatures. Apart
from reliability which is of prime importance, other factors
such as dilution of sampled sodium by bulk sodium, cross-
contamination of adjacent channels at the level of selector
valve and transit time which have a bearing on the sensitivity
and selectivity of the system are planned to be studied.
3. Conclusions
Indian programme in the field of failed fuel element detection
and localisationis aimed at augmenting the instr~lentation of
FBTR for localisation end developnent of a d.n .monitoring system
of localisation for future large fast reactors.
i
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Discussion
C. Berlin, CEA:
Will the FBR-SOO be a pool or a loop reactor?
D.B. Sangodkar, RRCK:
FBR-SOO will be a pool reactor.
S. J acobi, KfK:
Sorry that I did not understand clear enough the "disadvantages of the system"
mentioned in your presentation.
D.B. Sangodkar, RRCK:
One disadvantage is that the sampling equipment including selector valve, pump
etc. have to be inside the reactor vessel which calls for their qualification for
operation ~n a hostile environment. Another disadvantage is of course, that
the reactor has to be operated for localisation. A problem may arise when the
reactor cannot be started in the case of a large DND signal implying a large
defect.
